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ABSTRACT 
 
PRESIDENTS, THE STATE AND “DEMOCRACY” IN TURKEY 
THE IDEAS AND PRAXIS OF SÜLEYMAN DEMĐREL 
 
Çağlıyan Đçener, Zeyneb 
Ph.D., Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper 
 
February 2010 
 
 
This study aims to analyze the “statist” role that a president in the Turkish 
parliamentary system may play in maintaining a viable democracy, drawing on 
Giovanni Sartori’s bidimensional democracy theory and Alan Siaroff’s 
classification based on assessments of the nature of presidents. This study firstly 
discusses how under certain circumstances presidents come to have more powers 
in Turkey. It is argued that with the 1982 Constitution the president may assume a 
“corrective” role, despite lacking the legitimacy of popular elections, through 
benefiting from the vagueness of Article 104 of the Constitution. Unlike 
counterparts in some other parliamentary systems, the president in Turkey is not a 
symbolic and passive political actor but enjoys extensive powers. Focusing on the 
presidential term of Süleyman Demirel, this study secondly discusses how the 
president’s interpretations of his power and the way he puts this into practice may 
have had an impact on the maintenance of a viable democracy. The study suggests 
that Demirel developed a political line that prioritizes the effective functioning of 
the state, which he sees as indispensable for democracy. This explains the 
incentive behind Demirel’s active role as the president in protecting the political 
fabric of the state, which for him is directly linked with preserving the democratic 
nature of the regime. Despite coming from the circles of political elites, Demirel 
was able to set up a dialogue with the state elites when he was president, and thus 
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was moderately successful in achieving a balance in the chronically troubled 
relationship between the state elites and the political elites.  
 
Keywords: President, state, democracy, Turkey, Demirel, state elites, political 
elites 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKĐYE’DE CUMHURBAŞKANLARI, DEVLET VE “DEMOKRASĐ” 
SÜLEYMAN DEMĐREL’ĐN DÜŞÜNCELERĐ VE ĐCRAATI 
 
Çağlıyan Đçener, Zeyneb 
Ph.D., Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper 
 
Şubat 2010 
 
 
Bu çalışma, Giovanni Sartori’nin iki boyutlu demokrasi teorisinden ve Alan 
Siaroff’un cumhurbaşkanlarının yetkilerini temel alan sınıflandırmasından 
yararlanarak Türk parlamenter sisteminde cumhurbaşkanının işler bir demokrasi 
kurma sürecinde oynayabileceği “devleti merkeze alan rol”ünü analiz etmeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma ilkin Türkiye’de cumhurbaşkanlarının belirli koşullarda 
nasıl daha fazla yetkiye sahip duruma geldiğini tartışmaktadır. 1982 Anayasası ile 
cumhurbaşkanının, halk tarafından seçilmediği ve dolayısıyla seçilme kaynaklı bir 
meşruiyetten yoksun olduğu halde, Anayasanın 104. maddesinin müphem 
çerçevesinden istifade ederek “düzeltici” bir rol üstlenebileceğini ileri 
sürmektedir. Başka bazı parlamenter sistemlerdeki mevkidaşlarından farklı olarak 
Türkiye’de cumhurbaşkanı, sembolik ve pasif bir siyasi aktör olmanın aksine 
geniş yetkilere sahiptir. Süleyman Demirel’in cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemine 
odaklanan bu çalışma ikinci olarak cumhurbaşkanının yetkilerini yorumlayışının 
ve bunu pratiğe aktarışının işler bir demokrasiyi kurma sürecine nasıl bir etki 
yapabileceğini tartışmaktadır. Çalışma, Demirel’in demokrasinin vazgeçilmezi 
olarak gördüğü işleyen devlet kavramına öncelik veren bir siyasi üslup 
geliştirdiğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu durum, Demirel’in cumhurbaşkanı olarak 
devletin siyasi dokusunu koruma hususunda –ki Demirel’de rejimin demokratik 
yapısını muhafaza etmekle doğrudan ilişkilidir- oynadığı aktif rolün arkasında 
 vi 
yatan sebebi açıklamaktadır. Siyasi seçkinlerin arasından geliyor olmasına karşın 
Demirel cumhurbaşkanlığı süresince devlet seçkinleriyle diyalog kurabilmiş ve bu 
sayede her zaman problemli bir çizgide seyreden devlet seçkinleri-siyasi seçkinler 
ilişkisine denge getirmeyi kısmen başarabilmiştir.  
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Cumhurbaşkanı, devlet, demokrasi, Türkiye, Demirel, devlet 
seçkinleri, siyasi seçkinler 
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CHAPTER I  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
President in Turkish political system is one of the significant actors even though 
there is a general tendency to regard the office as a politically neutral arbiter. The 
emphasis on impartiality of the president however has undergone a considerable 
change in the recent years especially since 2002. Holding extensive powers that 
are delegated by the 1982 Constitution, the president in Turkey has become an 
active major figure rather than a symbolic one as it is normally expected in 
parliamentary systems. The office has become a focal point in a period when the 
clash between the state elites and the political elites was intensified. A debate on 
who should not be president during the 2007 presidential elections is quite 
interesting to observe that clash. Hence, the motive behind writing this essay is 
the necessity to reassess the status and role of the president particularly with 
regard to his/her position in the clash between the state elites and the political 
elites. Indeed this has important implications for the maintenance of a viable 
democracy, 
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The presidency in Turkey is mostly analyzed as part of the studies evaluating the 
parliamentary system in Turkey or its possible shift to presidential or semi-
presidential systems and its impacts. Majority of studies focus on the status of the 
president within this context from the perspective of constitutional law. Ergun 
Özbudun1, Serap Yazıcı2, Şule Özsoy3 and Kemal Gözler4 are among the scholars 
analyzing the presidency from this perspective. There are also studies examining 
the history of presidential elections and the tensions mounted during the election 
periods.5 Additonally, the impacts of the change in the constitutional status of the 
president on the political sphere attracted academic interest for research. Within a 
similar context, another important group of studies concentrating on specific 
presidential terms has provided useful insights about the political significance of 
the presidency vis-à-vis certain Turkish presidents. The works of Metin Heper6, 
Clement H. Dodd7, and Metin Heper and Menderes Çınar8 are among those that 
have posited the necessity of examining the political importance of the presidency 
in Turkey. All of these aforementioned studies have been inspiration for the 
present essay and provided a background for it. Relying on these studies, this essay 
                                                
1 Ergun Özbudun, ‘The Status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 
1982: Presidentialism or Parliamentarism?’, in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 
1980s, Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988). 
2 Serap Yazıcı, Başkanlık ve Yarı-Başkanlık Sistemleri: Türkiye için Bir Değerlendirme (Istanbul: 
Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002). 
3 Şule Özsoy, Başkanlı Parlamenter Sistem: Cumhurbaşkanının Halk Tarafından Seçildiği 
Parlamenter Hükümet Modeli ve Türkiye için Tavsiye Edilebilirliği (Istanbul: On Đki Levha 
Yayıncılık, 2009). 
4 Kemal Gözler, Cumhurbaşkanı Hükümet Çatışması (Bursa: Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000). 
5 Hikmet Özdemir, Devlet Krizi: TC Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimleri (Istanbul: AFA Yayınları, 1989); 
Hikmet Özdemir, Atatürk’ten Günümüze Cumhurbaşkanı Seçimleri (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 
2007). 
6 Metin Heper, “The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982-1989,” Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy and Administration 3, 3 (July 1990): pp. 299-319; Metin Heper, 
‘Turgut Özal’s Presidency: Crisis and the Glimmerings of Consensus’, in Politics in the Third 
Turkish Republic, Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. (Oxford: Boulder, 1994). 
7 Clement H. Dodd, ‘Kenan Evren as President: From Conflict to Compromise’, in Politics in the 
Third Turkish Republic, Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. (Oxford: Boulder, 1994). 
8 Metin Heper and Menderes Çınar, ‘Parliamentary Government with a Strong President: The 
Post-1989 Turkish Experience’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 111 (Fall 1996). 
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aims to cover a relatively neglected topic in the literature which is examining the 
role of president with more than usual powers in the development and maintenance 
of a consolidated democracy in Turkey. 
 
 
1.1. Aims and Methodology    
 
This essay concentrates on two questions: (a) How does the president come to 
have more powers in Turkey under certain circumstances? (b) How does the 
president’s reading of his constitutional powers influence the actual situation and, 
in turn, the overall process with regard to the maintenance of a viable democracy? 
In order to answer these two questions the essay is divided into two parts, namely 
“Mapping the Turkish Parliamentary System and the President in the Discussion 
on Classifying Democratic Regime Types” and “President Demirel, the State and 
Democracy.” As mentioned the essay focuses on a specific period (1993-2000) 
that Demirel assumed the post of presidency. Without disregarding the effects of 
the context, first the way Demirel conceptualizes state in his political discourse is 
examined and then its reflections on his presidential style particularly with regard 
to democracy is analyzed. For the purpose of framing Demirel’s 
conceptualizations of state and state-democracy interactions, it is necessary to use 
predominantly the primary sources. Here the aim is not to make a pro-Demirel 
reading. This essay is not interested in how Demirel is perceived. Rather the 
endeavor is to frame his views on state. To achieve this aim, two interviews were 
conducted with Demirel. Additionally Çankaya yearbooks which include detailed 
information on his daily schedule during his presidential term, presidential 
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speeches, press releases and statements, interviews, and the biographies based on 
the interviews conducted with Demirel are used. While analysing these, this essay 
does not intend to make judgmental comments on Demirel’s state understanding 
either being as true or false. What is important for the purpose of the essay is to 
concentrate on analyzing the reflections of Demirel’s state conceptualization on 
his practices as president and in a wider picture their positive or negative impacts 
over building up a viable democracy in Turkey.  
 
Although the essay focuses on Demirel’s presidency as the case, to better frame 
the concept of state in Demirel’s understanding, it is essential to look at the 
origins of the concept of state and its development in Demirel’s thinking starting 
from his early years in politics. Thus, pre-presidential term of Demirel is also 
examined in two separate chapters, one is designed to provide background 
information on his political origins and the other to examine his ideas and praxis 
as a political party leader. In this framework, important political events and 
Demirel’s relations with other major political actors are mentioned referring to 
secondary sources such as the memoirs of Demirel’s contemporaries, not only his 
colleagues and close associates but also his political opponents and rivals as well.9 
Besides prominent studies analyzing the era of AP under Demirel are of benefit to 
the purpose of the essay.10 Keeping in mind that autobiographies, hagiographies 
and memoirs may have the shortcoming of telling the story from a one sided and 
                                                
9 Đhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Anılarım (Istanbul: Yılmaz Yayınları, 1990); Deniz Bölükbaşı, Türk 
Siyasetinde Anadolu Fırtınası Osman Bölükbaşı (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ., 2005); Sadettin 
Bilgiç, Hatıralarım, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Akasya Kitap, 2007); Kâmran Đnan, Senatör, 2nd ed. 
(Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2007); Sedat Akay, 12 Eylül Darbe Yıllarında Bir Kurucu Üyenin 
Anılarından Bir Partinin Kuruluşu: DYP ve Kurucular Albümü (Ankara: Prestij Matbaacılık, 
2008); Ferruh Bozbeyli, Interview by Đhsan Dağı and Fatih Uğur, Yalnız Demokrat: Ferruh 
Bozbeyli Kitabı (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009). 
10 Ümit Cizre, AP-Ordu Đlişkileri: Bir Đkilemin Anatomisi, 2nd ed.  (Istanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 
2002); Tanel Demirel, Adalet Partisi Đdeoloji ve Politika (Istanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2004). 
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subjective perspective, the statements and anecdotes narrated in different sources 
are cross-checked to lean more on the shared memories. 
 
 
1.2. Why Demirel’s Presidential Term? 
 
It was in the 1990s that Turkey has begun to experience the outcomes of the great 
transformations triggered in the second half of the 1980s. Additionally the 
struggle to be a more democratic country gained momentum in the 1990s. So did 
the resistance to change and reforms related with democratization by the 
defenders of the status quo. Thus it is apt to study the role of the president in such 
a strained atmosphere of change and persistence of defending the status quo. In 
this context, Demirel’s presidential term has been a controversial period and focus 
of analysis. Some argue that in such a turning point for the country Demirel as a 
president allied himself with the state elites and behaved in a way quite contrary 
to his previous political line. For some others, on the other hand, Demirel behaved 
in a responsible manner about state matters and fulfilled what his post requires. It 
is a shared assumption of both sides that Demirel’s presidential term marked a 
significant shift in his political line. Elaborating on Demirel’s state and democracy 
understanding this essay aims to examine the position of president Demirel with 
regard to the ongoing clash between the state elites and the political elites and 
hence to reveal his impact (either positive or negative) on building up a viable 
democracy. Thus firstly the framework of Demirel’s state understanding and its 
link with democracy is drawn and secondly how this framework was put into 
practice during Demirel’s presidential term is analyzed. However, it should be 
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noted that it is beyond the scope of this essay to make judgmental remarks on to 
what extent Demirel is a genuine democrat or not.  
 
 
1.3. Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
The main focus of this essay is to answer two key questions mentioned above. 
Regarding the first one, which makes us to examine the factors empowering the 
president in a parliamentary system, Alan Siaroff’s classification is chosen as a 
framework. The reason to choose his classification is not that it offers a complete 
and perfect model. In actual fact, it leaves significant gaps that could be filled 
with the findings of this essay. Siaroff’s study is not the first of its kind that seeks 
alternative to the classification of regime types into parliamentarism, semi-
presidentialism, and presidentialism. There are other studies that contribute to the 
literature on the insufficiency of Duverger’s semi-presidentialism as a third 
separate category. Some of them are of the opinion that this triple classification 
should be preserved, but the conceptual framework of semi-presidentialism or its 
defining characteristics should be redefined and reframed.11 The argument here is 
that semi-presidentialism is case-specific as it is formulated by Duverger based on 
French experience. Thus, semipresidentialism in Duverger’s definition cannot 
cover the other countries as a separate category. Some others favor developing in-
                                                
11 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, 
Incentives and Outcomes (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994); Horst Bahro, Bernhard H. Bayerlein 
and Ernst Veser, “Duverger’s Concept: Semi-presidential Government Revisited,” European 
Journal of Political Research 34, 2 (1998): pp. 201-224; Robert Elgie, “The Politics of Semi-
Presidentialism” in Semi-presidentialism in Europe, ed. Robert Elgie (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999): pp. 1-21; Nur Uluşahin, Saf Hükümet Sistemleri Karşısında Đki Başlı Yürütme 
Yapılanması (Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları, 2007); Robert Elgie, “Duverger, Semi-Presidentialism 
and the Supposed French Archetype,” West European Politics 32, 2 (March 2009): pp. 248-267. 
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between categories to capture the varation within semi-presidential systems.12 
Siaroff is among the latter group. As his analysis is based on president it overlaps 
with the focus of this essay. Siaroff argues that semi-presidentialism is not 
sufficient to fully embrace the variety of subtypes and instead of it he formulates 
dispositional categories (parliamentary systems with presidential dominance, 
parliamentary systems with a presidential corrective, parliamentary systems with 
figurehead presidents). His classification offers a useful tool for this study. 
However, it is not fully adequate to explain the Turkish case. This essay will 
identify and address the gaps in Siaroff’s analysis concerning Turkey. 
 
To answer the second question that this essay concentrates on, Giovanni Sartori’s 
analysis on how a democracy would be viable will be used. It will offer us a 
means to identify the role of president that s/he may play in achieving a 
compromise between the state elites and political elites. Sartori argues that for 
democracy to flourish there should be a balance between different groups’ 
interests and the long-term interests of the community.13 This is pertinent to the 
interactions between the state elites and the political elites in the Turkish context 
since there has been an ongoing clash between the two over how general interest 
is perceived by them and how they think it is perceived by the other elite group. 
This clash in Turkey has relevance not only in the sense that it has important 
                                                
12 Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and 
Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Robert Elgie, “A Fresh Look 
at Semi-presidentialism. Varieties on a Theme,” Journal of Democracy 16, 3 (2005): pp. 98-112. 
13 See Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Part 2: The Classical Issues 
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987). Sartori uses the concepts of “group interests” and “long-
term interests” within the context of political domain. However, it is claimed that in the Turkish 
case these concepts are generally used at the expense of civilian politics. In fact, those who claim 
that have a point. Concepts such as the “supreme interests of the country” and “national interests” 
are used from time to time to justify the military interventions and to establish a tutelary regime.  
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implications regarding the flourishing of democracy, but also for shaping the 
nature of the role a president may perform. 
 
In this essay the “statist” role is proposed as a particular role that might be 
assumed by a president depending on the conditions of the context. It refers to 
giving a high priority to the matters of state. In this vein emphasizing political 
stability and the smooth functioning of state with a strong commitment to the 
constitutional order is closely related to the “statist” role. Considering it within the 
framework of the 1982 Constitution, this role is about being an overseer who 
should pay attention to safeguarding the state. That said the “statist” role has also 
a constructive dimension. This dimension is given an important place within the 
scope of this study aiming to examine the stance of the president in the clash 
between the state elites and the political elites. The president could act as a 
mediating force to reduce the conflict between the two which might clear the way 
towards a viable democracy. At this point it should be highlighted that to play a 
statist role the president should engage with the positions of neither the state elites 
nor the political elites. This is essential for the president to be able to mediate 
between the two in order to contribute to the establishment of a viable democracy.  
 
To critically scrutinize the “statist” role of presidents in the Turkish parliamentary 
system vis-à-vis the consolidation of democracy, Sartorian distinction between 
vertical and horizontal democracy makes sense in analyzing Demirel as president. 
The horizontal dimension in his argument is directly linked to public opinion and 
electoral democracy. The key concept for horizontal implementation and diffusion 
of democracy is political participation. The vertical dimension is linked to the 
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issues of public interest, governing and being ruled and the key concept is 
political responsibility. Sartori underlines the significance of state in preserving 
and promoting the general interest in his conceptualization of vertical structuring 
of democracy as a system of government.  
 
To present an articulate conceptualization of state in Demirel’s thinking, all the 
statements of Demirel have been classified according to the categorization of the 
advocates of “bringing the state back in.”14 Drawing on their classification, 
Demirel’s views on state, democracy and the relationship between the two are 
handled under four main categories in Chapter V: law and order, modernization 
and development, socio-economic issues, and international relations. These are 
useful to identify the functions of the state according to Demirel. The difficulty 
encountered in delineating the gist of Demirel’s viewpoints on state from huge 
number of materials has been overcome by the help of “bringing the state back in” 
theorists’ classifications.  
 
 
1.4. Organization of the Study 
 
Part I of the present essay looks at the Turkish parliamentary system and the 
President in relation to classifying democratic regime types. In doing so, the first 
section of Chapter II critically examines the classification of political regimes with 
                                                
14 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol are the scholars who criticize the 
mainstream comparative studies as being society-centered and instead offer a state-centered 
approach. The name of their influential study is Bringing the State Back in. That is why here they 
are referred to as the advocates of bringing the state back in. See Peter B. Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds.  Bringing the State Back In, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). 
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references to the works of the leading scholars in the field. It looks at the debate in 
the literature on traditional dichotomous classification – presidential and 
parliamentary systems – and triple classification – presidential, semi-presidential 
and parliamentary systems – and the challenges to the both as they are claimed 
insufficient to cover varied practices. The key point this study aims to address in 
this section is how the status and role of president as well as measuring 
presidential powers are mentioned in these classifications. Siaroff’s analysis is 
worth being elaborated in detail since his twofold study – presenting dispositional 
categories of political regimes and formulating subtypes within these categories 
through an assessment of presidential power– establishes a useful means to 
examine the Turkish system focusing on presidential powers. 
 
The subsequent section of Chapter II evaluates the status and role of presidents in 
the Turkish political system. To understand the significance of presidency in the 
Republic, it is crucial to discuss the issue within a historical continuum. Hence the 
first subsection traces back the tradition of parliamentarism to the early Republican 
days. In a similar vein, the origins of the concept of national sovereignty are 
examined to better evaluate the way the office of president has been (re)shaped 
over decades. For that purpose, the assembly debates on constitutional proposals 
on the status and powers of president are analyzed, and the changes made in the 
status and powers of the president with the adoption of different constitutions are 
explored. The second subsection looks at the institutionalization process of the 
presidency from the establishment era to the more mature decades of the regime by 
focusing on varied practices on the one hand, and on the other, the role given to the 
office by the state elites. Since it is the clash between the state elites and political 
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elites that has had impact on electing the would-be president in Turkey, the 
relationship between these two groups is assessed with respect to the concept of a 
viable democracy drawn by Sartori’s arguments on the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions of democracy.  
 
Following the general overview on the political regime classifications and the 
office of president in Turkey, Part II analyzes Süleyman Demirel’s presidential 
term concentrating basically on his views on state and democracy, and his praxis 
in line with these views. In Chapter III his background and the evolution of his 
political career, personal characteristics, and views on the concept of politics are 
summarized. The context in which Demirel’s ideas on state and democracy was 
originated is also examined in this chapter. Chapter IV, having two sections, gives 
information on Demirel’s active political life. These sections are not written just 
to give mere details about political history. Actually they serve to assess the 
continuities within Demirel’s discourse on state. The first section evaluates 
Demirel’s years as the leader of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi –AP) and has 
three subsections. The first one looks at the state-society relations and the 
conceptualizations of “national will” and democracy in the AP era. Demirel’s 
relations with the military and the then presidents (Cemal Gürsel, Cevdet Sunay, 
and Fahri Korutürk) are the subject matter of the two consecutive subsections. 
The second section, dealing with Demirel as the leader of the True Path Party 
(Doğru Yol Partisi –DYP), is structured like the preceding section to look at same 
parameters –namely, views on state and democracy, relations with the military, 
and relations with the then presidents (Kenan Evren and Turgut Özal). Portraying 
Demirel’s presidential term without these detailed analyses of his early years 
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would not offer a complete picture because how he conceptualizes state and 
democracy and perceives the role of president with regard to these two concepts 
are rooted in those years. 
 
The fifth and sixth chapters deal with the fulcrum point of the essay: the 
presidential term of Demirel. The analysis is centered around the concepts of state 
and democracy, each of which is taken up in two separate chapters. Chapter V 
aims to reveal Demirel’s conception of the state as president by examining his 
views on the evolution, features, and functions of the state. In order to have a better 
grasp of the functions of the state according to Demirel, the analysis is made under 
four main categories which cover the issues Demirel defines as “great matters of 
state:” law and order, modernization and development, socio-economic issues, and 
international relations, drawing on the classification of “bringing the state back in” 
theorists. The chapter also demonstrates how Demirel conceives of the president as 
head of state. Chapter VI dwells upon the subject of Demirel and democracy. To 
demonstrate how Demirel conceptualizes democracy and put this conceptualization 
into practice during his presidential term, Demirel’s relationship with the political 
parties, his views on the secularism-Islam debate and civil-military relations are 
examined. Since the concept of democracy is closely intertwined with the concept 
of state in Demirel’s political vocabulary, some statements of Demirel on state 
which are previously given in the preceding chapter are intentionally repeated in 
the chapter on democracy. These repetitions serve the purpose to highlight that the 
concept of democracy is inseparably linked to the concept of state in the political 
line of Demirel. This gives us insights into the “statist” role he assumed as 
president during the difficult times for the democracy in Turkey.  
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The Conclusion presents the general findings of the essay and its contributions to 
the existing literature on the office of president in parliamentary systems. The 
issue is often examined through the change in the constitutional status of the 
president, and the “statist” role of the president is mostly disregarded. This essay 
aims to reveal and highlight that latter role a president may play. The conclusion 
offers a response to the question of how the way Demirel acted as president has 
had important political implications on the fortunes of democracy in Turkey. 
Finally, some suggestions are offered for further research. 
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PART I 
 
 
MAPPING THE TURKISH PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND 
THE PRESIDENT IN THE DISCUSSION ON CLASSIFYING 
DEMOCRATIC REGIME TYPES 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
PRESIDENTS IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND THE 
TURKISH CASE 
 
 
 
2.1. President, Presidential Power and Classifying Regime Types 
 
The political systems of the existing democracies share the same foundations, 
such as the separation of powers and representation through parliament. However, 
the constitutional mechanisms and institutional arrangements achieve the above 
objectives in different ways that in turn bring varied practices in the world of 
democracies. In one spectrum, there exists the presidential system, “the system of 
mutual independence,” and on the other, the parliamentary system, “the system of 
mutual dependence,” as Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach point out.15 The purest 
forms can be observed in Britain, representing a paradigmatic parliamentary 
system, and in the USA a paradigmatic presidential one.  
 
                                                
15 Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: 
Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism,” World Politics 46, 1 (October 1993), p. 3. 
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The basic difference between the two regime types is derived from the 
relationship between the legislative and executive powers. Parliamentarism is 
predicated upon the dependence of executive and legislative powers, whereas the 
presidential system is based on the strict separation of the two. In presidential 
systems, the legislative power and the executive power are independent of each 
other.16 That feature of the presidential system paves the way for the “issue of 
dual legitimacy.” The president is the chief executive and is elected by popular 
vote. The terms of office for the president and the assembly are fixed. Moreover, 
the president and the assembly, both having their own source of political 
legitimacy, have separate electoral mandates. Presidential elections and legislative 
elections are the two sources of political legitimacy. 
  
In parliamentary regimes, on the other hand, the relationship between the 
executive and legislative entails mutual dependence. The ongoing confidence of 
the assembly is vital for the government. With the threat of the motion of no-
confidence, the legislature might exert pressure over the executive. Coming to 
office is only half of the task of securing power; for the other half, that is, 
remaining in office, the governing party, if it lacks an overall majority, needs the 
support of other parties in the parliament. On the other hand, the executive 
(normally in conjunction with the head of state) is given powers to dissolve 
parliament and call elections. The mechanisms such as confidence procedures and 
the power to call new elections are designed to resolve political tensions that 
might lead to impasses.17 In parliamentary regimes, maintenance of stability and 
elimination of deadlocks between the government and the parliament are 
                                                
16 Stepan and Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation,” pp. 3-4. 
17 Ibid., p. 18. 
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significant issues. That is why the system is designed in such a way that the price 
of any stalemate will be paid either by the members of the parliament or the 
government. The capacity of the president to dissolve parliament creates an 
incentive for all political parties with a parliamentary presence to cooperate and 
reach a consensus that in turn creates a functioning system even with fragmented 
party structures. By making individual parliamentarians align themselves with 
their parties, parliamentarism endorses party cohesion and discipline as well. 
Consequently, fusion of powers in parliamentarism generates governments 
capable of governing and thus a highly centralized decision-making process.18 
 
In pure parliamentary systems, the tendency is to give the head of state, who is 
elected by the parliament, mostly ceremonial roles. However, in practice, the 
constitutions of parliamentary regimes sometimes clothe the head of state with 
more than symbolic powers, as seen in the Turkish case which is the focus of this 
study. Juan J. Linz correctly argues that in such systems presidents “can play the 
role of adviser or arbiter by bringing party leaders together and facilitating the 
flow of information among them.”19 That is why even in parliamentary systems 
presidents have a more than purely titular position. Otherwise, politicians would 
not try to elect their candidate to the office as is commonly observed. As Scott 
Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart point out, politicians care who holds the 
office since the extensive authority granted to the office of presidency might lead 
                                                
18 Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, “Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: 
Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered,” Annual Review of Political Science 5 
(2002), p.  152. 
19 Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?,” in The 
Crisis of Presidential Democracy: The Latin American Evidence, eds. Juan J. Linz and Arturo 
Valenzuela (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 46-47. 
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to potential brakes to the parliamentary majority.20 The controversy in 2007 on 
who would be the next president in Turkey illustrates that the presidency is given 
great significance in the Turkish political system as well. For example, Deniz 
Baykal, the leader of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), considered the office of president as the “safety 
valve of the regime.”21 
 
In the long-established dichotomous classification of regime types, there is a 
consensus in the literature on the defining characteristics of presidential systems. 
However, there is no common agreement as to what are the defining features of 
parliamentary systems.22 In fact definitions have varied from one researcher to 
another. As Robert Elgie asserts the process of regime classification is both messy 
and subjective.23 Thus the need to go beyond the traditional dichotomy opened the 
way to the formulation of a triple distinction by introducing a separate model to 
cover the regimes neither fit into presidential nor parliamentary regimes. Maurice 
Duverger’s seminal work on semi-presidentialism is an example of that effort 
Semi-presidentialism continues to be a widely debated concept. This shows how 
dominant its impact is on the studies of regime classifications.   
 
Duverger introduced semi-presidentialism in 1970 by focusing on the system of 
the French Fifth Republic. For Duverger, there are three characteristics necessary 
to consider a political regime as semi-presidential: a president who is elected by 
                                                
20 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A 
Critical Appraisal,” Comparative Politics 29, 4 (July 1997), p. 452. 
21 Zaman (Istanbul daily), 25 February 2006. 
22 Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies,” p. 289. 
23 Robert Elgie, “The Classification of Democratic Regime Types: Conceptual Ambiguity and 
Contestable Assumptions,” European Journal of Political Research 33 (1998), p. 223. 
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universal suffrage; a president who possesses “quite considerable powers;” and a 
president having opposite him a prime minister who possesses executive and 
governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show 
its opposition to them.24 The constitutional powers of the president, the founding 
context of the regime, and the relationship of the president with the parliamentary 
majority are the variables Duverger used to explain presidential influence. By 
focusing on the extent of presidential power, Duverger has listed the systems that 
fit his definition of semi-presidentialism. 
 
As mentioned, Duverger started from the system in France while formulating his 
concept of semi-presidentialism. It is characterized by a “twin-headed executive” 
or “executive dyarchy,” in which both president and prime minister are important 
figures in their own right. The executive fulfills its responsibilities by the 
“common action of the head of state and head of government”.25 Elgie explains 
that the president can exercise power with the help of the prime minister, which 
for him is the nature of the French semi-presidential system.26 The 1962 
amendments to the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic introduced direct 
election of the president by universal suffrage. Previously, the president was 
elected by an electoral college. Since then, popular legitimacy has become more 
important. The presidential candidates make election promises concerning bread 
and butter issues. Chances of reelection also affect the performance of the 
                                                
24 Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government,” European 
Journal of Political Research 8 (1980), p. 166. 
25 Quoted from Francis de Baecque in Robert Elgie, France in Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, 
Robert Elgie, ed. (Oxford University Pres: 1999), p. 71. 
26 Elgie, France in Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, p. 67. 
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president. Therefore presidents tend to have a close interest in policy matters on 
the economy, social policy and cultural issues.  
 
The French Constitution grants extensive powers to the president. S/he is expected 
to ensure the proper functioning of the political institutions and the continuity of 
the state. The president is also the guarantor of national independence, territorial 
integrity of the country and observance of the Constitution and international 
treaties (Article 5). This has blurred the president’s place in the political system 
and, as Elgie highlights, almost any intervention of the president can be 
legitimized based on this Article.27 S/he can dissolve the National Assembly after 
consulting with the prime minister and president of the Assemblies (Article 12), 
chairs the Council of Ministers (Article 9) and has extensive appointment powers 
(Article 13). Concerning the issues of “high” politics, the president is a powerful 
actor. S/he is made active in foreign affairs. As France’s most prominent 
spokesperson in the international arena, the president negotiates and ratifies 
treaties (Article 52) and leads the French delegation at summit meetings. The 
president, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Article 15), 
has control over defense policy issues as well. S/he presides over the Higher 
National Defense Councils and committees.  
 
In parliamentary process though, the president takes no part.  It is the prime 
minister who directs the conduct of governmental affairs and is the more powerful 
political actor with regard to domestic policy making and day-to-day conduct of 
governmental affairs. 
                                                
27 Elgie, France in Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, p. 76. 
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 Certain powers are shared between president and prime minister: the prime 
minister should countersign all presidential decisions while the president should 
sign all decrees enacted by the council of ministers. Although, as mentioned 
above, the president is the commander-in-chief, responsibility for issues of 
national defense is shouldered by the prime minister. Hence, as Elgie suggests, 
apparently the tasks of guiding and coordinating the matters on governing the 
country was assigned to the prime minister, whereas the tasks of overseeing and 
protecting the long-term interests of the regime were given to the president.28 
These characteristics of the regime in France have led to Duverger’s formulation 
of the system of semi-presidentialism as a third category in classifying regime 
types. 
 
Duverger’s criteria have been revisited by some scholars.29 A group of them 
criticized the usage of concepts like semi-presidentialism or a parliamentary-
presidential mixed system as a separate model located in the middle of 
presidential and parliamentary systems on the two poles. Referring to how 
Steffani define them as “intellectual slips” or “mistakes”, Siaroff argues that, from 
the point of president’s domination in a double executive, there are only two 
options: the president either dominates or not.30 Hence rather than grounding the 
classification on the non-existent third option, an alternative subtype (presidential 
                                                
28 Elgie, France in Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, p. 77. 
29 For a useful summary of the reception of semi-presidentialism by the academic community and 
the discussions held by the French, Italian, and Anglo-American scholars, see Bahro et al., 
Duverger’s Concept,” pp. 203-207. 
30 Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies,” p. 307. 
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parliamentarism or parliamentary systems with presidential dominance) is 
offered.31  
 
Another criticism on Duverger’s semi-presidentialism is the vagueness and 
weakness of the concept. Elgie claims that it has a problematic definition.32 
Similarly Bahro et al. emphasize the need to interpret and clarify the concept.33 
There are also discussions on the three defining features of semi-presidentialism 
as Duverger listed. What constitutes “quite considerable powers” is claimed to be 
vague and open to subjective judgments. That creates fuzziness in listing the 
systems of which countries as semi-presidential according to whose definition and 
interpretation of the “quite” in the concept of “quite considerable powers.”34 
Sartori deems necessary to formulate the defining characteristics in a more clear 
and detailed way. He patterned on the feature of popularly elected president but 
with the addition of being elected for a fixed term of office. Instead of suggesting 
constestable measure of presidential powers Sartori puts forward a “dual authority 
structure” which enables “shifting power prevalences” and balances within the 
executive. This structure is based on the existence of, on one hand, a parliament-
independent but government-dependent president and, on the other, a president-
independent but parliament-dependent (through confidence mechanisms) 
government.35   
 
                                                
31 Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies,” p. 307. 
32 Elgie, “Duverger, “Semi-presidentialism and the Supposed French Archetype,” p. 250. 
33 Bahro et al, p. 218. 
34 Bahro et al., “Duverger’s Concept,” p. 214; Elgie, “Duverger, Semi-Presidentialism and the 
Supposed French Archetype,” p. 250. 
35 Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, p. 132. 
 23 
Another important challenge to semi-presidentialism is the claim that a great 
variation is seen within this category, thus subtypes should be formulated to make 
the model more functional. Elgie highlights the “inherent heterogeneity” of semi-
presidentialism36 and suggests three types of semi-presidentialism: 
“parliamentary-like, dual presidential/prime ministerial, and presidential-like 
semi-presidentialism.”37 Shugart and Carey’s classifications as “premier-
presidential” and “president-parliamentary”38 in addition to pure types of 
parliamentarism and presidentialism can also be listed as examples of this 
endeavor to distinguish the variation within semi-presidentialism. Nur Uluşahin 
agrees on the insufficiency of semi-presidentialism to be able to cover all the 
regimes that fits into neither presidential nor parliamentary systems. But she 
criticizes the above classifications for trying to overcome the problem of variation 
through using the concepts of dichotomous classification.39 Dealing with 
Duverger’s concept of semi-presidentialism, Uluşahin argues that it has 
significant deficiencies in terms of definition and scope; it fails to cover the 
variety of patterns in the levels of de jure (according to the legal-constiutional 
arrangements) and de facto (according to the actual practices).40 She means by de 
jure level the way the president assume office and presidential powers; by de facto 
level, the distance between the constitutional powers and the displayed 
presidential profile. Hence Uluşahin, instead of departing from actual political 
                                                
36 Elgie, “Duverger, Semi-presidentialism and the Supposed French Archetype,” p. 252. 
37 See Elgie, “A Fresh Look at Semi-presidentialism,” pp. 98-112. 
38 See Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies; Matthew S. Shugart, “Of Presidents and 
Parliaments,” East European Constitutional Review 30 (1993), pp. 30-31. The head of state holds 
more powers (appointment and dismissal) over the cabinet in president-parliamentary systems 
compared to the head of state in premier-presidential regimes. The other distinctive feature is the 
separation of the assembly and the cabinet survival which is present in the latter while absent in 
the former. 
39 Uluşahin, Đki Başlı Yürütme Yapılanması, p. 60. 
40 Ibid., p. 46. 
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regimes, presents an abstract model named as iki başlı yürütme yapılanması (twin-
headed executive structuring) by reformulating the conceptual framework of semi-
presidentialism which she considers inherently insufficient in suggesting a 
coherent typology.41  
 
Alan Siaroff also claims that the widely used triple distinction is indeed 
inadequate to cover all governmental systems in the world.42 He pointed out that 
there are several “dispositional categories” of political regimes among semi-
presidential systems. That means Siaroff agrees with the opinion that “semi-
presidential regimes exhibits varying forms of political practice”43. However, 
rather than assessing systems in terms of the accountability of prime ministers and 
governments, Siaroff puts the president at the center of his argument. For that 
purpose, he rejects semi-presidentialism as a separate third category; instead, by 
observing that seemingly similar political systems listed under the title of semi-
presidential systems might operate in various ways, he comes up with new labels. 
In addition to one of the major categories, presidential systems, Siaroff puts 
forward “parliamentary systems with presidential dominance,” “parliamentary 
systems with a presidential corrective,” and “parliamentary systems with 
figurehead presidents/monarchs” as new formulations.44  
                                                
41 Uluşahin, Đki Başlı Yürütme Yapılanması, p. 49. One of the strengths of Uluşahin’s model is that 
it does not eliminate presidential powers from the defining criteria. Instead it makes an addition to 
clarify the ambiguous usage of  president’s“considerable powers” which is prone to subjective 
judgments. Hence “a president who possesses considerable powers to the extent that he competes 
in the executive with the government” becomes a defining feature of her twin-headed executive 
structuring model. This is important to underline the conflict-driven nature of these systems. 
Uluşahin not only presents a conceptual model but also elaborates on how it would operate 
successfully. 
42 Alan Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential 
and Parliamentary Distinction,” European Journal of Political Research 42 (2003), p. 288. 
43 Elgie, Semi-presidentialism in Europe, p. 8. 
44 Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies,” pp. 294-295. 
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To understand Siaroff’s new labels, it is worth examining the way he compares 
political regimes. Initially, based on the dispositional attributes, he defines eight 
distinct categories. There are three basic questions that help Siaroff in forming the 
categories at this stage: Is the head of state also the head of government? Is the 
head of state popularly elected? Is the head of government accountable to the 
legislature? The answer given to the first question creates two main units. In the 
unified executive, head of state and head of government are fused in one person. 
However, in the dual executive they are strictly separated. Depending on the 
answers of the second and third questions, the two units are each divided into four 
to form eight categories. The first four categories are found under the title of 
unified executive. In Category 1 and Category 2 the president is popularly elected, 
whereas in Category 3 and Category 4 s/he is selected by the legislature. Within 
these two groups, the difference is the issue of the head of government’s 
accountability to the legislature. In Categories 1 and 3, the head of government is 
accountable, while in the other two, Categories 2 and 4, s/he is not. Under the title 
of dual executive, the last four of the categories are listed. Category 5 and 
Category 6 have popularly elected presidents, though in the former the head of 
government is accountable, whereas in the latter s/he is not. The two last 
categories, 7 and 8, have presidents selected by the legislature, and only in the 
former is the head of government accountable to the parliament.  
 
To compare political regimes, Siaroff, secondly, pays attention to measuring 
presidential power and focuses on this perspective. In contrast to any sort of 
scaling measurement, he limits his analysis to nine dichotomously measured key 
powers related to the presidential office: popular election, concurrent elections of 
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the president and the members of the parliament for synchronized terms, the 
president’s discretionary appointment powers, chairing cabinet meetings and 
engaging in the agenda setting, veto power, having long-term emergency and/or 
decree powers, playing central role in foreign policy, playing a similar role in 
government formation, and having the capacity to dissolve the legislature at will. 
The president’s central role in foreign policy includes presiding over a security or 
defense council, having a say in choosing the foreign and defense ministers, 
attending international summits and representing the country there, and actively 
taking part in foreign policy making on certain key issues. The central role of the 
president in government formation is about the ability to select the prime minister 
or remove him/her from office. Each of these key powers is counted as 1 in the 
countries where they exist. In Siaroff’s measuring scale, countries having a score 
of 1 or 2 are termed “parliamentary systems with figurehead presidents;”  
countries having a score between 3 to 6 are termed “parliamentary systems with a 
presidential corrective;” and countries scoring more than 6 are termed 
“parliamentary systems with presidential dominance.” 
 
Siaroff’s distinction based on these variables indicates that the diversification is 
seen more in parliamentary systems than it is in presidential ones. Therefore, 
semi-presidentialism as a third category is far from reflecting the diversity coming 
out from practices in different political systems.  
 
Siaroff’s effort to present an alternative classification of regime types is neither 
novel nor original. Yet it evidently shows that semi-presidentialism is not a clear 
regime type. Furthermore the scope of the study is broad enough to include all 
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electoral democracies in the world (of 2003) which provides a seemingly 
comprehensive picture enabling comparison. That said Siaroff’s classification has 
also some weaknesses. He states that he has concurred with Elgie in eliminating 
any measure of presidential power from the definition of semi-presidentialism. 
The reason is that the subjective judgments on what makes one a “relatively 
strong president” brings varied list of semi-presidential countries.45 Hence, as 
Siaroff explains, while formulating his categories presidential powers are not at 
issue but they are central in terms of subtypes. As an initial impression, this 
weakens Siaroff’s claim that his study is different from the others focusing on the 
prime minister and government as it looks through the prism of president. This 
creates fuzziness. However Siaroff in the subsequent parts of his study clarified 
this point by stating that what is central in his classification is the question of 
“who controls the prime minister and cabinet.”46 Hence his emphasis on the 
nature of the domination of president demonstrates that this is a classification 
centred on president.  
 
The second weakness in Siaroff’s analysis can be seen in the method he used for 
measuring presidential power. It is the checklist method in which presidential 
power is measured on a scale from 0 to 1. As Lee Kendall Metcalf argues, 
although this method provides a “more comprehensive listing of possible 
presidential powers” it also has a disadvantage. Giving all the powers of president 
equal importance in such a detailed list would obscure the main issue about 
                                                
45 Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies,” p. 292.  
46 Ibid. 
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revealing to what extent president is strong in a political regime.47 Being aware of 
this disadvantage, Siaroff limits his list to nine powers. However, limiting the list 
of the powers to measure but continuing to use a dichotomous scale did not help 
to capture the real situation considering the relative powers of the presidents in 
different countries. For instance one of the variables in Siaroff’s analysis is the 
discretionary appointment powers. He explains this power as “appointment by the 
president of some key individuals” and mentioned some posts.48 Thus two 
countries having presidents with differing levels of appointment powers receive 
the same score of 1. Indeed number of posts that a president has the power to 
appoint as well as the importance of these posts for the political regime may make 
great difference. This vagueness is also repeated for the veto power. Scaling from 
0 to 1 is not sufficient to distinguish the presidents having a veto power which can 
be overridden by varied majority in different countries. This shortcoming in a way 
weakens the claim of Siaroff that his scores are based on actual political practice 
in addition to the constitutional arrangements on the powers of the president.49 In 
fact Siaroff criticized Shugart and Carey on the grounds that they focus solely on 
legal constitutional arrangements and this could result in a mismeasurement of 
presidential power.50 Having mentioned the actual political practice, one can 
expect a well equipped measure for establishing subtypes. Yet Siaroff’s analysis 
falls short of these expectations. Siaroff is far from clarifying how political 
practices are incorporated into his classification.51 That said, Siaroff’s eclectic 
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48 Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies,” p. 304. 
49 Ibid., p. 303. 
50 Ibid. 
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classification. Uluşahin’s model, by enabling de facto level, is able to incorporate the differences 
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study is significant in the sense that it is formulated after the strengths and 
weaknesses of the previous studies are taken into account. There is a mutual 
benefit in using Siaroff’s classification in analyzing the Turkish case. It provides a 
framework to elaborate on the alternating characteristics of Turkish parliamentary 
system. At the same time the findings of the essay offer contribution to the gaps 
left in Siaroff’s study regarding Turkey.  
 
Siaroff puts Turkey under the grouping that fits into the Category 7 by examining 
the country in three periods—Turkey between 1961 and 1971, Turkey between 
1973 and 1980, and Turkey after 1983. In the first two periods, Turkey scores 2 
according to Siaroff’s scale based on nine key powers of the president. The 
Turkish president chaired cabinet meetings and had veto powers which made 
Siaroff put the Turkish political system under the grouping of “parliamentary 
systems with figurehead presidents.” Turkey in the post-1983 period scores 3 
(discretionary appointment powers, chairing of cabinet meetings, right of veto) 
out of the nine dichotomous presidential powers.52 This created a shift in the 
grouping that Turkey belonged to, from the “parliamentary systems with 
figurehead presidents” to the “parliamentary systems with a presidential 
corrective.” According to Siaroff, Turkey in the post-1983 is an exception to the 
pattern he proposes.53 Turkey has a system with a president assuming a corrective 
role without being popularly elected. However, this pattern suggests that there is a 
direct correlation between maintaining a corrective role and the legitimacy of 
popular elections. Thus, Turkey appears as the only country which has a similar 
                                                                                                                                 
among the countries and even among the terms of different presidents in the same country. See 
Uluşahin, Đki Başlı Yürütme Yapılanması, pp. 37-42. 
52 Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies,” p. 302. 
53 Ibid., p. 308. 
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score with the other cases fit into this pattern but does not have a weaker 
presidency.  
 
For Siaroff, in general terms “a presidential corrective role cannot be maintained 
without the legitimacy of popular elections for the president.”54 However, Siaroff 
has not explained how in the case of Turkey in the post-1983 period presidents 
could play a corrective role lacking the popular legitimacy gained through popular 
elections. Thus, with regard to this study of the Turkish presidency, Siaroff’s 
distinction will be of use to a certain extent. The gaps he left concerning the 
exceptionalism of the Turkish case in his analysis, however, will be filled by 
looking at the above variables that differ from one presidential term to the other, 
either because of constitutional changes in presidential status or because of the 
different interpretations and practices of presidents. This is the basic task that the 
author undertakes to perform in this two-part essay.  
 
 
2.2. President in the Turkish Parliamentary System 
2.2.1. Historical Development of the Office of President 
 
The Turkish Republic, since its inception, has a tendency to consider the 
parliamentary system as the most appropriate system for the country, despite 
vacillating between different models of government in its early days. Historically 
speaking, it is possible to argue that there is a tradition of parliamentarism which 
can be traced back to the pre-Republican period. The promulgation of the 
                                                
54 Siaroff, “Comparative Presidencies”, p. 308. 
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Constitution of 1876 (Kanun-i Esasî)55 in the Ottoman period introduced the 
parliament to the Ottoman state system but did not pave the way to a system of a 
Western-style parliamentary government; the Sultan continued to exercise his 
sovereign rights.56 He was practically omnipotent, having extensive powers over 
the system that made the status of the Ottoman parliament distinct from that of 
parliaments in parliamentary systems.  
  
It is the Second Constitutional period (1908-1918) that the Sultan’s constitutional 
status and power was, for the first time, shaped by the requirements of a system of 
constitutional monarchy.57 The executive and legislative powers were separated 
from the Sultan’s sovereignty and granted to different bodies. The Council of 
Ministers was made responsible to the parliament, which had now been given 
additional powers while the monarch enjoyed only limited powers.58 In the 
opening address, Ahmet Rıza Bey, the Speaker of the General Assembly said that 
“working for the establishment of national sovereignty was one of the duties of 
the members of the parliament.”59 In the official reply of the Assembly to the 
Sultan’s inaugural address, “national assembly” as a concept was used and the 
                                                
55 For the unabridged version of the 1876 Constitution see Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, 
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parliament was defined as the “symbol of national sovereignty” (hakimiyet-i 
milliyenin timsali).60 As can be seen, for the first time, the sovereignty of the 
Sultan was curtailed at the expense of the sovereign power of parliament, and the 
concept of “national sovereignty” (hakimiyet-i milliye) began to be used in the 
second constitutional period.61 
 
In the transition period from the days of the constitutional monarchy to the 
opening of the Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi -BMM) in 1920, 
it was the said national sovereignty principle that formed the basis of the newly 
established republican state. In spite of the intermittent ruptures of parliamentary 
periods, the desire to have a functioning parliament continued to be salient in the 
Republican period, too. 
 
However, due to the extraordinary circumstances of the time, in the early 1920s, 
the assembly government model was adopted. The basic feature of this 
governmental system was the fusion of powers in the Assembly. The Assembly 
had complete say over the state matters and it had power over the Council of 
Ministers. According to the 1921 Constitution (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye)62, the BMM 
was so powerful that its government carried the title of the Grand National 
Assembly government (Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti). The head of the BMM 
was elected in the plenary session of the Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet 
Meclisi Heyet-i Umumiyesi), and with this title, in the name of the BMM, he 
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possessed the right to approve and sign the decisions of the Council of Ministers 
(Đcra Vekilleri Heyeti). Each of the ministers was elected individually by the 
assembly, which was entitled to make changes in the Council of Ministers at any 
time, whereas the Council lacked any power such as dissolving the parliament. 
Even though the Council elected its chairman, the head of the BMM was at the 
same time the natural head of the Council as well. It is necessary to note that up 
until 1923, there existed no office with the title of president. 
 
During the first legislative session of the Assembly (1920-1923), there were no 
political parties; rather, there were two groups agreeing on the same objective of 
saving the country from foreign invasion but diverging on the issue of which 
policies should be pursued afterwards. The First Group composed of Mustafa 
Kemal63 and his pro-change supporters, who were in favor of establishing a 
republican regime, was roundly criticized by the Second Group members, who 
favored the preservation of the office of Sultan. Until the Independence War had 
come to an end, Mustafa Kemal preferred to postpone his change-oriented future 
plans. The First Assembly, before taking a recess, decided to call for new 
elections in April 1923.  
 
It was the Second Assembly that proclaimed a republic and put revolutionary 
policies into practice. With the amendments to Teşkilat-ı Esasiye in 1923, the 
regime started to be called a republic and the office of president was established. 
Mustafa Kemal was elected the first President of the Republic. The amended 
Article 10 stipulated that the president was to be elected by the General 
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Committee among the members of the Assembly for one legislative term. 
Reelection was made possible. The term of the president lasted until the next 
president was elected. With the law, Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanununun Bazı 
Maddelerinin Tavzihen Değiştirilmesine Dair Kanun, Article 12 of the 
Constitution also changed. The president was given the right to choose the prime 
minister (başvekil) among the Assembly members. The ministers were no longer 
elected individually by the Assembly. Rather, the prime minister elected them and 
the cabinet was submitted to the approval of the Assembly by the president. It is 
apparent that some degree of separation of powers started to be observed, and the 
model of government formation came closer to the model seen in parliamentary 
systems. Parallel to that, the president was not given any powers allowing him to 
act independently of both the Assembly and the government.   
 
During the course of debates in the Assembly on the Constitutional Commission’s 
draft of the Constitution of 1924, the anti-Sultanate and pro-Republican 
sentiments were strongly felt while the articles stipulating the status and powers of 
the president were being discussed. The power of dissolution at that time had been 
given to the Assembly itself. The proposal, on the other hand, conferred this 
power of dissolution upon the president; in addition, he would act as the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and promulgate laws made by the 
Assembly. Some deputies expressed their worries by saying that delegating such 
powers to an office other than the Assembly might endanger the principle of the 
unconditional sovereignty of the nation. For them, the concentration of powers in 
the Assembly should have been preserved, as it was the best expression of 
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national sovereignty.64 The ostensible discomfort of those deputies was due to the 
possibility of making the office of presidency too strong, which recalled the 
Sultanic regime of Ottoman days. Suna Kili mentioned “the extreme sensitivity of 
the Assembly toward a strong executive” deriving from “Turkey’s historical 
experiences with absolute rulers.”65  Although several deputies felt the necessity 
to underline that their criticisms of the powers given to the executive by the 
Commission’s draft had nothing to do with the personality of Mustafa Kemal, 
they nevertheless opposed him and his plans for the revolutionary new regime in-
the-making. What was commonly desired was the embodiment of the national will 
through the national representatives in the parliament. Presidency, for many in the 
assembly, should be an office of arbiter and be kept out of daily politics.66 They 
emphasized that the head of the Republic should be the spokesperson of the whole 
nation, not of the party in power.67  
 
The ongoing discussions concluded with the enactment of the new constitution in 
April 1924. The Constitution of 1924 is said to have established a mixed system 
in between an assembly government model and a parliamentary regime.68 The 
sole supremacy in representing the Turkish nation still rested with the BMM 
(Article 4). The Commission’s proposal which would open the way to the 
dissolution of the parliament by a presidential decree after consultation with the 
council of ministers was rejected after a heated debate. Instead, the following 
                                                
64 For the full text of the speeches of deputies on this discussion, see the transliterated version of 
the official records of the GNA, Zekai Sezgin and A. Şeref Gözübüyük (trans.), 1924 Anayasası 
Hakkındaki Meclis Görüşmeleri (Ankara: Balkanoğlu Matbaacılık, 1957), pp. 8-9, 37-40, 56-60, 
64-66, 84-87, 104, 186, 194-201. 
65 Suna Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments and Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 
1924 and 1961 (Istanbul: Robert College Research Center, 1971), p. 62. 
66 Özdemir, Devlet Krizi, pp. 20-25. 
67 Ibid., p. 22. 
68 Ergun Özbudun, Türk Anayasa Hukuku, 6th edition (Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları, 2000), p. 31. 
 36 
statement was accepted as Article 25: “When the Assembly by absolute majority 
votes to dissolve before the expiration of its term, the session of the new 
Assembly must begin the first of November following.”69 The office of president 
was confirmed in the Constitution. Similarly to the 1923 amendment, the 
president was given the right to choose the prime minister from among the 
members of the Assembly (Article 7). The prime minister chose the ministers 
likewise from among the members of the Assembly and submitted the names to 
the president’s approval. As mentioned, in the 1921 Constitution, the ministers 
were chosen directly by the Assembly. However, with the 1924 Constitution, 
presidential approval became mandatory before the list of council of ministers 
was presented to the Assembly (Article 44). 
 
On the matter of granting more powers to the president, the outcome was 
discouraging for those favoring a stronger presidency. The president was accepted 
as the head of state but lacked any substantial independent powers. Article 32 
stated that the president presides over the assembly on ceremonial occasions and, 
in case of necessity, over the council of ministers. More importantly, it was made 
certain that the president, during his term of office, may not participate in 
parliamentary debates and discussions nor cast his vote. The proposal of the 
Commission that the president would be elected by the Assembly for a term of 
seven years was amended. The principle previously formulated with the 1923 
amendments which asserted that the president must be chosen from among the 
members of the Assembly for a four-year term that synchronized with the term of 
the Assembly (Article 31) was preserved. A simple majority was considered 
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sufficient to become elected. As mentioned, the proposal on the power of 
president to promulgate laws was one of the three issues which had provoked 
lengthy discussions in the Assembly. As a result of these debates, it was decided 
to amend the proposal so that the president could exercise his veto power over all 
matters except financial and constitutional legislation within ten days, but the 
Assembly could override president’s veto by a simple majority (Article 35). All 
presidential decrees should be signed by the prime minister and the ministers 
within whose jurisdiction the measure lies (Article 39), which means the main 
executive organ according to the Constitution was to be the Council of Ministers. 
The counter-signature principle, as Serap Yazıcı has noted, made the system 
closer to parliamentarism.70 The third longest discussion on the proposed article 
about the president’s power as the Commander-in-Chief resulted in amending the 
article so as to state that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces was vested 
in the BMM and assumed by the President of the Republic. In peace time, the 
Chief of the General Staff (CGS) was to command all armed forces, while in time 
of war, the command would be entrusted to a person appointed by the president 
upon the proposal of the Council of Ministers and approval of the BMM (Article 
40).  
 
As we have seen, the impartiality of the presidency has been highlighted since the 
inception of the Republican regime. However, the charisma of Atatürk 
transformed the conception of presidency in the sense that the presidency became 
the influential office in the political system. Atatürk’s wartime record and 
popularity, along with his revolutionary steps in the years of establishment and 
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reconstruction, created an unrivaled power. In fact, he was seen as the father of 
the nation. Needless to say, he left a personal imprint on the office of presidency 
as its first incumbent. Even though President Atatürk, in his later years in the 
office, preferred to confine himself largely to his specific reform projects rather 
than be involved in day-to-day running of the country, the capacity of the 
president to maintain an influence over the system was institutionalized in his era. 
The question of who would be the next president became one of the most 
contentious issues from then on. Nonetheless, due to Atatürk’s personal 
characteristics, more than the office itself, the president became a major political 
actor.  
 
The major role of the presidency, as Clement Dodd points out, was “to lead the 
Atatürkian Revolution,” under the leadership of Atatürk heading the Party, “which 
has not been an unimportant precedent.”71 As the founding father of the new State 
and also the CHP, Atatürk was perceived as the “one man”. It was a one-party 
regime, and as the party of the State, the CHP was identified with the aims of the 
Republic. Hence it was not perceived by the people as incompatible to be the head 
of state and the head of the party simultaneously. Indeed, Article 36 stipulated that 
the president, each year in November, addresses the Assembly on the activities of 
the government of the previous year and on the policies to be pursued over a year. 
Both Atatürk and Đnönü, in the president’s constitutional capacity, continued to 
give information about the government’s policies and future plans for the 
following legislative term in the opening addresses they delivered in parliament 
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on the first day of every legislative year.72 Irrespective of the necessities of the 
day, it can be argued that, from then on, the omnipotence of the presidency as the 
head of state has become visible in the characteristics of the regime in the difficult 
times of political crisis and social unrest, as will be elaborated below.  
 
After Atatürk’s death, the controversy about the possible presidential candidates 
has revolved around the issue of finding the best person competent enough to 
succeed Atatürk. Seeking for a competent successor, later, brought a new 
dimension to the perception of presidency that is about being the guarantor of the 
Republican regime and the guardian of Atatürkist principles – republicanism 
(cumhuriyetçilik), secularism (laiklik), nationalism (milliyetçilik), populism 
(halkçılık), statism (devletçilik), and revolutionism (inkılâpçılık). 
 
In spite of the palpable tension between Atatürk and Đnönü in Atatürk’s last years 
which ended in Atatürk asking Đnönü to step down from prime ministry, no other 
candidate could be seen as appropriate to shoulder such a heavy responsibility. 
Attempts by his political adversaries to obstruct his ascendancy to the presidency 
proved futile, and just one day after Atatürk’s death on November 10, 1938, Đnönü 
was elected the second President of the Republic. The fusion of party leadership 
and presidency continued in Đnönü’s term as well. Đnönü was given the title of 
“national leader” (“milli şef”) by the CHP. The “eternal chairman of the party” 
(“ebedi şef”) unquestionably continued to be Atatürk, while Đnönü was made the 
“permanent chairman.” Erik J. Zürcher argues that “Đnönü was in complete control 
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and his prime ministers executed the policies determined by the President.”73 
Hence, it is apparent that the political power base of the president was broadened 
during the terms of the first two presidents. 
 
However, it is also necessary to note that Đnönü himself proposed to renounce the 
title of permanent party chairman to show his commitment and sincerity in the 
transition to democracy, and instead suggested to the party delegates in the 
Second Extraordinary Congress of the CHP that the party chairman be elected for 
a fixed term of four years.  Đnönü was well aware of the fact that he was fiercely 
criticized by the members of the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti –DP) for 
holding the titles of President and Party Chairman at the same time. The leader of 
the DP, Celal Bayar, was highly critical of that arrangement, claiming that it 
benefited the party in power [CHP] through wielding the state power and 
controlling the administration apparatus.74 For him, it meant that there was a 
“crisis of head of state” (devlet reisliği buhranı).75 Đnönü responded to those 
criticisms by defining it as a “constitutional issue” and expressed his opinions as 
follows: 
Our Constitution concentrated state power in the Assembly. No 
power was vested in the hands of President, the Head of State 
(devlet başı), to be used by him when deemed necessary to 
serve best interests and maintain a balance while ruling the 
country. The President was thought to be the leader of the 
majority party. Hence, he is also thought to exercise moral 
influence (manevi nüfuz) and to maintain and preserve balance 
and harmony. In my opinion, there is no obstacle to the 
President’s being Party Chairman at the same time. The 
President’s being politically irresponsible does not mean that 
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he will be indifferent to his duties regarding parliamentary 
work. If the President wants to abuse his politically 
irresponsible status then the Parliament will always be ready to 
act to call him to account. In a nutshell, according to our 
Constitution, the Head of State needs to rely on a majority in 
the Parliament to perform a duty.76 
 
It is clear that, for Đnönü, a president could join the election campaigns of his 
party without infringing the constitution. There was no provision at that time that 
forbade the president from being affiliated to a political party while he was in 
office. The Constitution only prohibited the president from taking part in 
parliamentary discussions (Article 32). According to Đnönü, as the Head of State, 
he was in charge of maintaining and preserving peace and security, carrying out 
political activities within the framework of the relevant legislation, and providing 
an atmosphere in which citizens who have dissenting opinions treat each other 
with courtesy.77 
 
Đnönü’s determined efforts to make the regime more democratic resulted in the 
transition to multi-party politics in 1945 with the establishment of opposition 
parties, the National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi –MKP) and later 
the DP, among others. The DP succeeded in gaining some seats in the parliament 
in the July 1946 Elections. Its popularity among the people showed a tremendous 
increase. The DP’s criticisms of the CHP’s policies mounted and, within a short 
period, relations between the two parties became extremely tense, so much so that 
the timely intervention of President Đnönü saved the young multi-party regime. 
Đnönü had meetings with the leaders of both parties separately to develop trust 
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between them. Đnönü’s famous “Twelfth of July Declaration” (12 Temmuz 
Beyannamesi) emphasized the necessity of dealing with both parties impartially 
and evenhandedly. The declaration was significant in the sense that the President, 
by making such a statement to the press, displayed his endeavor to play the role of 
an arbiter to prevent people from being entrapped in the “politics of violence.”78  
 
Despite his efforts, President Đnönü could not avoid bitter criticism from the DP 
members. The Administrative Council of the DP took a decision forbidding the 
party members to contact him. The DP deputies protested in parliament and did 
not even stand up when president Đnönü came in to address deputies.  
 
Before Bayar was elected President in 1950 after the DP’s success at the polls that 
same year, he emphasized the principle of president’s political irresponsibility. He 
suggested that the head of state, when deemed necessary, become a “balancing 
factor” (muvazene unsuru) within the limits of legal framework. He underlined 
that heads of state, by becoming immersed in low politics, would be subject to 
gossip.79 While in the office, President Bayar highlighted his awareness of the 
constitutionally defined limits of his functions as head of state. He continued by 
stressing the regulatory (nazım) role of the head of state. For Bayar, he 
represented the state and hence performed his duty impartially above the 
governing bodies.80 However, during his presidential term, Bayar criss-crossed the 
country during the election period and addressed people as Đnönü once did. He did 
not even hesitate to solicit votes for his former party. Like Đnönü, Bayar did not 
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think that it would harm his impartiality because, he said, the timing of his 
political speeches was limited to a particular period, i.e. the parliamentary election 
period, which was the time for giving an account of the DP’s policies to nation.81 
Neither Đnönü nor Bayar considered speaking in election campaigns incompatible 
with their office on the grounds that in accordance with constitutional provisions 
the head of state should in the first instance be an elected deputy.  
 
Bayar’s term was terminated by the 1960 military take-over. It was with the 
Constitution of 1961 that for the first time the principles of classical 
parliamentarism were fully adopted. The president was still to be elected by the 
Assembly, now in a joint session with the newly established Senate, from among 
their own members. The president-elect should be at least forty years old and a 
university graduate. In reviewing the position of the president, the framers of the 
1961 Constitution had in mind the need to ensure that the president was politically 
impartial. After the election, the president was expected to disassociate himself 
from any political party he had been affiliated with. In order to ensure the election 
of a politically impartial president, a two-thirds majority was specified for the first 
two ballots, after which a majority vote was sufficient. In contrast to the previous 
Constitution, the term of office was extended to seven years. Hence, presidential 
elections would not be synchronized with parliamentary elections; this was 
expected to result in the election of a politically neutral president. Furthermore, 
the president was made ineligible for re-election. The two-thirds majority that was 
necessary to become elected president gave rise to harsh struggles between the 
major parties and, worse than that, to the embroiling the military in this struggle. 
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As Dodd argues, after the 1960 coup, the impartiality of the presidency began to 
take on a new meaning. It often came to be seen as guaranteed only by the 
election of presidents of military provenance.82 Parallel to that, Özbudun 
considers the election of the coup leader as president after the restoration of the 
civilian rule as an exit guarantee.83 In that way, the military leaders had an 
opportunity to preserve their positions and the principles of the coup. For the 
politicians, it also served some other important purposes. As Özdemir suggests, it 
functioned as a lightening conductor to eliminate the potential ups and downs that 
could occur while the military was returning to barracks.84 For the presidential 
office, the struggle between the civilian and military groups in 1961, excluding 
the next (1965) election, was repeated in the other elections. During the 1970s, 
after the experience of a military intervention in 1971, the political parties were 
agreed on removing the influence of military on politics through the election of 
former military officers to the presidency. However, they could not reach a 
consensus on a particular name when the office of the presidency fell vacant in 
1980 and, as a result, a political impasse could not be avoided. In 1980, the 
military again intervened.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, for the periods between 1961 and 1971 and 
between 1973 and 1980 Siaroff put Turkey under “parliamentary systems with 
figurehead presidents.” However, if the practices are also taken into consideration, 
following his own distinction, it can be argued that the system in Turkey came 
closer to a “parliamentary system with a presidential corrective.” The head of state 
                                                
82 Dodd, “Kenan Evren as President,” p. 176. 
83 Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 54. 
84 Özdemir, Devlet Krizi, p. 45. 
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and the head of government were separate from each other. The former was 
elected by parliament and the latter was accountable to the legislature. Although 
the president had no considerable powers, as it was stipulated in the 1961 
Constitution, some “corrective powers” such as presiding over the meetings of the 
Council of Ministers (Article 97), and promulgating the laws enacted by the 
TBMM and returning any laws he disapproves of to the Assembly for 
reconsideration (Article 93), looking at the actual practices, somehow created a 
corrective president. However, should the TBMM re-enact the law so returned, 
the President was obliged to promulgate said law.85  
 
The Constitution of 1982, following the 1980 military intervention, created a 
strong presidency. For two years, up until the Constitution was adopted, the leader 
of the coup, General Kenan Evren using the title of “head of state” had ruled the 
country. That can be interpreted as an indication of the desire of the guardians of 
the regime to create a president having extensive powers and exerting greater 
influence over the regime matters without being “politically” active.86 The 
military came to have a loss of trust in politics; not only politicians but also 
bureaucratic bodies were perceived to have been contaminated with radical 
ideologies. Consequently they felt the necessity to create an office that would 
safeguard the regime. This office could only be the presidency, which in the eyes 
of the military was the embodiment of the continuity of the secular state.  
 
                                                
85 Sadık Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal H. Karpat (trans.), Constitution of the Turkish 
Republic (Ankara, 1961), p. 25. 
86 Here political refers to what the coup leaders perceived as day-to-day politics. 
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Dodd observes that the role of guardian of the state and the constitution was taken 
seriously by President Evren, but due to his lacking a political base he did not 
successfully develop independent powers that would make it easier for him to 
achieve this objective.87 Despite Evren’s showing his opposition to the 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi -ANAP) overtly at first, a good deal of 
harmony prevailed between President Evren and Prime Minister Özal except 
during those times Evren was considered to be intruding into matters of 
government.88 For instance, the ANAP government under Özal was at odds with 
Evren because of his remarks on a number of shortcomings of the government in 
economic matters. Evren never refrained from commenting on the foreign policy 
that the government pursued and even sometimes led to dramatic shifts on some 
critical issues, such as Turkey’s European Community (EC) membership and the 
Cyprus issue.  He blamed Europe for having an anti-Turkey approach and 
rejecting Turkey’s quest for EC membership on the grounds that Turkey was a 
Muslim country. Evren threatened to leave NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) on the grounds that the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) had 
received a great amount of help and support from some European countries. For 
Evren, such a move would have been definitely in line with his mission to defend 
the principles guiding the 1980 military intervention. In this way, Evren extended 
his powers by exerting an influence over the foreign policy issues, and, through 
his particular interpretation of his constitutional duties and powers as president, 
tried to assume a corrective role.  
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The 1982 Constitution, like its predecessor, sought to ensure the political 
impartiality of the president. The president was kept politically irresponsible but 
on the other hand, as Özbudun asserts, the Constitution has transformed the 
presidency from a largely symbolic and ceremonial office into an active and 
powerful one, with important political and appointment functions.89 The principle 
of being elected by the TBMM for a term of seven years is adopted with a 
difference. The president-elect does not need to be a member of the Assembly 
anymore. Turkish citizens who fulfill the requirements (being over 40 years of age 
and having received university-level education) and are eligible to be elected 
deputies can be candidates. However, a person outside the Assembly should be 
nominated by a group of deputies not less than one-fifth of the full membership. 
The president cannot be elected for a second term.  The president-elect must sever 
all his party allegiances, and if he has ties with any political party he should 
resign. Moreover, his status as a member of the TBMM will cease after being 
elected. The procedure for the selection of the president is similar to that in the 
1961 Constitution in that it requires a two-thirds majority; however, if the 
Assembly fails to elect a president in the fourth ballot, it is automatically 
dissolved, a precaution against a possible deadlock as was experienced in the 
1980 presidential elections.90  
                                                
89 Özbudun, “The Status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982,” 
p. 37. 
90 A referendum was held on October 21, 2007 on a constitutional amendment concerning changes 
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be reached in the first ballot then the first two candidates who received the most number of votes 
will have the right to join the second ballot. The one gaining the most votes shall become 
president.  
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In the 1982 Constitution, as the first paragraph of Article 104 stipulates, the 
president is obliged to ensure the implementation of the constitution and regular 
and harmonious functioning of state organs. As the head of state, the president is 
expected not only to be impartial but also to supervise in an impartial manner the 
working of the constitution in the light of the requirements of democracy and, 
more importantly, in accordance with the Atatürkist principles, especially 
secularism. The presidency under the 1982 Constitution became an office of 
safeguarding and protecting the state more than acting as an impartial arbiter 
which means, as Heper and Çınar argue, the Turkish president has appeared as a 
“statist president, though with limited executive powers.”91 Similar to Elgie’s 
assessment on Article 5 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, Article 
104 of the 1982 Constitution is said to create a perception of a president who is 
above politics but who may at the same time make some kinds of intervention in 
the functioning of the state mechanism.92 
 
The Constitution of 1982 gives considerable powers to the president, leading to 
controversies over the system of government so created. Özbudun refers to the 
new system of government by borrowing a French term, “parliamentarisme 
attenué,” meaning a modified or weakened form of parliamentarism.93 By 
endowing the president with discretionary appointment powers, the 1982 
Constitution has considerably strengthened the presidency in Turkish political 
system.94 The president’s veto power over the legislation has increased; a draft 
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94 These powers include nominating the prime minister, approving the appointment of the Chief of 
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law related to a constitutional amendment (which requires the support of two-
thirds of the total number of members of the Assembly) may be referred back to 
the Assembly by the president for further consideration. If the Assembly adopts 
the referred law as it stands by a two-thirds majority, the president may submit the 
law to a referendum.95 As Dodd underlines, in this way, the president gains “a 
degree of access to the expression of the popular will.”96 
 
Apart from these considerable appointment powers, the 1982 Constitution 
contains some articles that are open to interpretation. Hence, the presidents 
coming to the office after 1989 have had the opportunity to extend their influence 
over governmental issues. For instance, from the very beginning of his term, Özal 
was criticized for not being impartial and meddling in the party affairs, which was 
seen as inappropriate for the president. He did not hesitate to publicly criticize the 
government if he was not consulted before making critical decisions. On foreign 
policy issues, he did not refrain from playing an active role on critical problems, a 
striking example being his initiative during the Gulf Crisis in 1990. Özal justified 
his interventionist acts by saying that as President and the head of the National 
Security Council he was responsible for defending the interests of the state, which 
shows his reading of the Constitution. Therefore, it can be argued that the 1982 
Constitution, by opening the channels to varied interpretations and consequently 
                                                                                                                                 
of the Higher Education Council, rectors of universities, members of the Constitutional Court, one- 
fourth of the members of the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief 
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95 The other exceptional condition related to the amendment of the constitution stipulated in 
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96 Dodd, “Kenan Evren as President,” p. 178. 
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to practices, has made possible the vacillation of the system from “parliamentary 
systems with a presidential corrective” to “parliamentary systems with 
presidential dominance.” As mentioned, in Siaroff’s country based analysis 
Turkey in the post-1983 period is categorized as a “parliamentary system with a 
presidential corrective” with the score of 3 - discretionary appointment powers, 
chairing of cabinet meetings, right of veto. This score is based on constitutional 
features. Although Siaroff claims that his measuring scores are based not only on 
constitutional arrangements but also the actual political practice, his country based 
analysis lacks the latter part. For instance on the Turkish case, above mentioned 
practices show that the presidents may extend their influence on the system 
through different interpretations of the constitutional powers. In addition to the 
three measures of Siaroff mentioned above, the presidents could play role in 
government formation, agenda setting and/or foreign policy making. Hence it can 
be argued that the system in Turkey gets closer even to “the parliamentary 
systems with presidential dominance” without having a popularly elected 
president. 
 
In fact, as mentioned, the basic responsibility of the president in accordance with 
Article 104 of the 1982 Constitution is ensuring the regular and harmonious 
functioning of the state organs. How Demirel played a key role based on that 
principle during the February 28 crisis will be extensively analyzed in Chapter VI. 
There it will be argued that he took the initiative and tried to defuse the crisis 
while observing the limits of the constitutional regime. In contrast to that, 
Demirel’s successor Ahmet Necdet Sezer remained indifferent to that particular 
constitutional responsibility and instead behaved in such a way that it became a 
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contributing factor to disharmony. Sezer gave more importance to the duties of 
safeguarding national unity, the indivisible integrity of the country, and 
secularism. During his presidential term, Sezer failed to take into account the need 
for negotiation and compromise and openly clashed with the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi –AKP) government, especially 
concerning the latter’s policies that he considered as promoting political Islam. 
The secularist state elites, who surmised that the Republican regime was being 
undermined deliberately and mischievously by the AKP, relied heavily on Sezer. 
Consequently, the significance that the state elites attach to the office of 
presidency has increased. 
 
 
2.2.2. The Presidency in the Clash between the State Elites and Political 
Elites 
 
In its struggle to establish a viable democracy, Turkey has encountered some 
difficulties. One such difficulty, which has been directly reflected in debates over 
the presidential succession, relates to the problems in bringing about a harmonious 
relationship between the state elites and the political elites. Following the 
argument of Sartori, one may argue that a viable democracy can be maintained 
through striking a balance between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of 
democracy. He emphasized the necessity of achieving a balance between different 
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groups’ specific interests and the long-term interests of the community for 
democracy to flourish.97 
 
 In order to better grasp the distinction between the horizontal and the vertical 
dimensions of democracy, firstly and foremost, Sartori’s understanding of politics 
should be explicated. Sartori associates the term “politics” with both the 
horizontal discourse and the vertical idea.98 The former was originally related to 
the community. Notions like public good, commonwealth, and general interest 
were born within the horizontal discourse. However, in the course of time those 
concepts have become attached to the vertical dimension; that is, as Sartori 
argues, they were related to the “hierarchical structuring of collectivities - 
subordination, superordination, and coordination.”99 The vertical leg of politics 
has become the sphere of the state; thus the good of the community started to be 
prioritized at the expense of particular interests. With the coming of the twentieth 
century, the horizontal dimension has re-entered the literature. While the vertical 
dimension of democracy denoted political responsibility, the horizontal dimension 
referred to as political participation.100 
 
In the light of this distinction, the quintessential point in Sartori’s argument on the 
horizontal and the vertical dimensions of democracy becomes clearer. Sartori 
argues that “the uniqueness of democracy resides precisely in establishing or 
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reeatablishing horizontal dimension of politics.”101 Public opinion and 
participation are the issues related to the implementation and diffusion of 
democracy horizontally. So, as Sartori states, electoral democracy emerges as the 
typical form of this horizontal dimension. In that way, the foundations of 
democracy is defined. However Sartori claims that this gives us an incomplete 
picture: “a polity monitored by the will of the majority” is not sufficient to build 
democracy and address its perfectibility.102 That is why Sartori brings into the 
picture the vertical structuring of democracy which is linked to the issues of 
public interest, governing, and being ruled. Sartori defines the vertical layout as 
“democracy as a system of government.”103   
 
In Turkey, the state elites have primarily perceived themselves as responsible for 
the guardianship of the long-term interests of the community. Political elites, on 
the other hand, have mostly regarded themselves as the representatives of the will 
of nation. From the perception of the state elites, political elites have only taken 
care of the interests of their constituencies, and this is considered inappropriate. 
Whereas from the perception of the political elites, the state elites do not respect 
the nation’s will. What the state elites have attributed importance to is the vertical 
dimension of democracy. For instance, while the political elites wish to see 
elections as one of the instruments for conveying the wishes and preferences of 
the people to politicians, state elites have perceived elections as a means to serve 
for the highest interests of the public and society, which, for them, is the most 
important component of democracy. In Turkey, the different emphases placed on 
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the concept of democracy by the two groups have given rise to a tension between 
them, which in turn has frequently made the maintenance of democracy 
problematic.104 
 
Here it is worth examining further the conception of the “general interest” in the 
discourse of the state elites so as to illustrate the divergence between them and the 
political elites.  The “general interest” in the discourse of the state elites in Turkey 
has been conceived as the maintenance of national unity, territorial integrity, and 
living in harmony in a secular, modern nation-state. The well being of society in 
terms of its above meaning has been an overriding concern for them. The state 
elites have perceived politicians as greedy and insatiable and accused them of 
deviating from the principle of the common interest of the community. The 
political elites have been blamed for their supposed inability to eliminate political 
tension and social unrest, and also for not acting with regard to the enlightened 
public opinion in the country. It has been concluded that the main conviction on 
the part of the political parties was that they were overriding the nation’s will, no 
matter whether they were either in power or in opposition, they were trapped into 
giving more importance to personal or partial interests than to their real duty – 
that is, promoting the general interest.105 
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The state elites have regarded themselves as “above” politics - above classes, 
above partisan interests and the like. In their eyes, the policy preferences of 
representatives of the political class (as well as that of the civil society) are 
suspect because they represent only part of the nation, and not the interests of the 
nation as a whole. Moreover, in their view, short-term, rather than long-term, 
interests have motivated the political elites. The republican model, as E. Fuat 
Keyman asserts, was built on three fundamental philosophical and normative 
principles: the state as a sovereign object; an “organic society” vision that opens 
the way to the understanding of politics which functions to make state elites 
define the public interest and to impose it over the private/sectional interests; and 
an understanding of the “republican citizen” that is defined as having duties and 
responsibilities rather than rights.106 
 
As Kemal H. Karpat has also noted, understanding of the role of the military in 
the Turkish political system, and for the present purpose the state elites in general, 
is essential for the understanding of the development of Turkish-style 
democracy.107 The state elites in Turkey have a rational understanding of 
democracy, which Heper defines as “an activity among the knowledgeable and 
patriotic persons who [try] to find the best policy and thus [promote] the general 
interest.”108 In the state elites’ model of democracy, there is always a degree of 
suspicion towards elected politicians because the elites worry that the politicians 
will display indifference toward the general interest of the country. That is why, 
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from time to time, the military in Turkey justified its intervention in matters that 
properly belonged to the political domain on the grounds that it is the military’s 
duty to save the country from the civilian politicians who were considered 
ineptitude and distrustful by the military.  
 
In the shift from Ottoman monarchy to the Republican regime, the state elites, 
especially the military, played a key role. The military has been the most modern 
and cohesive force, both as developer and as implementer of the reforms starting 
from the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, and especially in the building of the 
new nation-state. The identification of the military with the state was reinforced 
during the War of Independence. Atatürk, a successful leader coming from the 
military ranks, became the symbol of the new state. In the establishment period 
what was prominent was the development and modernization of Turkey. 
According to Atatürk, a one-party system could create a developed and modern 
Turkey.109 As a consequence of the necessities of the day, democracy was 
postponed until the Republican regime has been consolidated. As Dankwart 
Rustow emphasizes, the military and civilian spheres have never been separated 
strictly from each other under the Republic.110 Therefore, it is also to be expected 
that the military, when it thinks that a critical issue is a matter of the state, forms 
alliances with the other state elites. 
 
The state elites, in particular the military, regarded the new State and the 
modernization project as Atatürk’s legacy. What was important for the founders 
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of the new regime has continued to be vital for the military. To a great extent, the 
latter considers itself an emanation from the former. As Karpat argues, “the 
military has been intimately associated with the state since its inception.”111 Up 
until 1989, with the exception of the period between 1950 and 1960, the head of 
the state had always been a military man.   
 
In Turkey, the ongoing clash between the state elites and the political elites has 
relevance not only in the sense that it has important implications regarding the 
flourishing of democracy, but it has also shaped the presidency as an office. The 
oath sworn by the president under the 1982 Constitution in a sense stipulates that 
the president is among the state elites who are obliged to protect the regime when 
it is necessary. This article of Constitution is as follows: 
In my capacity as President of the Republic I swear upon my 
honour and integrity before the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly and before history to safeguard the existence and 
independence of the state, the indivisible integrity of the 
Country and the Nation and the absolute sovereignty of the 
Nation, to abide by the Constitution, the rule of law, 
democracy, the principles of the secular Republic, not to 
deviate from the ideal according to which everyone is entitled 
to enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms under 
conditions of national peace and prosperity and in a spirit of 
national solidarity and justice, and do my utmost to preserve 
and exalt the glory and honour of the Republic of Turkey and 
perform without bias the functions that I have assumed. 
(Article 103) 
 
As seen the first task of the president mentioned in the oath is “to safeguard the 
existence and independence of the state.” This is relevant to what this essay 
suggests as the statist role of the president.  
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PRESIDENT DEMIREL, THE STATE AND DEMOCRACY 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE POLITICAL PROFILE OF DEMĐREL  
 
 
 
3.1. Background and the Evolution of Demirel’s Political Career 
 
Süleyman Demirel was born in 1924 in Islamköy, a remote village of Isparta. 
After completing his elementary school education in this village, upon the 
suggestions of his teachers, Demirel’s father brought him to Isparta, the only city 
having a secondary school nearby. It is important to underline that, despite being 
poor and needy, his father did his best to make Demirel continue his education. 
He even rented a house in Isparta for his son to stay in with his grandmother. In 
return for these efforts, Demirel rewarded his father by being a hardworking 
student in his new school. However, the expenses increased day by day as young 
Demirel continued his education in Muğla, a city further away from his family. To 
lessen the expenditures, Demirel entered an exam (Devlet Parasız Yatılı Sınavı) 
which provided financial support for needy students if they scored high. Demirel 
was successful in the exam and got the opportunity to continue his education in 
Muğla free of charge. Meeting with a new competitive environment, resulting 
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from the migration of masses of Turks from Western Thrace in those years, made 
Demirel more ambitious.112 After graduating from middle school, he came to 
Afyon to attend high school and stayed there until he graduated. His days in 
Afyon made Demirel think more about his future plans. What he desired most was 
to have either legal training or an education in engineering. His years of hard 
work bore fruit when he succeeded in the entrance exam of the Engineering 
Academy (Yüksek Mühendis Mektebi) which provided education in the fields of 
engineering and architecture and was incorporated into Istanbul Technical 
University (ĐTÜ) in 1944. 
 
In 1949, Demirel graduated from the Civil Engineering Department of ĐTÜ. After 
working temporarily in Istanbul Water Works Agency (Đstanbul Sular Đdaresi), he 
began working as a civil servant in Turkey’s Electrical Works and Research 
Administration (Elektrik Đşleri Etüd Đdaresi -EĐEĐ), in return for his debt to the 
state, which had financed his secondary education. Having witnessed drought and 
villagers’ communal prayers for rain in his childhood, Demirel has remained 
attentive to the problems of water and irrigation throughout his professional life. 
He stated that experiencing the villagers’ suffering from drought and scarcity in 
1934 inspired his struggle on the way to civilization.113  
  
As part of a training program in irrigation, electrical technologies, and dam 
construction, Demirel was sent to the United States in 1949 to undertake studies in 
the Bureau of Reclamation in Denver and stayed there until 1950. He was the first 
engineer that the Turkish state sent abroad ever. The Bureau carried out major 
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projects in the western states of the US including huge dams, irrigation systems, 
and generating stations. Demirel later said that when he first saw the Boulder Dam 
built across the Colorado River, he sat on a rock and admired the view for three 
days.114 What he observed there impressed Demirel very much and inspired the 
ambition to implement what he learned there on his return to Turkey. Thus he 
concretized the “Western civilization” - the concept that he had first heard from 
his teacher in Isparta when he was a small child - as being technologically 
advanced.115 
 
Demirel’s days in America made him think that what led the USA become a 
powerful and wealthy country was activist individuals. As one of the closer 
persons to Demirel, journalist Yavuz Donat claims that his impressions about 
America later created Demirel’s philosophy of governing that can be summarized 
in a nutshell as “the participation of people in governing.”116 This concerns the 
horizontal dimension of politics. For Demirel, another point is that the individual 
who governs should be aware of his responsibility about fulfilling his duty, which 
concerns the vertical dimension. It is important to note here that since those years, 
these two concepts, participation and responsibility, have formed and shaped 
Demirel’s political mindset. 
 
When Demirel returned to his country, Turkey had already gone through 
significant changes. The DP had come to power with many promises about 
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preparing and implementing development projects and starting new investment 
projects. Following his return to the EĐEĐ, he was first appointed to supervise the 
ground survey of Seyhan Dam in Adana, and after a year was called up to Ankara 
again. Until 1953, Demirel worked as a project engineer. In 1954, he was 
appointed as the Head of Dam Administration. He became involved in dam 
construction projects so much that later he was given the nickname “king of the 
dams” (barajlar kralı) by his supporters. It was used as a propaganda tool to gain 
much support for Demirel as the young leader of the AP. Within a year, he was 
appointed as the Director General of the State Hydraulic Works Department 
(Devlet Su Đşleri -DSĐ). Demirel mentions that in the course of that duty he 
learned much about the geography, natural resources and also the people of 
Turkey.117 It was said that Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was aware of the 
capacities of Demirel who was seen as a brilliant technocrat of the DP period, and 
drew the attention of his close associates to “Demirel’s brilliant future.”118 
 
When the military intervened in 1960 and removed the DP government from 
power, Demirel was in Spain attending a meeting as the Director General of the 
DSĐ. After he came back, he also suffered from the pressure put on the DP 
bureaucrats. From time to time, investigations were opened about Demirel, and he 
was subjected to groundless accusations about irregularities in some dam bids of 
the DSĐ. Although his military service had been deferred by the Ministry of 
National Defense during the DP era, Demirel was tried by the military court with 
the accusation of being an army deserter. It was decided to conscript him as a 
                                                
117 Turgut, Görüntüler, p. 225. 
118 Cited in Füruzan Tekil, Türk Demokrasisi Đçinde Süleyman Demirel (Istanbul: Göktürk 
Yayınları, 1976). 
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reserve officer. It is narrated by Alpaslan Türkeş (one of the army officers who 
planned the 1960 military coup and then became the undersecretary of the prime 
ministry under military rule) that with the efforts of common acquaintances, he 
helped Demirel to perform his military service in the newly established State 
Planning Agency (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı –DPT).119  After he was discharged 
from the military in 1962, Demirel did not return to civil bureaucracy. In 1962-
1964, Demirel worked as a free-lance engineer and a consultant. He also gave 
courses on engineering in the Middle East Technical University during this 
period.  
 
In 1962, Demirel joined the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi –AP) which had been 
founded by a retired general Ragıp Gümüşpala on February 11, 1961. In 
summarizing his story of entering politics, he said that it was not an intentional 
act. Indeed, he drifted into politics.120 The beginning of Demirel’s political career 
was his being elected to the party’s General Executive Board (Genel Đdare 
Kurulu) in 1962. Although Demirel did not take part in setting up the AP, he was 
elected as a result of an intensive campaign to support him. As Bozbeyli narrated 
Demirel was promoted as being an old Democrat -denoting his attachment to the 
DP- and one of the princes of Menderes.121 Such efforts to promote Demirel’s 
image as a young and promising politician who was coming from the DP tradition 
were so successful that this positive image paved the way for his future leadership 
of the AP.  
 
                                                
119 Quoted in Đrfan Ülkü and Ali Hasanov, Süleyman Demirel (Istanbul: 1999), p. 72. 
120 Turgut, Demirel’in Dünyası, p. 21. 
121 Ferruh Bozbeyli, Interview by. Đhsan Dağı and Fatih Uğur, Yalnız Demokrat: Ferruh Bozbeyli 
Kitabı (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009), p. 192. 
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Nevertheless Demirel’s first post in the party ranks did not last long. After Bayar 
was released from Kayseri prison many demonstrations supporting him were 
staged in the places on Bayar’s way to Istanbul. Pro-May 27 groups protested 
against the favorable atmosphere that the supporters of the ousted DP tried to 
create. Consequently the tension was mounted throughout the country. The AP 
headquarters was stoned by a crowd on October 2, 1962. At the time Demirel was 
inside the building with some other party administrators. It is told that Demirel 
was negatively affected by the attack and he decided to cut his ties with the party. 
Both Bozbeyli122 and Bilgiç123 mentioned Demirel’s comment that “democracy 
will not be established in Turkey no earlier than in fifty-year-time.” Demirel’s 
behavior may be interpreted as an indication of keeping himself away from 
conflicts in times of trouble. The expression “şapkayı alıp gitmek” – although this 
refers to its literal meaning to take his hat and leave the party, it denotes escaping 
when faced with the difficult situations - associated with him started to be used 
after this event. 
 
Upon the death of Gümüşpala on November 28, 1964, Demirel’s name was put 
forward as one of the candidates for chairmanship. Some leading members of the 
AP visited Demirel to persuade him to be the vice chairman of the AP when the 
party was in the process of electing its chairman. Demirel was offered that after 
coming to power to overcome the difficulty of carrying out the government affairs 
along with party affairs he and Bilgiç could work together, each was solely 
responsible with the affairs respectively. However Demirel rejected this offer on 
the grounds that such a practice would turn the government into a puppet of the 
                                                
122 Bozbeyli, Yalnız Demokrat, p. 189. 
123 Bilgiç, Hatıralarım, p. 116. 
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party by referring to the Union and Progress (Đttihat ve Terakki) example.124 When 
Demirel rejected the vice chairmanship, Bilgiç was assigned with this task. It was 
with that development that Demirel and Bilgiç appeared as the prospective 
candidates for the leadership contest. Tekin Arıburun, ex-air force commander 
who was removed from his post in the army by the May 27 coup, also became a 
candidate. The race however was mostly taken place between Demirel and Bilgiç. 
Winning by a landslide, Demirel was elected party chairman at the Second AP 
Grand Congress.125 Between February and October 1965, Demirel served as 
deputy prime minister in the coalition government (AP, YTP, CKMP, MP) led by 
Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, a senator for Kayseri who was assigned to form the 
government by the president after the CHP government had been brought down 
with the rejection of its budget. 
 
The 1965 general election was the first election in which Demirel, as the leader of 
the AP, competed. At the time, he had been the party leader for a year and the 
deputy prime minister. His first speech during the election campaign, delivered in 
Şanlıurfa on October 10, 1965, is important to show Demirel’s political strategy in 
reaching the masses:  
For ages, you and your children have always lacked water. 
Therefore, I consider your [water] problem as the biggest 
political issue, as the biggest problem on the way to modernity. 
I am a child of a region obliged to pray for rain. I know very 
well how ruinous droughts could be for your household. I 
could not stay indifferent to your plight. I am the child of your 
grief. Saving you from your woes is what I reckon as a matter 
of dignity and honor.126 
 
                                                
124 Bozbeyli, Yalnız Demokrat, pp. 194-195. 
125 Demirel received 1072, Bilgiç 562, Arıburun 39 votes. Even though Ali Fuat Başgil was not a 
candidate, four votes were given to him. There were 12 blank votes.   
126 Donat, Cumhuriyet’in Kara Kutusu, p. 8. 
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During those years of economic recession and hard times, Demirel gave priority 
in his political agenda to problems related to the lack of advancement in technical 
matters and technology. The election manifesto of the AP prioritized the 
infrastructural projects on irrigation, electricity production, road building, and 
communication. The 1965 general election was an unprecedented victory for the 
AP, who garnered 53 percent of the votes and made the then 41-year-old Demirel 
the youngest prime minister ever in Turkey. 
 
In the following general elections that took place on October 10, 1969, Demirel’s 
AP was the sole victor once again with 46.5 percent of the votes. Nevertheless the 
decline in the votes raised the voice of the opposition within the party. 
Furthermore, Demirel’s disbandment of the local organizations that did not 
comply with his directives deepened the intra-party conflict. At that time the CHP 
requested a parliamentary investigation concerning Prime Minister Demirel. In the 
course of the debates, allegations of corruption against Demirel were made by the 
CHP deputies. In reaction to this, while these allegations were being discussed, 
some AP deputies proposed to limit the time allotted for deputies to express their 
views to the parliament. Two AP deputies voted against this proposal along the 
same line with the CHP which resulted in their expulsion from the AP. On 
October 17, 1970, seventy-two AP senators and deputies issued a declaration that 
criticized the party administration and asked for the reversal of the decision on 
expulsion.127 However, this last-ditch effort bore no fruits. Then forty-one out of 
seventy-two voted against the budget submitted by the AP government. As a 
                                                
127 This effort is named as the “Movement of Seventy-Twos” (Yetmişikiler Hareketi) and can be 
considerd a signal of the split from the AP to establish a new party. For the full text of the 
declaration, see Bilgiç, Hatıralarım, pp. 207-213. 
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result the budget proposal was rejected and the government resigned. The 
rejectionists thought that Demirel sought for one man domination in the party and 
for that purpose he did not refrain from turning the party into a place to advance 
short-term interests and personal gains.128 Subsequently, the cases of those forty-
one people were referred to the disciplinary committee and twenty-six of them 
were expelled from the party. According to Bozbeyli, punishing some of them 
was a purposeful act. The aim was to divide that opposing group but it failed.129 
The remaining fifteen resigned from the party and together with the expelled 
parliamentarians formed the Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti –DeP) on 
December 18, 1970.130 Bilgiç argued that the motivation behind the expulsions 
was to eliminate the nationalist-conservative members in order to please the leftist 
circles.131 On the other hand, Bozbeyli told that he had neither information nor 
impression on such motivation that would change the conservative identity of the 
party. For him, this could be interpreted as an effort to get rid of the members that 
Demirel could not control in the party.132  
 
In 1971, the Demirel government had to resign upon the military memorandum of 
March 12, 1971. The 1970s never recaptured the heyday of the 1960s for the AP. 
Under the leadership of the AP, two Nationalist Front Governments (Milliyetçi 
                                                
128 Bilgiç, Hatıralarım, p. 216. 
129 Bozbeyli, Yalnız Demokrat, p. 322. 
130 The DeP was initially successful in reaching the people coming from the DP tradition who were 
not satisfied by the policies of the AP under Demirel. For instance Bayar actively supported the 
DeP when the party was established. He was furious with the AP as he thought that Demirel and 
his friends were aborted the attempts on the issue of amnesty to the members of the defunct DP. 
After this issue was resolved, the Democrats supporting the DeP backpedaled and joined the AP to 
be elected deputies after their political ban were lifted. This triggered the dissolution of the DeP. 
131 Bilgiç, Hatıralarım, p.230. 
132 Bozbeyli, Yalnız Demokrat, p. 349. 
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Cephe Hükümetleri -MCH)133 were formed first between March 1975 and June 
1977 and the second between July 1977 and January 1978. The first MCH was 
formed by the AP, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi –
MHP), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi –MSP) and the 
Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi –CGP). All but the CGP 
came together for the second MCH. In 1979, Demirel formed a minority 
government which a year later was terminated by a military coup. All political 
parties were closed and their leaders and higher cadres were banned from 
involvement in active politics for ten years.  
 
In 1987, with the result of a national referendum, the ban was lifted. For Demirel, 
it meant returning to active politics. That same year, he was elected chairman of 
the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi –DYP) at the party’s extraordinary 
congress. He was reelected to the Parliament as deputy from Isparta in the general 
elections of 1991. Following the elections, Demirel formed a coalition 
government with the Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı 
Parti –SHP). In 1993, after the unexpected death of the eighth President, Turgut 
Özal, Demirel was elected president on May 16. 
 
Demirel’s role in Turkish politics did not end after he completed his presidential 
term. Rather he continues to participate by expressing his views on contentious 
political issues. He did not directly engage in the matters of any political party 
until May 2009, when he supported one of his political colleagues in the latter’s 
bid for the chairmanship of the new Democrat Party. His name had always been 
                                                
133 The Nationalist Front Governments were broad-based coalition governments aiming to embrace 
nationalist and conservative elements.  
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pronounced in the process of new party formations.134 It always became an object 
of interest what Demirel thought on a hotly debated issue. For instance, he 
actively took part in the heated debate on the 2007 presidential elections by 
supporting the campaign to reach a social compromise on a presidential candidate. 
Some of his remarks such as “Those who wear headscarves should go to Saudi 
Arabia,” and “This parliament [in 2007] does not have the ability to represent [the 
people’s will]” have stirred up his old constituency and led to interpretations that 
he had changed drastically.135 On the other hand, in the eyes of many, Demirel has 
become a respected authority on state matters due to his considerable experience 
as an above-party figure. Some people expressed their opinions that he could be 
offered the status of ombudsman when a discussion was opened up on 
establishing the office of ombudsman in Turkey. He was labeled as a “wise man” 
(akil adam) who has earned a reputation with the experiences he gained in 
Çankaya [the Presidential office]. Furthermore, he is said to successfully assess 
the conditions of the country, having a good grasp of the institutions that are vital 
for safeguarding the constitutional regime.136 
 
Each and every phase of Demirel’s political life will be examined in detail in the 
following chapters. After all, the story of his political career overlaps with the 
political history of Turkey since the 1960s. Thus some give him nickname “the 
black box of the Republic” (Cumhuriyet’in karakutusu).137  
 
 
                                                
134 Yavuz Donat, “Demirel ve Istanbul Yaklaşımları”, Sabah, 2 April 2007. 
135 Yeni Şafak, 2 April 2007. 
136 M. Ali Kışlalı, “Demirel Olacağı Biliyor,” Radikal, 15 February 2008. 
137 Donat, Cumhuriyet’in Kara Kutusu, p. 5. 
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3.2. Personal Characteristics 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, Demirel has always been ambitious. Even 
though he was not brought up in an advantageous environment, he worked hard 
and pushed his limits to be better off. Demirel has never lost his trust in equality 
of opportunity. He has always believed that as long as he continues to work hard 
he will accomplish what he dreamt for. Demirel’s leaving his village in order to 
continue his education when he was a small child is an illustration of his 
motivation. Once, when he came back to his hometown in one of the summer 
holidays, he said to his father that “in the regime that Atatürk established, 
everybody can be a deputy in the parliament.”138 It shows, in the mind of young 
Demirel, how the Republican regime began to be equated with the vertical 
mobility it offers the relatively disadvantaged portions of the society. 
 
Demirel’s upbringing in an environment respecting and praising education has 
also had positive impact on his personal development. After the Latin alphabet 
was adopted (1928), the villagers, rather than resisting the changes, tried to adapt 
themselves to the new script by actively participating in the educational 
mobilization of the Republic. The people of Đslamköy came together and built a 
primary school with their own means.139   
 
Demirel’s parents also had an impact over the development of his personality. 
Like the other people in his village, his father praised education. As noted above, 
he was a person who, despite opposition from his mother and wife, sent his son to 
                                                
138 Turgut, Demirel’in Dünyası, p. 34. 
139 Ibid., p. 30. 
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the city to continue his secondary school education there. Even though the family 
was living in poverty, he did not hesitate even for a moment to spend what he 
possessed on young Demirel’s educational expenses. Demirel portrayed his father 
as a self-educated man who was so courageous and energetic that he opened new 
horizons in the minds of his children.140 Demirel’s father was cautious in his 
business affairs and calculated every eventuality he might face. Such attitudes on 
the part of his father were claimed to be adopted by Demirel in the latter’s 
politics.141 
 
Demirel’s mother was an example of a tireless Anatolian woman. Demirel said 
that she always completed what she started.142 Demirel’s mother influenced him 
with her personality too. She was a devout Muslim (mütedeyyin) who resigned 
herself to God’s hands (mütevekkil). Demirel’s approach to religion was shaped 
mostly by his mother. He learnt the Qur’an by heart. Coming from a devout 
family and being brought up in a religiously oriented environment had a certain 
impact on the formation of his political style. Having a background in religion 
also had an effect, towards the end of his ĐTÜ years, on his re-discovering of some 
concepts with which he had previously been familiar. Although ĐTÜ was 
established by taking the French and German universities as models, and hence 
followed a curriculum which was prepared under the influence of a European 
positivist way of thinking,143 as narrated by Demirel, starting from 1948, a wind 
of change started to be felt. He said that some students who had previously been 
                                                
140 Demirel has one elder sister, Afife, and two younger brothers Şevket and Hacı Ali. Şevket also 
graduated from ĐTÜ. Turgut, Demirel’in Dünyası, p. 41.  
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid., p. 47. 
143 Ercüment Kuran, Türk Çağdaşlaşması: Çileli Bir Yolda Đlerleyiş (Ankara: Akçağ, 1997), p. 
261. 
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the regular participants of the entertainments and parties, in due course, began a 
quest for a new identity and focused more on the issues of Islam, tradition, 
national and moral values, and history.144 It is known that, in those years, M. 
Zahid Kotku, the religious leader of the Đskenderpaşa Seminary, which was a 
branch of an influential Sufi order, Naqshbandiyya, influenced some engineering 
students with his ideas about promoting industrialization, science and technology 
in addition to caring deeply about preserving national and moral values. It can be 
argued that Demirel’s familiarity with religious terminology that he had gained in 
his childhood facilitated his communication with the Islamic groups and masses. 
 
Demirel enjoyed huge popularity with the right-wing voters by being perceived as 
a politician who preserved national and religious elements of his Anatolian 
origins. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, an influential ideologue and activist who was 
highly esteemed in rightist circles, also remarked on Demirel’s “indigenous” 
character by referring to him as “the son of Anatolia.”145 Despite the fact that 
Kısakürek was highly critical of several of Demirel’s policies and practices, he 
praised Demirel’s freedom from patronizing attitudes towards the common 
people. Moreover, Kısakürek added that among the prime ministers whom he had 
been in touch with Demirel was unique in the sense that he possessed such 
personal qualities as listening attentively and being open to any criticisms, no 
matter how sharp.146 
 
                                                
144 Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Türk Sağı ve AKP (Istanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2007), p. 29. 
145 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Rapor 9 (Istanbul: Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 1980), p. 60. 
146 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Rapor 4 (Istanbul: Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 1978), p. 25. 
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Another characteristic of Demirel is industry. As already noted, throughout his 
school days, he was among the brilliant students in his classes. According to his 
primary school teacher, Demirel had strong will-power and always accomplished 
what he decided on.147 One of his close friends in Afyon High School portrayed 
Demirel as a student who was calm, careful, prudent, hard working, and 
successful.148  
 
Demirel’s hard working nature is coupled with his calmness. People who know 
him have commonly noted that side of his personality. One of his close 
colleagues, Đhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, described Demirel as a man who keeps his 
silence when angry, who does not make decisions immediately on impulse but 
rather calculates all possible outcomes like a chess player. Demirel never leaves 
anything to chance; he is cautious and organized.149 As Çağlayangil noted, during 
hard times he wanted to find the best solution by taking into account each and 
every possible path he might follow. He assessed well the timing of when to 
retreat or resist.150 Đsmet Đnönü, an important statesman and a political rival of 
Demirel especially during the 1960s, said that Demirel was a different person in 
the sense that he managed anger and was aware of what he was talking about.151   
 
Demirel values reason and calculation. Clearly, this is linked with ĐTÜ’s positivist 
education, or, to put it better, with the discipline of engineering in general. He is 
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gifted in the realistic assessment of political opportunities and constraints, which 
in turn strengthen his hand in politics. As Arat observes, “[h]e was not a romantic 
who was led by impulsive and emotional reaction to critical political events.”152   
He has an ability to adapt his past experiences and political skills to the changing 
political context. For Çağlayangil, there has never been a statesman who 
regenerates himself as quickly as Demirel. He is said to show a remarkable 
example of personal development and an outstanding performance in influencing 
events.153 On the other hand there are some people who interpret the same 
attitudes of Demirel in a negative way. For instance, according to the observation 
of Bozbeyli, Demirel knows better to use a proper language rather than to speak 
truly.154 This made him skillful in adopting himself to changing conditions.  
Demirel is also criticized for the methods he employed while dealing with the 
intra-party opposition. It is argued that instead of taking a hardline stance against 
the opponents he made his close associates criticize them aggressively.155 He was 
even alleged to have his own team of attrition.156 It is claimed that in some 
instances Demirel applied a tactic of making the opponents ineffective through 
appointing them to important posts and in doing so aimed at giving the impression 
that he would not let personal hostilities interfere in party affairs.157 
 
In the initial stage of his AP leadership Demirel gave great importance to team-
work and praised collective reasoning. However some of his former party 
colleagues said that Demirel established his own team comprising those who were 
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 75 
faithful to him (yeminliler).158 Furthermore he was accused of seeing himself as 
the owner of the party. It was claimed that challenging the leader might be costly 
and the expulsions from the party in the late 1960s were linked with this.159 
However when there were important and difficult decision-making processes, as 
argued, Demirel refrained from taking any initiatives not to assume the 
responsibility and chose not to take a stance.160  
 
 
3.3. Demirel’s Views on the Concept of Politics 
 
Demirel had a long tenure. Despite being ousted from office by the military twice 
and banned from active politics for seven years, he managed to form seven 
governments and served for ten years as prime minister and seven years as 
president, and this made him one of the most important political figures of 
Turkey.  
 
Demirel states that he engaged in politics “to complete what had been left 
incomplete.” What Demirel called as an “uncompleted action” is, in his words, 
“the struggle for being civilized [read, development] (medeniyetçilik mücadelesi) 
that the DP government had triggered but was interrupted by the 1960 military 
coup.”161 He proudly emphasized that he took part in this fight against poverty 
                                                
158 This group claimed to be established to provide a shield to protect the leader against every kind 
of attack and included 119 deputies. For more see Bilgiç, Hatıralarım,  p. 145. Bozbeyli said that 
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160 Bozbeyli, Yalnız Demokrat, p. 275; Đnan, Senatör, p. 45. 
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and ignorance as a technocrat. In that way, Demirel successfully gave the message 
that the AP inherited the developmentalist line of the DP. He explains his story of 
drifting into politics as an outcome of his feeling of responsibility to the society in 
which he was grown up. He had in mind, as he explained, to make Turkey a 
developed, modern, and prosperous country.162  
 
As the long-time leader of a mainstream political movement in Turkey which is 
conservative but more importantly developmentalist, it can be argued that Demirel 
is equating politics with serving one’s people. That is why, in his political line, 
social and economic development has had an important place. After all, while in 
power, Demirel immediately launched the giant projects of the Turkish Republic 
such as the Keban Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant, the Bosphorus Bridge, the 
Urfa Tunnel, the Đzmit Yarımca Petrochemical Complex, and the first TV 
broadcasting, all of which mark significant milestones in the history of 
development in Turkey. For him, the issues connected with being more 
“civilized” are at the same time the major issues of politics.163 He argued that, 
starting from the early Republic onward, politics had been shaped by the fight 
against poverty, despair and ignorance. To support his opinion, Demirel referred 
to Atatürk’s saying: “The country, in any case, will be modern, civilized, and 
affluent.”164 In this way, Demirel related politics to the concepts of welfare, 
development and civilization.  
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According to Demirel, the state should make its existence apparent to the people 
through its services; the people should not fear the state; they should think that the 
state has a compassionate attitude towards them. One can also argue that Demirel 
considers politics as a means to erase in the minds of the people the negative 
image of the state. Indeed, he argued that he entered into politics to make peace 
between the state, religion and the people.165 Consequently, Demirel endeavored 
to spread modernization to the masses and make them favorably inclined towards 
becoming modern. He expressed the rationale behind praising becoming civilized 
in his conception of politics by reminiscing about his childhood memories.  
The state always took but gave nothing. The state was distant. 
There was no policy of retirement or unemployment insurance. 
The village was unsociably living in the world of its own. 
People sent soldiers, paid taxes. There wasn’t even a single 
road in use. For the taxes that could not be paid, one had to 
work for the state as a laborer, for instance on road 
construction.166 
 
It is understood that, in Demirel’s conception, politics is closely related to 
reconciliation. Parallel to that, politics is also about maintaining stability 
(istikrarlaştırma). He states that politics should prioritize a bright future which 
would be the end result of efforts to adopt the changes that take place in the era 
one lives, not the trials and tribulations that the latter changes may also lead to. He 
added that what is important is that the expectations of the society should be 
met.167 In Demirel’s discourse, politics should not focus on bringing contentious 
issues up for discussion. According to Demirel, concentrating on solutions and 
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searching for the better to make the state and regime function well should always 
at the top of the political agenda.168 
 
For Demirel, politics is on the one hand, a scientific act that is centred around the 
human being and on the other, it is an artistic act.169 Politics is derived from 
science since science is grounded upon norms, upon reason and “Cartesian” 
thinking, but at the same time it is an art since art carries the sign of its creator. A 
politician, like an artist, leaves his mark upon the solutions of crucial issues. There 
are many ways to solve an issue, and it will not always be possible to find the best 
formula. However, what a politician can do is to do his best in finding the most 
appropriate way to deal with complicated issues. According to Demirel, a 
politician might choose one of the alternative policies based on reason. 
Nevertheless, the result carries the sign of his unique style, which makes politics 
an art.170  
 
Demirel perceived politics and political struggles “sacred” in that they will bring 
the development of the country and also involve a competition to serve one’s own 
nation. The highest aim of politics, according to Demirel, is to enable people to 
control their own future and have the right to make final decisions about 
themselves on the path to being contemporary, rich, and strong.171 Demirel 
claimed that politics should not be confined to a certain class of people; the 
                                                
168 From the keynote speech Demirel delivered in the Conference on the Problems of French State 
Administration and the Solutions Offered, 4 April 1996 in T.C Başbakanlık, Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın 
Süleyman Demirel’in Çeşitli Toplantılarda Yaptığı Konuşmalar III, p. 5. 
169 The interview of the author with Demirel, 21 December 2005. 
170 The Interview, 21 December 2005. 
171 Özgüven, A Life Devoted to the Grand Turkey Ideal, p. 34. 
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participation of the whole nation is necessary.172 This is in parallel with the 
horizontal dimension of democracy. Politics, for Demirel, is a human-centered 
phenomenon, which means that anything related to human beings is political. In 
his words, “the basis of politics is the love for humanity.”173 Hence, he 
emphasizes that politics should not be regarded merely as party politics.174 
 
In Demirel’s view, politics functions as a bridge between the state and nation. He 
thus highlights the prominence of politicians.175 They are, as Demirel thinks, the 
voice of the people.176 Therefore, it is crucial for politicians to be in dialogue with 
the people. In that way, according to Demirel, politicians could continue to act 
both as a teacher and a learner.177 
 
Demirel’s political principles comprised the following: being patient, never losing 
confidence and courage, and not giving up easily. These principles can be 
deduced from the response of Demirel to his wife who was wondering what might 
happen from then on while they were detained in a military base in Hamzakoy. 
Demirel said, “That is what we have to experience. We should be calm and 
patient. I will return [to active politics] when the time comes.”178 Demirel believes 
that “if one enters politics, he should be well-prepared for anything that might 
                                                
172 Özgüven, A Life Devoted to the Grand Turkey Ideal, p. 67. 
173 Süleyman Demirel, AP Genel Başkanlığına Adaylığımı Neden Koyuyorum? (Ankara: Resimli 
Posta Matbaası, 1964), p. 11. 
174 The Interview, 3 January 2006. 
175 Abdullah Uraz, ed. Devletimize, Demokrasimize ve Kendimize Güven (Ankara: Desen, 1995), p. 
53. 
176 Abdullah Uraz, Baba: Demirel’in Büyük Türkiye Kavgası, Demokrasi ve Kalkınma (Ankara: 
EKA, 1993), p. 237. 
177 The Interview, 3 January 2006. 
178 Donat, Cumhuriyet’in Kara Kutusu, p. 28. 
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happen.”179 Therefore in line with this motto of him, he never lost hope and 
enthusiasm even after he was banned from politics. On the other hand, Demirel 
argues that politics is not the art of heroism. It requires a secure environment.180 
He thinks that in politics when necessary one should act in a courageous manner. 
However, one should not unnecessarily employ force; rather, one should be able 
to grapple with problems in an elegant manner.181  
 
For Demirel, those involved in politics should have the ability to forgive others 
and forget previous disputes and troubles. He emphasizes being constructive and 
conciliatory in political life, since the opposite may prove to be incapacitating and 
immobilizing for a politician. Demirel also gives importance to the necessity of 
being cautious in politics and says that “If you don’t know how to put the car in 
reverse, you can’t park. Politics is pretty much alike. Stepping on the gas pedal 
continuously is not rational. You should also know how to put on the brakes. One 
day, you may get to a situation requiring retreat. If you don’t manage to do that 
then you will stumble [and lose everything].”182  
 
In Demirel’s political vocabulary, politics is the “art of opportunities” and is about 
acting rationally.183 Thus, there is no benefit in discarding some alternatives just 
because of painful memories from the past. His political style is best reflected in 
the three pieces of golden advice he gave to a journalist: “Never forget the past. 
                                                
179 Donat, Cumhuriyet’in Kara Kutusu, p. 39. 
180 The Interview, 3 January 2006. 
181 Uraz, Demirel’in Büyük Türkiye Kavgası, p. 273. 
182 Donat, Cumhuriyet’in Kara Kutusu, p. 59. 
183 Uraz, Demirel’in Büyük Türkiye Kavgası, p. 19. 
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Draw lessons from the past. But do not be stuck in the past.”184 Demirel’s said 
attitude has been interpreted by some as a Machiavellian approach to politics. One 
of Demirel’s former political colleagues argued that Demirel was driven by a lust 
for power hence labeled him “as a chemist of politics (siyaset kimyageri) who 
sees every kind of power legitimate.”185  
 
 
3.4. An Overview of the Context Shaping Demirel’s Views on State and 
Democracy 
 
In the Turkish political tradition, the state has always been the most potent and 
autonomous phenomenon. Even though the Ottoman system was based on a 
hereditary sultanic regime, Devlet-i Âliyye (Sublime State) as an eminent entity 
became in the process more than the dynasty itself. Insuring the viability of state 
was the first priority, which in the last decades of the empire was embodied in the 
question of how the state could be salvaged. With the advent of the Republic, the 
discourse on the state as being sacred and omnipotent has lingered in the 
mainstream political traditions of the Republican days.186 
 
The issue of the continuity of the state that the Republican cadre has always been 
sensitive about is also shared by the political philosophy of the center-right. The 
latter is said to target those who make the people disenchanted with their state by 
pursuing elitist policies in its name. The founding leader of the DP, Celal Bayar, 
                                                
184 Donat, Cumhuriyet’in Kara Kutusu, p. 28. 
185 Đnan, Senatör, p. 67, 134. 
186 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, Chapter Two. 
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asserted that, without harming the characteristics of the “guardian state” (hami 
devlet), people should be encouraged to participate in politics, and this can be 
realized with a fair electoral system. He added that our traditional understanding 
of the state could only be kept alive in the hands of “effective governments” 
(“kuvvetli hükûmetler”) that had a great majority (kuvvetli ekseriyet) in the 
assembly.187  
 
It can be deduced that the leaders of the DP had a problem neither with the strong, 
father-like state nor with its mechanisms, but with the very people who were 
acting as state elites. Bayar stated that they, like Đnönü, thought to establish 
democracy on the basis of our thousand-year state tradition.188 The fundamental 
discord between the approaches of the DP and the CHP, for Bayar, was in the 
conception of state administration: the DP espoused the idea that democracy in 
Turkey would be realized through acting upon the principle that “sovereignty is 
vested fully and unconditionally in the nation and the nation itself shall exercise 
its sovereignty,” whereas the CHP, according to Bayar, embraced the idea that 
democracy would function upon the principle of a “soft sovereignty of the people” 
based on new authorized organs which take part in exercising sovereignty in the 
name of the nation.189 Hence, the DP wanted to make a shift in the locus of 
stateness from the CHP, which claims to have a vanguard mission, to the 
parliament, regarded as the true representative of national will.  
 
                                                
187 Celal Bayar, Başvekilim Adnan Menderes (Istanbul: Tercüman, 1986), p. 42. 
188 Bayar, Başvekilim Adnan Menderes, p. 10. 
189 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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As the leader of the AP, Demirel voiced a similar view and criticized the state 
administration of the CHP in one of his pre-election speeches as follows: 
All of the republican reforms realized were set to be successful 
by the help of state pressure and command of law. The support 
of people, mostly, was not in demand. The democratic 
methods, two of which are persuading and informing, were 
hardly applied. Hence, people has come to have become a 
complaint not of the reforms but of the suppression made in the 
name of reforms.190  
 
As Tanel Demirel points out, the significant feature of the AP was its being an 
opponent of the bureaucratic-statist alliance that was believed to include the CHP, 
the higher echelons of the military, university faculty members, the higher cadres 
of the civil bureaucracy, and the media.191 For Demirel, the coming to power of 
the DP in 1950 was a move of grabbing the state from the hands of the state elites, 
whereas the toppling of the DP by a military coup in 1960 was a move to take the 
state back from the hands of people.192 Demirel did not consider the state as an 
oppressive apparatus transforming the society and causing social change. During 
the election campaign, Demirel, referring to the practices of the CHP, told the 
electorate that the AP will change the image of “the state cracking the whip.” 
Hence, it is clear that early in his career, Demirel, like the politicians having DP 
origins, paid special attention to the significance of the state, which, according to 
him, had to embrace all of the people. Since they viewed state and nation as 
integral parts, any ideology opposing this integrity was fiercely rejected by the 
AP.193 Demirel asserted that the state’s main task is to serve the nation as a whole 
for the maintenance of public peace and welfare.  
 
                                                
190 Süleyman Demirel, Seçim Konuşmaları 2 (Ankara: Doğuş Matbaası, 1966). 
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The political atmosphere in which the AP was established had impacts on the 
developing a double-strategy194 for the party to survive. The founders of the party 
realized the difficulty to survive in a political domain under the military 
supervision if they gave the impression that the party was the true heir of the DP. 
They were also aware that they should be responsive to the demands and 
sensitivities of the political base of the overthrown DP to have broad popular 
support. Bozbeyli defined the situation of the party as “being caught in the 
middle;” the AP struggled, on one hand, for not being perceived as a menace by 
the military rule, and on the other, for convincing the people that it would correct 
the injustices done to Democrats.195 As demonstrated, the AP was stuck in finding 
a balance between these two strategies. This was also reflected in the party’s 
internal affairs. The AP, in its establishment period, encompassed mainly two 
groups of people who had different perspectives on choosing one of the two 
strategies.196 For a while this double discourse worked out to hold these divergent 
groups together but gradually it turned into a source of clash within the party. 
However, the AP’s double discourse especially on the civil-military relations 
continued to be used.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
194 For an in-depth analysis on the AP’s double-discourse, see Cizre, AP-Ordu Đlişkileri. 
195 Bozbeyli, Yalnız Demokrat, p. 137. 
196 The Moderates (Mutediller/Ilımlılar) believed that the party should avoid using an accusatory 
tone and should delay dealing with the issues which could be interpreted by the military regime as 
opposition to May 27. On the other hand the Hardliners (Müfritler/Hışımlılar) insisted on 
appealing to the political base of the DP by fighting against the injustices of the military regime. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DEMĐREL AS A POLITICAL PARTY LEADER 
 
 
 
4.1. The Justice Party Era 
4.1.1. State-Society Relations, “National Will,” and Democracy 
 
The followers of the political line of the defunct DP gathered around the newly 
established parties, one of which was the AP. Taking the party’s emotional 
anchorage to the DP’s ideology into account, the AP chose adalet as its name to 
imply that it was a movement to bring justice to the banned DP cadres. However, 
due to the constraints of the post-coup atmosphere, the AP chose not to be overtly 
critical on the “injustices” of the military take-over. As mentioned a double 
strategy was employed by the party. Using democracy as a term was convenient 
for the purpose of this double strategy.  
 
In general, democracy was equated with the manifestation of the “national will” 
that could be realized by increasing the political participation of the masses 
through elections. According to Demirel, democracy could not be defined as a 
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system other than nation’s self-rule.197 Indeed, this way of thinking is very 
dominant in the center-right. Parliament is perceived as a sacred place where the 
will of the nation becomes manifest. Sharing this argument on the sanctity of the 
parliament, the party’s mission hence is summarized as making the nation’s will 
supreme, which, as noted, is believed to be realized through fair elections.  
 
The relationship between state and democracy was obviously emphasized in the 
discourse of the AP. For Demirel, the maintenance of an effective state is 
dependent on a democratic regime. In the 1973 Election Pamphlet, the “great 
Turkey” ideal was defined as the wish to make the Turkish nation and state more 
powerful and honorable. On the other hand, the military’s involvement in politics 
is depicted as a problem for democracy.198 Moreover, Demirel pointed out that 
military interventions weaken the state, since they indicate the defeat of the state 
at the hands of the “street.”199  
 
In 1970s, Demirel began to use the term hürriyetçi demokrasi (democracy with 
special emphasis on rights and liberties). The rationale behind using the word 
democracy with the addition of an adjective might be that of defining how the AP 
took the term “democracy.” Hürriyetçi demokrasi commends a regime in which 
people are not silenced and the latter are well aware of the fact that the real 
owners of democratic regime are no other bodies but themselves.200 He underlined 
the importance of freedom of speech for a democratic regime to flourish and 
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stated that in a country where anything could not be discussed freely no one can 
claim that freedom is enjoyed. 201 
 
Demirel’s loyalty to constitutional principles is evident even in the days when he 
was fiercely critical of the Constitution in general. For instance, in 1968 when 
student movements (and hence tension) were on the rise, a delegate of the AP 
took the floor in the AP Congress and accused the AP government of condoning 
the street demonstrations. Demirel as a response read an article from the 
Constitution emphasizing the horizontal dimension of democracy: “Everybody 
has the right to participate in peaceful demonstrations.” Then, addressing this 
delegate, he said that enforcing people’s rights to demonstrate is a good thing. He 
made an analogy by saying that “Roads will not be worn away by walking 
provided that aggression, violence and guns would not come into the picture.”202 
 
Demirel placed emphasis on the responsibility of institutions, too. He asserted that 
none of the institutions of Turkish Republic, including the constitutional 
institutions, could escape from assuming responsibilities. Adding that reform in 
democracies is a continuous process, he linked responsibility with reform and 
argued that 
A democratic regime would lose its power in case of its 
objection to reform. If we rejected reform, then autonomous 
institutions, which are established upon the norms brought by 
parliaments having the will of nation, would transcend the 
state. In that case the sovereignty of state would be 
damaged.203 
 
                                                
201 Quoted in Turgut, Görüntüler I, p. 51.  
202 Donat, Cumhuriyetin Kara Kutusu, pp. 10-11. 
203 Quoted in Turgut, Görüntüler I, pp. 54-55. 
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This shows that Demirel gave great importance to the vertical dimension too. At 
that point, he associated responsibility with the trust of the people by claiming that 
in the case of a dysfunctional political responsibility mechanism, citizens lose 
their reliance on the state and government. What is important is to preserve the 
trust of the people.204  
 
As Demirel suggested, it is a prerequisite of a functioning and open regime that all 
institutions fulfill their duties. Government is an important institution in a 
democratic regime but not the sole one. Free elections, free parliament, free 
judiciary, free press, free labor unions, and autonomous universities comprise the 
institutions of a democratic regime according to Demirel.205 He was aiming at 
having a state that embraces the nation with all of its institutions.206 Thus, state 
and nation came together in this way in his discourse. 
 
Although praise of religion and moral values is common in center-right circles, 
the necessity of secularism as a principle is also emphasized. For them, 
secularism, on the one hand, means limiting the role of religion as an independent 
political authority. On the other, it is also interpreted as the absence of state 
control over religion, denoting the horizontal dimension of democracy. It is 
underlined that secularism does not give any rights to the state such as forbidding 
religious practices and morality or showing hostility toward religious people.207  
 
                                                
204 Ibid., p. 59. 
205 Ibid., pp. 397-398. 
206 Ibid., p. 430. 
207 Ali Fuat Başgil, Din ve Laiklik  (Istanbul: Kubbealtı Neşriyatı, 2003), pp. 186-87. 
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In line with these arguments, Demirel stated that the AP adopted a policy of 
neither controlling nor exploiting religion.208 For Demirel, secularism could be 
equated neither with the animosity to religion nor with atheism. Contrary to some 
opposing views, Demirel insisted that secularism and Islam are compatible. 
Adopting new techniques and borrowing material products from the West would 
not lead to incompatibility with Islam since, as he argued, Islam has rational 
foundations that facilitate the process of modernization.209 Moreover, he claimed 
that what democracy envisages for humanity is basically similar to the 
fundamental principles of Islam, its orders, and its guided path.210 In the program 
of the AP, it was pointed out that in a secular state the citizens are not coerced into 
cutting their ties with their faiths but rather are left free to live as they believe.211 
Demirel did not see any discrepancy between the party’s views on secularism and 
the party’s practices regarding the state’s role in setting up religious schools and 
in supporting religious education. Indeed, that is the point where Demirel tried to 
strike a balance between the vertical and the horizontal dimensions.  
 
Demirel’s success in fostering close relationships with specific religious orders 
and communities was a widely known fact. Nonetheless, even this intimacy did 
not cast suspicion on Demirel’s loyalty to the secular regime. For instance, Kenan 
Evren, the secularist leader of the 1980 military intervention, stated that Demirel 
would never indulge the people who wish to establish a regime based on 
Shari’a.212 
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4.1.2. Relations with the Military 
 
Demirel became the leader of the AP at a time when civil-military relations were 
going through a difficult phase. The civil-military relations have evolved in a 
confrontational style in Turkish political development. As mentioned, the military 
has always been an important institution in Turkish history. Being the most 
educated and disciplined body, it has always been an ardent supporter of 
modernization embodied in the development of a new identity that is national, 
secular, Western, and culturally homogeneous. After the mission of “saving the 
country” had successfully been completed, the route of the National Struggle in 
the early 1920s turned towards setting up a completely different regime than the 
Ottoman one. Since then, the military has undertaken another responsibility, that 
of being the guardian of the basic tenets of the newly established Republican 
regime.213 As Karpat argues, the military has been intimately associated with the 
Republican state since its inception.214 Hence, maintaining the civilian supremacy 
over the military became a difficult task in Turkey which from time to time has 
led to political crises and breakdowns.215 
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The first military coup, plotted by a group of middle-ranking officers, took place 
on May 27, 1960 and removed the ruling party, the DP, from power. It was 
declared by the junta that the unconstitutional acts of the former government of 
the DP provoked the army to intervene. The first announcement of the junta 
clarified the rationale of the coup as “extricating the parties from the 
irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen” and “having just and free 
elections to be held as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an 
above-party and impartial administration, and for handing over the administration 
to which ever party wins the elections.”216  
 
As far as the head of the junta, General Cemal Gürsel, was concerned, the 
politicians who were “enchanted with the passion of politics” were responsible for 
the social and political unrest.217 As indicated by Türkeş, the colonel who read the 
communiqué from the radio, the officers making up the junta thought that for the 
sake of electoral gains, the political parties made many concessions that became 
the biggest obstacle to solving the urgent problems that the country faced at the 
time.218 However, the junta’s close collaboration with the main opposition party, 
the CHP, clearly showed that the target of the intervention was the DP 
government, not the political parties in general.  
 
The military ruling council, the National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi -
MBK), consisting initially of thirty eight and then of twenty three members, 
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 92 
governed the country until it was considered safe to restore civilian rule. Despite 
the fact that establishing an enduring military rule was not the intention of the 
MBK members, they wished to safeguard the regime and the outcomes of the 
coup in return for relinquishing government control. As one of the exit guarantees, 
a new Constitution was prepared and promulgated with a considerable 
involvement of the military regime. The bicameral Constituent Assembly (Kurucu 
Meclis) which was established in December 1960 dealt with this issue. One of the 
chambers included the MBK members. In the civilian chamber, there were 
representatives of only two parties, the CHP and the Republican Peasants Nation 
Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi – CKMP), and of some institutions such 
as the judiciary, universities, bar associations, trade unions, and the press, in 
addition to the appointees of the head of state and the MBK. Hence, under the 
shadow of the military, the 1961 Constitution was adopted by the Constituent 
Assembly and then ratified by 61.7 percent of the popular vote.219 With the 1961 
Constitution, the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu -MGK) was 
established. The Council set the precedent of the military influencing government 
policy on external and internal security matters, and hence laid a legal ground for 
the military’s assuming a formal role in the political decision-making process 
henceforth.220  
                                                
219 As Özbudun observes, the circumstances of the constitution’s creation were beyond the 
requirements of a democratic constitution-making. For more on his assessments, see Özbudun, 
Contemporary Turkish Politics, pp. 54-55. 
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for submitting its views on formulation and implementation of the national security policy of the 
state to the Council of Ministers. It was also authorized to determine the measures deemed 
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orienting the Turkish nation around the national ideals and values in accordance with the 
Atatürkist principles and reforms. In order to eliminate the threats against these principles of the 
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Although propaganda against the Constitution was forbidden before it was put to a 
referendum, the hardliners within the AP pushed Gümüşpala to start a negative 
campaign against it. The hardliners were fiercely criticized by the moderate group 
of the AP who thought that careful steps should be taken in this process not to 
alienate the military. The opposing voices within the AP caused displeasure 
among the members of the MBK. Gürsel heavily and publicly criticized the 
party’s “sinister activities” (“meş’um faaliyetler”) and forced the AP to reorganize 
the party’s cadres by purging the members affiliated with the DP.221 
 
As another exit guarantee, the MBK proposed Gürsel’s presidency to the civilians. 
This move, too, caused disagreement within the AP. Some members wanted to 
propose Gümüşpala as presidential candidate. However, he did not welcome this 
idea. Some others put forward another name, A. Fuat Başgil, professor of 
Constitutional Law at Istanbul University, as a candidate for presidency. He was 
backed by the CKMP and the AP. However the latter party declared that if it was 
forced to do so, it would support Gürsel. The MBK and the armed forces were 
against Başgil’s candidacy. Indeed they accepted no other names but Gürsel as a 
candidate. A group of generals and colonels gathered in the War College and 
signed a protocol proposing an intervention before the newly elected assembly 
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convened. Başgil withdrew his candidacy after he was invited to the prime 
ministry to be informed about “the tragic events that might likely occur” if he 
insisted on his own candidacy.222 The party leaders were called to the prime 
ministry on October 24, where they were informed about the demands of the 
military. The leaders of four political parties -Đnönü (CHP), Gümüşpala (AP), 
Bölükbaşı (CKMP), and Alican (YTP)- signed a protocol agreeing that they 
would not introduce any other candidate but do their best in their groups to vote 
for Gürsel.223 Those efforts made Gürsel elected president by the parliament on 
October 26, 1961.  
 
As another requirement of the protocol signed by the leaders, the CHP and AP 
was coerced into setting up a coalition government (20 November 1961-25 June 
1962) after the elections had been held. This was another issue that had created 
rift within the AP members. The hardliners strongly opposed to be a part of the 
coalition government imposed by the military regime. However, once again, the 
party headed in the direction that the moderates demanded. Despite the objection 
of the party group, the coalition was formed with the decision of the party’s 
General Executive Board.224 
 
Although everything was rearranged under the supervision of the military, the 
unrest within the armed forces could not be quelled easily. Some officers who 
attempted to stage a coup on February 22, 1962 were deterred by the then prime 
minister Đnönü. The officers were told that they would not be tried if the coup was 
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aborted.  As a coalition partner, Gümüşpala told Đnönü that his party could support 
this proposal in the parliament. While saying this he had in mind that together 
with this proposal the issue of granting political amnesty to the leaders and the 
rank-and-file members of the DP could also be solved. However Đnönü replied 
that those two could not be solved together since they agitated one another and 
hence the right time did not come yet.225 This again stirred things up in the AP. 
The hardliners wanted to keep the amnesty issue central in the agenda of the 
party. The military reacted fiercely to such kind of comments and President 
Gürsel warned the leaders. In fact, Gürsel was uneasy about some AP members’ 
actions and remarks that he perceived as vengeful and provocative concerning the 
May 27 regime. There was an increase in the number of military officers who 
began to think that another military coup was inevitable. The tense atmosphere 
brought the termination of the CHP-AP coalition government only six months 
after it was formed. Nonetheless, uncontrolled elements in the AP continued to 
upset the military during the second coalition government (CHP- YTP-CKMP) 
period (25 June 1962-25 December 1963). However the ups and downs in the 
statements of the party waned gradually. As Bölükbaşı argued, considerable 
change occurred in the discourse of the AP for the sake of formulating a 
monolithic discourse after the headquarters of the party in Ankara was attacked in 
1962. Accordingly, the party turned into an advocate of the declaration of May 27 
as a national festival.226 
 
In general terms, the AP under Gümüşpala tried not to disturb the military. When 
the party established its organizations, some retired generals loyal to May 27 were 
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recruited with the opinion that they would function as “lightening conductor.” 
While announcing the establishment of the AP, Gümüşpala underlined that they 
would not tolerate any moves that could overshadow the May 27 Movement. 
Moreover he added that their comments on the policies of the party in power 
would be made by expressing their opinions not by criticizing.227 However, as the 
follow up events explained above demonstrated, this cautious style, though from 
time to time, did not succeed to keep the party safe from the pressures of the 
military. That said, in anyway the use of double discourse got a foothold in the 
party’s political tradition.228 
 
Demirel, after he was elected the Chairman of the AP, continued to benefit from 
this double discourse to soften the image of the AP in the eyes of the military. To 
do so, he preferred a constructive approach in his speeches rather than harsh 
criticism of the military coup. It is narrated that just after the AP won the 1965 
general election Demirel visited the MBK members and stated the aim of the 
party as “leaving behind the previous feuds and focusing on the services.”229 He 
delayed the issue of political amnesty so as not to anger the post-coup military 
administration, but at the same time tried to find a compromise so as not to draw a 
reaction from his fellow party members.  Demirel tried to send a message to his 
electorate that he is protecting the former members of the DP by emphasizing the 
necessity to heal the wounds of the past. To show that he did not pose a threat to 
the military administration, Demirel highlighted that this should be done without 
animosity and not as an act of revenge. This is actually the core of what he calls 
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the effort to reconcile the nation with the military. However the issue of political 
amnesty was brought to the agenda again in 1969. This time the CHP gave the 
green light to the AP that it would support a proposal to return the political rights 
to the DP members. Although the two sides finally reached a compromise, the 
military took steps to block this initiative. As Bozbeyli reported the then CGS 
Tağmaç forwarded the reactions of the generals to the then president Sunay who 
immediately called the then speaker of the parliament Bozbeyli to convey these 
reactions.230 Even under such a tense atmosphere the proposal was adopted by the 
National Assembly and referred to the Senate. Subsequently a controversy broke 
out on the issue of time assigned to the Senate to vote on the draft. The pressure 
exerted by the military for making the proposal void continued to mount. The 
parliament took vacation after the proposal of the AP was accepted in the 
parliament. In that way the constitutional provision stipulating that when the 
parliament is on vacation the time assigned to the senate for voting on a draft shall 
not be counted was operated. In doing so, the draft stayed in the Senate without 
being finalized. As Bozbeyli reported some rumors were circulating about 
Demirel that he had not been willing to resolve the issue of political amnesty. 231 
The claim was that some deputies feared that they might lose the elections if the 
defunct DP members returned to politics. Despite accepting that these fears were 
valid for some AP deputies, Bozbeyli did not believe that Demirel had such 
concerns but might have taken the reactions of the military seriously and 
considered delaying the issue to the post-election period as a rational move.232 
Bozbeyli’s observation that the delay in returning the political rights of the DP 
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members brought relaxation is acceptable.233 On the other hand as mentioned this 
had become a starting point for the split of the AP. 
 
Starting from the end of the 1960s, the AP under the chairmanship of Demirel 
became unsuccessful in coping with the mounting political tension. The unsolved 
economic problems along with the increase in violence between extremist groups 
led to a debate on the legitimacy of the ruling AP. Some radicals in the military 
began to be highly critical of the policies of Prime Minister Demirel. They wanted 
radical social reforms to be carried out, and for that purpose those radicals, a small 
minority of military officers, were in favor of establishing a long-term military 
regime. For instance, one of the generals said to his colleagues in a meeting that 
he had no trust in the AP government since it lacked qualified administrators. 
Moreover, he emphasized that he could not approve a person as prime minister 
who had previously worked for an American company.234 This is an indication 
that Demirel started to be seen as undesirable. The radical officers mostly 
criticized Demirel for “pleasing one specific class (zümre)” at the expense of the 
national interest and of giving more importance to personal or group gains rather 
than promoting the general interest.235 
 
However, the radicals were not the only ones being frustrated by the policies of 
the AP. Even moderate generals were uncomfortable with the worsening political 
situation. Furthermore, they were afraid that the radicals within the military would 
attempt to launch a coup. Hence, as a last minute move, on March 12, 1971 the 
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top military commanders presented a letter of memorandum declaring the 
following: 
1. The Parliament and the Government, through their sustained 
policies, views and actions, have driven our country into 
anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest. 
They have caused the public to lose all hope of rising to the 
level of contemporary civilization which was set for us by 
Atatürk as a goal, and have failed to realize the reforms 
stipulated by the Constitution. The future of the Turkish 
Republic is therefore seriously threatened. 
 
2. The assessment by the Parliament, in a spirit above partisan 
considerations, of the solutions needed to eliminate the concern 
and disillusionment of the Turkish Armed Forces, which have 
sprung from the bosom of the Turkish nation, over this grave 
situation; and the formation, within the context of democratic 
principles, of a strong and credible government, which will 
neutralize the current anarchical situation and which, inspired 
by Atatürk’s views, will implement the reformist laws 
envisaged by the Constitution, are considered essential. 
 
3. Unless this is done quickly, the Turkish Armed Forces are 
determined to take over the administration of the State in 
accordance with the powers vested in them by the laws to 
protect and preserve the Turkish Republic. 
Please be informed. 236 
 
After discussing the situation with his party notables, Demirel resigned. Some 
people criticized him, saying that he should have not yielded so quickly.237 
However, Demirel reminded these ctirics of the threat that if the government did 
not resign then the parliament would be dissolved due to a possible military 
seizure of power.238 Demirel’s fundamental motive at that time was to keep the 
parliament functioning. Ostensibly, the AP was not ruling the country any more, 
but it still kept its parliamentary majority. Demirel used that trump card in the 
presidential elections. The AP with the support of the CHP managed to resist the 
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election of General Faruk Gürler, the military’s preferred candidate, to the office 
of presidency. 
 
Not long after the 1971 military memorandum, the political turmoil resumed. 
Nihat Erim, an independent deputy, assumed the duty of forming the government. 
The first Erim government (26 March 1971-11 December 1971), which was an 
above-party government, ended with the resignation of Erim after eleven 
ministers had resigned. The second Erim government (11 December 1971-22 May 
1972) was formed after he was appointed again by President Sunay. The second 
above-party government was terminated with Erim’s resignation due to his health 
problems. Afterwards, President Sunay asked Suat Hayri Ürgüplü to form a 
government. However, Ürgüplü’s cabinet list was vetoed by Sunay on the grounds 
that it was not in line with the Memorandum of March 12. The following 
government was formed by a member of the Republican Senate, Ferit Melen. It 
was a coalition government (22 May 1972-15 April 1973) consisting of the AP, 
CHP, and CGP. Melen resigned after Korutürk was elected president. Korutürk 
gave the duty of forming a government to Naim Talu, who had been nominated by 
the President to the Republican Senate. The Talu government (15 April 1973-26 
January 1974) was, like its predecessor, a coalition government formed by the AP 
and CGP. The parliamentary elections were held in October 1973. Neither the 
CHP nor the AP could form a government. Talu was reappointed. His efforts to 
bring together the CHP, AP, and CGP were fruitless. As a consequence of the 
opposition coming from the ranks of the AP, Talu resigned. 
Following the interim governments, the era of coalition governments, which 
brought instability, started. First, the CHP-MSP coalition government (26 January 
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1974-17 November 1974) under the premiership of Bülent Ecevit was formed. 
The disagreement between the two coalition partners brought the end of the 
government. President Korutürk appointed Sadi Irmak, a Senate member, to form 
the government. His minority government (17 November 1974-31 March 1975), 
which was formed by four deputies from the CGP and the remaining ministers 
from outsiders, could not obtain vote of confidence; hence Irmak resigned. Under 
the leadership of Demirel, the succeeding coalition government was formed on 
March 31, 1975 among the AP-MSP-MHP-CGP, and this lasted until the 1977 
parliamentary elections. 
 
Demirel, as the leader of the coalition government and prime minister, removed 
the Commander of the Land Forces, General Namık Kemal Ersun from his post 
on June 1, 1977. That was three months earlier than the time Ersun’s tour of duty 
was to be completed. Hence this decision suggested varied interpretations. For 
Evren, it was a vengeful act on the part of Demirel.239 Within the year of 1977, 
Demirel had made a visit to the eastern provinces. In Elazığ, he was presented 
with a military shield by the Commandant of the Third Army, General Ali Fethi 
Esener. It is narrated by Evren that General Ersun had asked for information on 
that incident adding that he had not given his permission to what General Esener 
had done.240  
 
After the 1977 elections, on June 21, Ecevit established a majority government. It 
could not endure more than a month; with a vote of no-confidence, it fell. Demirel 
was again asked to form a government. The AP, MSP, and MHP came together 
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and formed the second nationalist front government (21 July 1977-5 January 
1978). Demirel, shortly after becoming prime minister, submitted a decree on the 
appointment of General Esener as the Commander of the Land Forces. However, 
President Korutürk did not sign the decree on account of the fact that this 
appointment was not in tune with the hierarchical order of the army. It was the 
Commandant of the First Army who was supposed to be the Commander of the 
Land Forces. Demirel tried to oblige Korutürk to sign the decree, saying that he 
would resign unless Korutürk approved it. Nonetheless, Korutürk did not change 
his decision. Demirel’s attempt was considered to be interfering in the military’s 
internal affairs and caused mixed reactions. On the other hand, Evren claimed that 
the then CGS General Semih Sancar must have been in concert with Demirel.241 
He noted that the appointment of the Commander of the Land Forces required 
preparation of three-name list by the CGS, nomination by the Council of 
Ministers and the approval by the president. These examples show that Demirel 
established a somewhat complex relationship with the military that changed from 
time to time.  
 
The CHP tabled a motion of censure which brought the end of the government on 
December 31, 1977. The party claimed that the coalition government could 
maintain security neither internally nor externally, had shattered national unity 
with its polarizing discourse, accelerated poverty and violated the constitution. 
The government fell as a result of the vote of no-confidence. 
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Ecevit was assigned the duty of forming the new government. Change of 
governments was so fast that the social and economic problems went from bad to 
worse. The economic situation of the country began to deteriorate day by day with 
a rocketing inflation rate. Violent clashes along ideological and sectarian lines 
escalated into armed conflict between opposing camps. Following the notorious 
Kahramanmaraş incidents that took place in December 1978, in thirteen provinces 
martial law was declared. In the General Staff Headquarters, a new Command to 
ensure coordination in the state of emergency called Sıkıyönetim Eşgüdüm 
Komutanlığı was set up. The opposition leaders Demirel and Türkeş objected to 
this Command on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. However, it is 
important to note here that this Command continued to function during the 
minority government (12 November 1979-12 September 1980), which was 
formed by Demirel with the external support of the MSP and MHP following the 
resignation of Ecevit after the CHP was defeated in by-elections held on October 
14, 1979. (The AP took the majority of the votes in all of the five cities –Konya, 
Manisa, Edirne, Muğla, Aydın).  
 
During the term of the Ecevit government, Demirel began to implicitly criticize 
the military, while he was seemingly scathing about the CHP. He claimed that the 
CHP government was trying to make use of the military’s influence to conceal its 
failures. It is interesting that at that point Demirel made a reference to the once 
stated formula that the the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri -TSK) 
plus the CHP is equal to government and argued that his opponents were trying to 
resurrect it. This statement of Demirel angered Evren and other commanders in 
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the sense that it implied that there was a connection between the military and the 
CHP.242 
 
Despite the martial law, the armed struggle between the rightists and leftists 
intensified. The military urged the leaders of the AP and the CHP to form a 
coalition government as a solution for the crisis,243 but these were futile efforts 
since Demirel regarded it as “against the nature of things”244 and a “tactic [of 
CHP] for concealing [its] maladministration”245 and hence vehemently rejected it. 
Indeed, the two parties could not even agree on a candidate for the office of 
presidency, which was vacant for six months. The military became so frustrated 
with the social disorder and the political deadlock that the then CGS General 
Kenan Evren presented a memorandum-like letter to President Korutürk on 
December 27, 1979. Evren noted that the decision to submit such a letter to the 
president was taken in a meeting which was held on December 21 with the 
participation of force commanders, army commanders, and commanders of the 
war colleges. It was agreed that a letter would be presented to the president, as he 
was the chairman of the MGK, but addressed not only to the government but also 
to all the constitutional institutions that were responsible for defusing the crisis.246  
 
President Korutürk thought that it would be better to hand in the letter after New 
Year’s Eve. On January 2, 1980, both Demirel and Ecevit were called to Çankaya 
and notified of the letter. Ecevit stated that it was the government that was the 
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addressee of the letter. Demirel was well aware of the fact that the public in 
Turkey has always been sensitive about such letters presented by the generals, 
which might well precede a military take-over. Therefore, he immediately wanted 
to meet with Evren. Demirel tried to curb the mounting tension by underlining 
that the letter’s addressee was not solely the government, referring to what Evren 
said to him in their meeting that took place on January 7.247 Evren confirmed that 
the letter was written to all political parties and constitutional bodies. Futhermore, 
Evren underlined that it was a coincidence that the letter was presented in the term 
of the AP government.248  
 
 Demirel, personally, was not convinced by Evren’s response but, to prevent 
agitation, preferred to give people the message that there was no clash between 
him and the military. However, at the same time, he tried to eliminate any planned 
actions of the generals. In the third meeting of the state of emergency 
coordination, Demirel argued that  
The assault –referring to the armed clashes between the 
ideologically polarized groups– was directed against the state. 
Nevertheless, the state should overcome it on legitimate 
grounds, through legitimate ways, with legitimate power. The 
reason behind my drawing the framework described above is 
that I have great respect for the rule of law. It is the vigilance 
of the citizens that is stated in the constitution as the guarantee 
for safeguarding the regime.249 
 
This shows that Demirel underlined the fact that any external intervention in 
politics will be illegitimate. In that way, he linked state and politics within the 
legitimate framework drawn by the rule of law. Demirel’s suspicion turned out to 
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be correct and on September 12, 1980 the military toppled down the government 
and dissolved the parliament.  
 
Demirel kept his silence about the pre-coup period until the former junta leader 
Kenan Evren published his memoirs. The basic point Evren made in his book is 
that the criticisms centered on the intention of the leaders of the intervention are 
not valid. He states that the allegation that they did not make an all-out effort to 
stop the violent clashes is not true. As a counter-move against Evren, Demirel 
opened a Pandora’s Box by writing a book and responding to Evren’s claims. He 
raised the question that if there was no preparation for a coup to take over political 
power, then how could the armed forces explain their failure to stop the bloodshed 
despite the state of emergency, when it immediately stopped following the coup. 
For Demirel, Evren’s book was an attempt to counter the allegations by distorting 
the reality. 
  
While writing against Evren’s claims, Demirel is said to be cautious in 
maintaining his respect to the TSK as an institution. He tried to handle the issue 
by differentiating the top five generals who prepared the coup from the whole 
institution. This is important in order to understand the place of the TSK in 
Demirel’s political discourse. In that way, throughout his term of office in 
Çankaya, it was not a difficult task for Demirel to establish cordial relations with 
the military; that in turn made him a respected leader in the eyes of the officers, 
strengthening Demirel’s hands as a president in the hard times of civil-military 
relations. 
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According to Demirel, the 1980 military intervention did not occur due to the 
shortcomings of the politicians. Demirel, in his book, portrayed a different picture 
of the pre-coup Turkey. He claimed that it is a distortion to place the blame for the 
factors making the state dysfunctional and the state of emergency unsuccessful 
only on the government. Since in the areas where a state of emergency was 
declared the military had a certain degree of autonomy regarding which measures 
to adopt, the government should not be depicted as solely responsible for the 
anarchy. Demirel explicitly accused Evren and the other four top-ranking generals 
of willingly adopting a hands-off policy to worsen the situation so that a coup 
would become legitimate and necessary.250 Demirel also pointed out that, at those 
times, he believed that the soldiers did not shirk their duties but rather were not 
allowed to fulfill their duties by the architects of the coup.251 For Demirel, the 
costs of the 1980 military take-over were numerous. It damaged the state and the 
regime, and discredited the belief in democracy. With the coup, the regional 
differences became crystallized and the state lost its character of being a social 
state.252 
As noted, even though Demirel was ousted from power directly by military 
interventions twice, he never openly criticized the army as an institution. Rather, 
he preferred to comment on the activities of some generals who, according to 
Demirel, were trying to hinder the functioning of democratic politics. From time 
to time, Demirel’s attitude towards the Armed Forces has been criticized by his 
former comrades as an indication of concessionism or opportunism. Hasan Celal 
Güzel, who worked as the private secretary of Prime Minister Demirel before 
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September 12, 1980, argued that Demirel has never taken the absolute 
civilianization of the regime to heart. Güzel accused him of not behaving as a 
genuine democrat who gives importance to the values of people.253 He criticized 
Demirel for not calling the military junta of May 27 to account despite having 
parliamentary majority to do so and not resisting the military’s influence over the 
civilian domain which caused him to experience the following military 
interventions of March 12 and September 12.254 Similarly Đnan held him 
responsible for inviting the coup by prioritizing short-term interests. For him 
Demirel and his circle made great mistakes: Many concessions for the sake of 
remaining in power were made and nepotism in government increased.255 Besides 
as Đnan argued the inability to activate the internal party mechanisms and to 
function the parliament effectively paved the way to the September 12 
intervention.256 Over time through expulsions and forced resignations Demirel 
turned the party into a monolithic body at the expense of the hardliners in the 
party. The lack of internal democracy accompanied the polarizing and 
uncompromising political atmosphere of the period in addition to the clientelistic 
relations. The adoption of a cautious and timid political line by the AP under the 
pressure of the possibility to be closed down weakened the fight against the 
tutelary regime. 
 
As mentioned Cizre has arrived at the conclusion that Demirel had a double-
discourse on civil-military relations.257 Parallel to what Güzel argued, Cizre stated 
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that Demirel followed the strategy of bringing about a rapprochement with the 
military while keeping it neutral towards the AP. As a consequence, the role of the 
military in the political system was not challenged but preserved as it was, as long 
as the anti-AP tendencies did not come to the fore.258 That said, Demirel did not 
invent this double-discourse. It was part of the AP’s identity. The AP was set up 
in a post-coup period when the ex-prime minister and two ministers were 
executed, the juntas within the army were active and as a result the oppressive 
atmosphere surrounded the political life. Thus, it is not surprising that, since its 
establishment the AP had always been fearful of military intervention and 
cautious about how its activities would be perceived by the military. Demirel 
inherited and continued to employ this double discourse with its contradictions 
and problems.259 It would not be erroneous to argue that Demirel followed such a 
pragmatic strategy in such a critical period of civil-military relations in order to 
open new spaces for his party in a shrinking political arena.  
 
Demirel always stated that civilian supremacy in political matters was a 
requirement of a democratic regime. Furthermore, he frequently underlined that 
the government must have the last word in appointing Commanders of the Forces 
and the CGS, extending their terms or retiring them. Demirel used his discretion 
during his premiership when he deemed it necessary. In 1969, the then CGS 
General Cemal Tural wanted his term to be extended. Demirel, however, did not 
favor it. Demirel’s advantage was that General Tural had had poor relations with 
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the other commanders. Thus Demirel was able to have Tural removed from the 
office of the commander-in-chief before his term ended and to have General 
Memduh Tağmaç appointed upon the proposal of the council of ministers and the 
acceptance of the president. 
 
Demirel tried to regulate his relations with the TSK via Ahmet Topaloğlu, the 
National Defense Minister in his cabinet. Topaloğlu had previously been the 
Director General of Public Security. Topaloğlu applied police intelligence 
methods in his relations with the TSK. However, the methods of Topaloğlu 
contributed little to Demirel’s objective to restructure the command echelon of the 
TSK. If Demirel gave the top-ranking army officers confidence in himself, he 
would understand that Tural had had loose relations with the other commanders 
rather than relying solely on the intelligence of Topaloğlu. Indeed, it was the 
cadre Topaloğlu considered “safe” that had issued the March 12 memorandum.260 
 
In 1977, the government under the leadership of Demirel again used its 
discretionary power and appointed Ali Fethi Esener to the Command of the Land 
Forces from the three-name list prepared by the then CGS General Semih 
Sancar261. However to confirm this appointment, the approval of the president was 
required. As noted above, the then president Fahri Korutürk did not sign this 
appointment.  The government did not retreat. This situation continued up until 
August 31, when all three generals were retired due to their having completed 
their terms of office as generals. The crisis ended with the appointment of the 
Commander of the Aegean Army, General Kenan Evren, to the post in question 
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by President Korutürk upon the nomination by the Council of Ministers which 
Demirel chaired. On the other hand, in March 1980, the terms of office of the 
Commander of the Land Forces, General Nurettin Ersin and the Commander of 
the Air Force, General Tahsin Şahinkaya were extended in accordance with the 
government’s proposal and the president’s approval. What is interesting is that all 
these generals later participated in the junta that toppled down the government in 
1980. 
 
 
4.1.3. Relations with the Presidents in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
As indicated, between 1965 and 1980, Demirel was asked five times to form a 
government as the leader of the AP. So it is clear that he worked with all three 
presidents of the era, Cemal Gürsel, Cevdet Sunay, and Fahri Korutürk. These 
experiences influenced how Demirel perceived the way the state organs function, 
and thus contributed to his later conceptualization of presidential office. 
 
4.1.3.1. Demirel and President Cemal Gürsel  
 
General Cemal Gürsel was a respected soldier who had taken part in many fronts 
during the First World War (1914-1918) and the War of Independence (1919-
1922). He was appointed as the Commander of the Land Forces in 1958. Gürsel 
wrote a letter to the then Minister of National Defense Ethem Menderes in which 
he criticized the existing political situation of the country. Because of this letter, 
Gürsel was given a temporary leave on the condition that two months later he 
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would be retired. In reaction to that, Gürsel resigned from the military on May 3, 
1960 and moved to Đzmir. Not long after his resignation, he was invited to lead the 
military coup of 1960 by a group of middle-ranking officers. The plans had been 
prepared and a network had already been set up. As noted the coup brought a 
complete rupture with the existing institutional structure, including the 
Constitution.  
 
After the coup, Gürsel announced that he undertook the duties of the head of state 
and government, the Commander-in-Chief of the TSK and the Minister of 
National Defense. The softening of the discourse of the AP continued after 
Demirel was elected chairman of the party. Demirel had the intention to make a 
break with the past referring to the incidents of the coup years. It would not be 
wrong to claim that this mild and conciliatory tone of Demirel left positive 
imprints on the Demirel-Gürsel relationship. 
 
There were some claims that Gürsel and MBK were very much involved in the 
election of the chairman of the AP following the death of Gümüşpala. Bilgiç 
quoted from Cihat Baban, a member of the Constituent Assembly and the minister 
of tourism in Gürsel cabinet formed after 1960 coup, that Gürsel was favorable to 
Demirel’s chairmanship and tried to influence the outcome of the AP’s congress 
to make him elected. It was argued that in the eyes of Gürsel, Demirel was a 
young and enlightened person who would not become an instrument of the 
Democrats and indulge towards religious bigotry.262 
 
                                                
262 Cited in Bilgiç, Hatıralarım, p. 141. 
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President Gürsel, from time to time, invited the chairmen of the political parties to 
Çankaya. In those meetings, which were publicly known as huzur toplantıları, 
vitally important issues that led to controversies or conflict were discussed. 
Demirel, as the newly elected chairman of the AP, attended the last meeting of the 
series in Çankaya in June 1964. In the meeting, Demirel listed his party’s 
grievances concerning the policies of the CHP government. The then Prime 
Minister Đsmet Đnönü, after listening to the complaints of the opposition, invited 
the party leaders to the parliament to discuss these matters. He said that Çankaya 
was not the right address to discuss political issues. This was the last remark of 
the meeting and Gürsel closed it by saying that these meetings would not be held 
any more. After the meeting, Demirel told his party associates that Đnönü’s 
statement became a real lesson for him.263 It can be argued that Demirel was so 
much affected by what Đnönü had said that later, in his presidential term, he gave 
full weight to the necessity of an impartial president regarding party politics. 
 
In general terms, President Gürsel and Prime Minister Demirel had cordial 
relations. Some argue that Gürsel had a good opinion of Demirel due to his 
personal success story. It is also claimed that Gürsel overlooked some of the 
statements of Demirel covertly criticizing the things done to the DP cadre by the 
military junta.264 Both mentioned that they had trust in the people and had a 
common enemy, i.e. communism. After the 1965 general elections, President 
Gürsel nominated Demirel to form the government. Prime Minister Demirel and 
President Gürsel developed a working relationship for a year. No dissonance was 
                                                
263 Quoted in Arcayürek, Demokrasi Dönemecinde Üç Adam, p. 16. 
264 Ibid., p. 17. 
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observed in the relationship between Gürsel and Demirel. Gürsel’s presidency 
was terminated upon the decision of the parliament on March 28, 1966.265  
 
 
4.1.3.2. Demirel and President Cevdet Sunay  
 
Before the decision on the termination of Gürsel’s presidency was taken by the 
parliament, civilian and military circles had already started to discuss the possible 
candidates for presidency. The most pronounced name was Cevdet Sunay who 
was the CGS at the time. He was a veteran soldier who had served in various 
fronts in the First World War and later in the War of Independence.  For a certain 
period, he was imprisoned by the British forces in Egypt. In 1960, he was 
appointed as the Commander of the Land Forces and subsequently as the CGS. 
Even though he turned 65, which is the age of compulsory retirement, his term 
was extended for one year by the decision of the Council of Ministers in 1965.  
 
There emerged a consensus on Sunay’s candidacy among the political parties 
which had divergent opinions and objectives. For the AP a president with a 
military background was preferable to a president coming from the ranks of the 
CHP. Hence no opposition against Sunay’s candidacy was expressed in the AP.266 
Furthermore, a positive climate of opinion on the candidacy of Sunay had already 
been formed in public. Sunay had been at the head of the group called the Turkish 
                                                
265 Due to a quickly progressed illness, Gürsel came to a point that he could not continue to fulfill 
his duties as a president. After receiving a medical report of a committee of thirty seven doctors 
that indicated Gürsel’s impossibility of continuing his term of office, his term was ended by the 
parliament. 
266 Bozbeyli, Yalnız Demokrat, p. 231; Bilgiç, Hatıralarım, p. 170. 
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Armed Forces Union (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği);267 as such, he collaborated 
with the government in thwarting Talat Aydemir’s coup attempts.268 It is highly 
probable that this helped Sunay to build a positive image in the eyes of the 
civilians.  
 
The AP had a sufficient majority in the parliament to elect its candidate as 
president. However, Demirel thought that the legacy of the May 27 was enduring. 
The fear of a military coup had not yet been completely set aside. Hence, 
according to Demirel, a president with a military origin would help to get through 
difficult times. In other words, Demirel considered President Sunay to be a “safety 
valve” for the regime. Demirel pointed out that he wanted Sunay’s presidency to 
cope with the coup attempts.269 Demirel influenced his party members, who 
wished to choose a civilian for the office of presidency, to support Sunay. Demirel 
stated that they chose Sunay as president to prevent the rift between the politicians 
and the military. He added that his and the AP’s main rationale during the 1966 
                                                
267 The Union was founded during the coup administration to highlight that May 27 was not a coup 
aiming at overthrowing the DP government but a revolution, and the gains of this revolution 
should be preserved. After the 1961 parliamentary election, there emerged a crack within the army. 
The group of Ankara was of the opinion that before it was too late the military should seize power; 
whereas, the group of Istanbul believed that they should wait and see. A protocol was signed 
among the members of the union to guarantee that the intervention could only be made through the 
chain of command. It was claimed that Sunay did not sign the protocol and inform Đnönü about the 
coup attempt. After that, appointments and detentions started within the army to eliminate the 
Ankara group. For more, see Osman Deniz, Parola: Harbiyeli Aldanmaz (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi 
Yayınları, 2002); Fethi Gürcan, Ben Đhtilalciyim, Ömer Gürcan, ed. (Istanbul: Süvari Yayıncılık, 
2005).    
268 Colonel Aydemir, Colonel Dündar Seyhan and Major Fethi Gürcan alarmed their subordinate 
units on February 22, 1962 as a response to the elimination of May 27 supporters within the army. 
Aydemir demanded the dissolution of the parliament and called for new elections. These demands 
were refused and the operation was stopped the next morning. Aydemir and 20 officers were put 
on trial and forced to retire. Aydemir attempted another coup on May 21, 1963. The units loyal to 
the government suppressed the insurgent forces as a result of the clashes between the two. 
Consequently, Aydemir and 150 other participants of the attempted coup were tried. Aydemir and 
Gürcan were executed on July 5, 1964. 
269 Ülkü and Hasanov, Süleyman Demirel,  p. 105. 
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presidential elections were to make the nation and the military embrace each 
other.270  
 
According to the 1961 Constitution, the presidential candidate should be a 
member of parliament. The obstacle for Sunay’s presidency arising out of this 
provision of the Constitution was overcome by making Sunay a member of 
parliament. For this purpose a presidential quota senatorship was opened up with 
the resignation of a senator. The other candidate running for the election was the 
retired colonel Türkeş, who was then the leader of the CKMP. However, against 
Sunay, Türkeş had no chance and Sunay was elected the fifth President of the 
Republic with a vote of 431 out of 636. 
 
Until the 1971 military memorandum, Prime Minister Demirel thought that the 
AP did a good job to support Sunay as a candidate for presidency, since Sunay 
assisted in the consolidation of civil authority.271 It is argued that once Sunay 
came to power, Demirel was able to breathe easily in due to Sunay’s commitment 
to the Constitution and the democratic regime while there were calls not to open 
the parliament dominated by the AP.272 Demirel stated that Sunay as the CGS 
played a significant role in pulling out the armed forces from politics after 1960. 
Demirel underlined that taking part actively in choosing Sunay as president is one 
of his political services to the country. He believed that in that way, he could 
prevent damage to “the nation’s army” as an institution.273 Demirel rejected the 
accusations that he was responsible for opening the road to Çankaya to the CGSs 
                                                
270 Yavuz Donat, “Çankaya’nın Romanı,” Sabah, 19 January 2000. 
271 Fikret Bila, “Sunay’ı Cuntalara Karşı Getirdim,” Milliyet, 21 July 1989. 
272 Özdemir, Atatürk’ten Günümüze Cumhurbaşkanı Seçimleri, pp. 205-206. 
273 Donat, “Çankaya’nın Romanı”. 
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in the succeeding presidential elections.274 He asserted that if it were Sunay who 
came first and expressed his willingness to become president and he had no 
chance but to accept Sunay’s offer, only then it would have been opening the 
office of presidency to the CGSs as an established practice.275 
 
As reported, Sunay, during the five-year period of AP rule, made Demirel believe 
that he would never get involved in clandestine activities for a military take-
over.276 In 1969, Demirel received some information that the CGS General Cemal 
Tural was in preparation for a coup and wanted to see President Sunay urgently. 
At first, Sunay rejected Demirel’s idea of appointing Tural to another post. 
However, due to Demirel’s insistence on this matter, Sunay agreed to Tural’s 
appointment as a member of the Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askerî 
Şura).277 Thus, Demirel succeeded in avoiding a possible military attempt with the 
help of the president, thus increasing his trust in Sunay. That is why Demirel was 
shocked when he was informed by the Undersecretary of the National Intelligence 
Organization about Sunay’s call for Demirel’s resignation on March 12, 1971. An 
hour before the military memorandum was issued by the top-ranking military 
officers, Demirel and Sunay had talked on the phone. Sunay told Demirel that he 
                                                
274 The CKMP opposed the candidacy of Sunay on the grounds that this kind of candidate 
selection method would create a tradition of the CGS-origin presidents, which would be 
irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of a democratic regime. A similar opinion was also 
put forward by the MP Deputies. Osman Bölükbaşı, the leader of the MP, criticized the method of 
Sunay’s selection to the candidacy as well. He was worried about the harm it would cause to the 
future of Turkish democracy. 
275 Bila, “Sunay’ı Cuntalara Karşı Getirdim”. 
276 Quoted in Arcayürek, Demokrasi Dönemecinde Üç Adam, p. 18. 
277 The Supreme Military Council deals with the issues related to military bureaucracy. The 
Council succeeds the Şura-yı Askerî which was established in 1925 and restructured in 1972. The 
Council meets twice a year. It consists of 17 members, i.e. the prime minister, the defense 
minister, the chief of general staff, force commanders and army commanders. The Council’s duties 
are submitting opinions on the plans and objectives of the armed forces; assessing the drafts of 
laws, bylaws and regulations related to the armed forces and discussing the issues affecting its 
personnel such as promotions, retirements and expulsions. Its decisions require ratification by the 
president and cannot be appealed against.  
 118 
was cut out of the loop on this issue. Thereafter, Demirel summoned his cabinet 
and, after discussing the issue in detail with his colleagues, he submitted his 
resignation to Sunay.278 
 
For Demirel, Sunay as a president had the means to prevent the military 
intervention from taking place in 1971 but did nothing to operate all the 
constitutional mechanisms beforehand, such as including the issue in the agenda 
of the MGK. Whether Demirel’s critique of Sunay’s behavior during the 1971 
crisis has contributed to his conceptualization of presidency and his later practices 
in his presidential term will be taken up in the following chapters. 
 
 
4.1.3.3. Demirel and President Fahri Korutürk  
 
Fahri Korutürk was elected president on April 6, 1973 as an outcome of the 
confrontation between the civilians and the military concerning whose candidate 
will be elected president. Following in the footsteps of Sunay, the then CGS 
General Gürler stood as a presidential candidate. As mentioned in the previous 
part, the civilian authority was in the grip of a crisis, due to the fact that the 
generals exerted pressure over the civilians on the issue of who would be elected 
as next president. As a first move, the idea to extend the term of Sunay was put 
forward. A constitional amendment to extend the term of president for a two-year 
period did not gain the necessary two-thirds majority in the assembly and hence 
was not accepted. Then Demirel and Ecevit agreed on another name, Muhittin 
                                                
278 Arcayürek, Demokrasi Dönemecinde Üç Adam, pp. 20-21. 
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Taylan, the then president of Constitutional Court, as a presidential candidate. 
This effort again failed after Sunay did not appoint Taylan as a quota senator 
which was required to be eligible for being a presidential candidate. 
 
Afterwards Korutürk appeared as the compromise candidate of the AP, CHP, and 
CGP. As elaborated in the previous section of this essay, the problematic issue for 
the civilians was not the military background of the presidential candidate, but 
intervention of the military in the election by dictating its choice of candidate. 
During the voting sessions in the parliament, the full complement of generals 
turned out to influence the outcome of the elections. Nonetheless, the conflict 
ended up in favor of neither party, rather as “a victory for moderation and 
compromise in politics”279 and Korutürk was elected president.  
 
Korutürk was a retired admiral and former Commander of the Naval Forces. He 
had formerly served as the naval attaché to Italy, Germany, and Sweden in turn. In 
the meetings of the Montreux Convention in 1936, Korutürk had taken part as a 
military expert in the Turkish committee. Two months after the 1960 military 
coup, he retired. Afterwards, Korutürk was assigned as an ambassador to the 
Turkish embassy in Moscow in 1960 and in Madrid in 1964. He resigned from the 
embassy in Madrid in 1965, and, following his return to Turkey, he was 
nominated by the then President Sunay to the Senate in 1968, which later paved 
him the way to the office of presidency. Both the military and the civilians 
compromised on Korutürk’s candidacy, since he neither had affiliation with any 
                                                
279 Roger P. Nye, “Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Election,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 8, 2 (April 1977), p. 227. 
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political party nor with radicals in the military. His diplomatic experiences were 
perceived as assets that made him suitable for the office of presidency. 
 
In the presidential term of Korutürk, Demirel was not so strongly supported by the 
people as he had been in the second half of the 1960s. As explained in detail, 
starting from 1974, coalition governments had started to rule the country. Those 
were difficult times for Turkey. Deep polarization in Turkish society along with a 
severe economic crisis influenced public expectations that the leading political 
parties should find a way to overcome the difficulties the country faced. President 
Korutürk, at every turn, tried to establish a dialogue mechanism between the AP 
and CHP, emphasizing that the cooperation of political parties and its leaders was 
necessary for maintaining peace and safeguarding the regime.280 To that end, he 
called Demirel and Ecevit to Çankaya separately and had talks with them. 
Korutürk felt it necessary as president that he should act as an intermediary 
between Demirel and Ecevit. However, Korutürk’s individual meetings with the 
leading political figures were aborted. According to Demirel, the place for 
establishing a dialogue was nowhere else but the parliament, which had shown 
how important a functioning parliament was in Demirel’s political discourse.  
 
The most important event that occurred between Demirel and Korutürk was the 
notorious “warning letter” to politicians by the then CGS, General Kenan Evren. 
Evren submitted this letter directly to President Korutürk on December 27, 1979. 
Then Korutürk decided to meet with Demirel and Ecevit in Çankaya to inform 
them about the letter. Demirel threatened to resign while Ecevit stated that his 
                                                
280 Quoted in Evren, Zorlu Yıllarım Cilt 1, p. 54.  
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party was not ready to form the government again. President Korutürk, 
considering such remarks, felt uneasy about the threat of a governmental crisis. 
Hence, he increased his efforts to provide cooperation between the AP and the 
CHP. 
 
Demirel thought that Korutürk’s failure to inform him about the letter, even 
though he was prime minister, was not acceptable. What disturbed Demirel in that 
letter event was being bypassed as prime minister. He thought that such 
complaints should be brought to the agenda of the meetings of the MGK or the 
Martial Law Command281. The same approach was adopted in the practices of 
Demirel as president which will be examined in the fifth and sixth chapters.  
 
Even though Demirel emphasized the oddness of the situation, he also insisted 
that he had no doubts about Korutürk’s honesty. Demirel claimed that after being 
elected president, Korutürk had told Demirel that he would never collaborate with 
the interventionists. Therefore, he said he had not presumed that Korutürk took 
part in the plans to topple the government if necessary.282 
 
After examining the relations of Demirel as a head of government and a political 
leader with the then presidents having a military background, it may be suggested 
that in general terms Demirel succeeded in establishing working relationships 
                                                
281 Following the notorious Kahramanmaraş Incidents, martial law was imposed to restore law 
and order in 13 cities (Adana, Ankara, Bingöl, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Istanbul, 
Kars, Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, Şanlıurfa) on December 26, 1978. As a consequence of the 
increase in violent clashes, six more cities (Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Hakkâri, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli) 
were added to list of cities that were under martial law on April 26, 1979. By September 12, 1980, 
the number of cities which were under martial law was added up to 19. 
282 Demirel, Anı Değil Đtiraf, p. 45. 
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with the presidents in question. It might be striking at first sight that as the leader 
of the AP, which claimed that it was the heir of the DP, an overthrown party 
towards which the military regime had had deep suspicion, Demirel did not face 
animosity from the coup leaders. This could be explained by Demirel’s cautious 
stance towards the military. He continued to employ the double-discourse on 
civil-military relations which had positive impacts on establishing working 
relations with the presidents of the 1960s and 1970s while producing negative 
outcomes for Turkish democracy. 
 
Demirel and Gürsel’s shared anti-communist feelings had strengthened their 
relationship, as did Demirel’s cautious refusal to meet the expectations of his 
party members and constituencies about granting political amnesty to the DP 
members. This is still one of the policies that Demirel’s old colleagues criticize 
the most, considering such acts as examples of his “opportunism.” Demirel was 
also seen as responsible for making Çankaya the last stop for the CGSs or retired 
generals. His efforts to convince his circle to support Sunay’s presidential 
candidacy were interpreted as giving concessions for the sake of political gains. 
Against such accusations, Demirel defended himself by saying that the process of 
May 27 had lingered on, and hence a president with a military background could 
thwart any possible coup attempts. Despite the fact that he was right to a certain 
extent that Sunay had become influential in aborting some coup attempts, 
intervention of the army in political matters could not be eliminated for long, as 
was seen in the March 12 Memorandum. It is demonstrated that it is misleading to 
think that condoning such kind of reserved domains would serve the consolidation 
of civil authority. It is true that after Sunay’s term had ended, the then CGS 
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General Gürler was prevented from becoming the next president by a 
parliamentary majority. Nevertheless the compromise candidate was a retired 
admiral. This shows that Demirel prioritized finding the best person for the office 
of president who would become a safety valve for any coup attempts, despite the 
fact that he defended civilian supremacy in political matters as an important 
principle in his discourse. Keeping the parliament open and functioning was so 
significant for Demirel that he did not pay enough attention to the implications of 
sharing the executive power with the military-backed presidents. In that way, 
Demirel could continue his pragmatic style of politics and manage to survive in a 
shrinking political arena, but at the expense of the civilianization of the regime.  
 
 
4.2. The True Path Party Era 
 
The 1980 military intervention opened a new page in the political life of Demirel. 
In September 1981, the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi -
MGKo)283 announced that all of the political parties were outlawed on the grounds 
that they were the main actors of the political deadlock. One year later, all the 
leaders of the already outlawed political parties were declared to be banned from 
active politics for a ten-year period. In spite of the various impediments, Demirel 
under the wing of his close associates sought ways and means of remaining in the 
limelight. In 1983, the Great Turkey Party (Büyük Türkiye Partisi –BTP) was 
                                                
283 This council should not be confused with the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu 
-MGK). The former was established after the 1980 military intervention to assume the powers of 
the parliament whereas the latter was set up in 1961. The Council (Konsey) was composed of the 
Head of State and Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren, Commander of the Land Forces 
General Nurettin Ersin, Commander of the Air Forces General Tahsin Şenkaya, Commander of the 
Naval Forces Admiral Nejat Tümer, and Commander of Gendarmerie General Sedat Celasun.  
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established, but it met with a rebuff from the members of the MGKo because of 
the registration en masse of veteran deputies and ministers having an AP origin on 
the BTP list. The party was closed on May 31, 1983 by the MGKo. The Council 
sent 16 political figures, one of whom was Demirel, to Zincirbozan, a town in 
Çanakkale, where they were kept under custody for four months (June 2-October 
30, 1983).  
 
The establishment of the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi –DYP)284 
corresponded to the days in Zincirbozan. It is reported that the way to Zincirbozan 
inspired Demirel to call the party the “True Path”.285 Although the procedures to 
set up the party were fulfilled without delay, it was still one of the vetoed parties 
that lost the chance to join the 1983 elections. In fact, as Evren later pointed out, 
the reason of the veto was seemingly the objectionable names in the list of 
founders, but in reality what they wanted to eliminate was the likely 
fragmentation that would end up with coalition governments.286 Moreover, the 
military also saw a need for new faces in politics so that Turkey would have a 
brand new political life free from the old feuds.  
 
It was with the 1984 local elections that the DYP eventually entered into the 
political arena. However, in the same year the party faced trial at the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds that the DYP affirmed itself as the 
continuation of the AP and the BTP and had made statements and carried out 
                                                
284 For more on the DYP’s program and its organizational characteristics see Feride Acar, “The 
True Path Party, 1983-1989” in Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, eds. Metin Heper and 
Jacob M. Landau (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991): pp. 188-201. 
285 Bilgiç, Hatıralarım, p. 311. 
286 Evren, Zorlu Yıllarım Cilt 2, p. 78. 
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activities against the decisions of the MGKo.  The accusation was rejected 
unanimously by the Court.287 From that point onwards, the party associates began 
to work more vigorously. In 1985, a very close friend of the still banned Demirel, 
Hüsamettin Cindoruk, was elected to the party chairmanship. Even though 
Demirel was forced to stay behind the scenes, he did not abstain from politics. In 
that period, what Demirel primarily focused on was to re-gather the base of the 
AP under the roof of its successor DYP. 
 
Starting from 1986, the DYP began to gain momentum in the political arena. In 
the by-elections held in September 1986, the DYP succeeded in winning four of 
the eleven vacant deputy positions. In addition, some deputies from the other 
political parties joined the DYP. In that way, the party reached the number 
necessary to form a group in the parliament. It was also the time that Demirel 
became publicly much more visible. By addressing the people in different parts of 
the country, he tried to show that he did not mind the ban on him any more. From 
then on, Demirel and his party pushed strongly for the necessity of lifting the ban 
on pre-1980 period political figures. Demirel’s main argument in his campaign, as 
he underlined, was that it was not a mere political struggle but a struggle to have a 
state based on the rule of law.288  
 
The then Prime Minister Turgut Özal decided to bring the issue to the people. A 
referendum was held on September 6, 1987. As a result, Demirel and the other 
                                                
287 For the full texts of the indictment of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals 
against the DYP,  the response of the party to the indictment, and the verdict of the Constitutional 
Court, see Akay, DYP ve Kurucular Albümü, pp. 186-213. 
288 Quoted in Tanju Cılızoğlu, Zincirbozan’dan Bugüne Demokrasi Mücadelesinde Demirel 
(Istanbul: Matay, 1988), p. 68. 
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banned political leaders were given freedom to actively participate in politics. 
According to Demirel, the result strengthened his claim that he was supported by 
the people, which for him was the real victory of democracy. After the ban was 
lifted, Demirel was elected party chairman in the party congress held on 
September 24, 1987. Within a four-year period, Demirel made the DYP the 
victorious party of the 1991 general elections, though the party’s votes were not 
sufficient to form a government alone. Demirel formed a coalition government 
with the SHP on November 20. The important thing was that, after eleven years of 
a patient suspense, Demirel was again on the stage as prime minister. 
 
 
4.2.1. Views on State and Democracy 
 
As taken up in the previous chapter, starting from his political career under the 
banner of the AP, Demirel has continued considering state and democracy as 
closely related concepts. He has very much valued this relationship. Demirel’s 
political struggle could be better understood by looking at to what extent he 
followed his path by embracing these two interrelated notions in the DYP period. 
 
The importance of state as a concept continued to be salient in Demirel’s 
discourse after being politically suspended by the military regime. He never 
criticized any state institution overtly; Demirel preferred putting the blame on 
persons instead of institutions, considering the former responsible for democratic 
breakdowns. 
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The continuity of the philosophy and terminology of the AP in the party program 
of the DYP and in the statements of Demirel as the party leader was quite visible. 
He highlighted four major concepts to explain the party philosophy of the DYP. 
These were hürriyetçi demokrasi (democracy based on freedom), national will, 
rule of law, and national development.289 It is quite obvious that Demirel’s first 
objective in that period was to regain the support of the political base of the 
defunct AP; therefore, he frequently referred to the popular terminology of the AP 
in power. The major obstacle in front of the DYP to fall heir to its predecessor’s 
popularity was considered to be ANAP, under the leadership of Özal. Hence, at 
that period Demirel reserved his most aggressive criticism for the policies of 
ANAP, the number one political adversary of the DYP. 
 
Demirel labeled ANAP as the manifestation of a search for a guided rule 
(güdümlü iktidar). In his view, the party governed the country ineptly, and that in 
turn impeded the functioning of democracy. For instance, just before the 
November 29, 1987 parliamentary elections, as a last minute move, the election 
law was amended by the Özal government.  The amendments included an increase 
in the number of deputies in the parliament from 400 to 450 and a change in the 
constituencies. These changes provided ANAP with more seats despite their 
receiving fewer votes. ANAP won 64.89 percent of the seats in the parliament 
with 36.31 percent of the vote cast in the elections. This was harshly criticized by 
the opposition parties. Demirel in particular found such amendments and their 
                                                
289 Quoted in Cılızoğlu, Zincirbozan’dan Bugüne Demokrasi Mücadelesinde Demirel, p. 196.  
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impact on the election results unfair and argued that the national will was no 
longer represented in the parliament.290  
 
 
4.2.2. Relations with the Military 
 
The 1982 Constitution adopted the principle of the 1961 Constitution that 
sovereignty, vested fully and unconditionally in the nation, shall be exercised 
through the authorized organs as prescribed by the principles laid down in the 
constitution (Article 6). Justifying their actions with this article, the military 
regime could enjoy tutelary powers and reserved domains even long after the 
civilian regime was restored. The coup leaders’ distrust of politicians had 
influenced the wording of the constitution. In the eyes of the military, the people 
were never considered responsible for the tragic events. The politicians had 
exploited “the glorious feelings of the people.” Based on that, the authorized 
organs have been incorporated into the constitution by the MGKo regime to save 
the country from the “greedy” politicians.291 
 
Leaning on the DP tradition, the DYP leaders objected to bringing the sovereignty 
of the nation under the tutelage of other organs. For them, the supremacy of the 
national will was indisputable. It could not be subordinated to any state organ, 
including the military. Anti-militarism has formed the backbone of the DYP. 
However, as Cizre has argued, the anti-militarist discourse of the DYP has never 
                                                
290 For more on these developments, see Heper, “Turgut Özal’s Presidency,” pp. 190-191. 
291 Kenan Evren, Unutulan Gerçekler (Ankara: Tisamat, 1995), p. 210. 
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exercised sufficient influence over its former political base to regain their 
support.292  
 
Demirel’s ideas on civilianization of the politics, to some extent, are 
unsophisticated. It refers to the elimination of military’s direct interference in 
politics through influencing elections and exerting pressure on the work of the 
parliament in which the will of the nation is manifested. The military, on the other 
hand, left its mark on the civilian domain in many other ways. For instance, the 
change made in the composition of the MGK was one of the reserved domains of 
the military. The number of the military officers in the council exceeded the 
number of the civilian members. In addition to that, the recommendations of the 
Council’s decision gained priority. Demirel governments have always considered 
the MGK meetings as significant platforms to take decisions and formulate 
solutions on hot political issues. This means, as Cizre underlines, that Demirel, 
long before the 1982 Constitution, made the Council achieve a much more 
predominant role and status.293 
 
 
4.2.3. Relations with the Head of State/Presidents294  
4.2.3.1. Demirel and the Head of State, President Kenan Evren  
 
                                                
292 Cizre, AP-Ordu Đlişkileri, p. 276. 
293 Cizre, AP-Ordu Đlişkileri, p. 278. 
294 In the two-year period following the 1980 military intervention, General Evren, the leader of 
the coup, ruled the country as the head of the National Security Council (MGKo) and the head of 
state. He had the title of the head of state, not president, until the referendum on the constitution. 
Here, the analysis covers Demirel’s relations with Evren during his terms both as head of state and 
president.    
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General Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup, became the head of state 
during the interim period that ended in 1982. On November 7, 1982, a referendum 
was held on the 1982 Constitution. A presidential election was combined with the 
constitutional referendum. The new Constitution, together with Evren, the sole 
candidate of the presidency, received a 91.37 percent yes vote.  In that way, Evren 
became the only popularly elected president in Turkey.295  
 
Evren was known as one of the most outspoken presidents, especially during his 
early years in that office. During his term of office, he gave great importance to 
visiting various parts of the country and addressing people. His endeavor was to 
convince people that what he believed is right. That said, Evren has developed a 
style of his own as a president who like a father tried to correct, direct and guide. 
As Dodd has noted, Evren felt obliged to safeguard the Atatürkist principles and 
the Constitution based on those principles. His lack of trust in the politicians and 
the political parties of the pre-1980 period were very much apparent. As he stated 
in his memoirs, for Evren, the “fact” that politicians disregarded the general 
interest in favor of their personal interests, let the country drift into anarchy. It 
was a mistake to entrust politicians with the task of governing the country, since 
they were dishonest, irresponsible and greedy.296 Evren’s move to ban all of the 
pre-1980 political parties and their leaders from active politics was the result of 
this suspicion and distrust.  
 
                                                
295 As mentioned, by referendum which was held on September 21, 2007, the law concerning the 
changes in some articles of the Constitution was approved.  In accordance with that, the president 
who was previously elected by the parliament from then on will be popularly elected. 
296 Kenan Evren, Unutulan Gerçekler,  p. 210. 
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The direct intervention of Evren in the political domain irritated Demirel, who had 
always highlighted the immense significance of keeping the parliament open no 
matter what may happen. In fact, at first, Evren had declared that the military 
regime would not target the political parties. However, other generals influenced 
Evren, and then the ban was enforced against the political parties, a move which 
was later admitted as a mistake by Evren himself.297 
 
In 1983, the elections were held under the aegis of the military regime. 
Participation in the elections was limited, in the sense that only three newly 
established political parties obtaining the approval of the coup leaders by not 
having “objectionable” names on their lists could compete in the elections. Evren 
and his friends said that they were in favor of restoring the democratic regime. 
But this does not mean that they would refrain entirely from intervening in the 
election process. Evren saw no harm in fully endorsing one of the three parties - 
the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi –MDP) - allowed 
to enter the election. Evren made a speech the night before the elections to 
persuade people to vote for the MDP in preference to Özal’s ANAP. Nevertheless, 
Evren’s popularity was not sufficient to influence the outcome of the elections, 
which opened the era of one-party government led by Özal. 
 
The relationship between Demirel and Evren could be better analyzed by 
examining it in two different periods. In the period before the political bans were 
lifted, the relationship between the two was under strain. Their differences 
revolved around the events leading to the 1980 military intervention and its 
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outcomes. For Demirel, the unfortunate set of circumstances forming a basis for 
the intervention could be avoided if the military used its power effectively under 
the martial law. Demirel’s most probing question was about the ending of the 
bloodshed on September 12, which had not been prevented on September 11. On 
the other hand, Evren argued that governments and other political parties did not 
take the necessary measures in time and thus deepened the rift between different 
ideological groups. It is clear that both Demirel and Evren indicted the other for 
not behaving in a responsible manner. 
 
Following the 1980 military intervention, Demirel was placed in a difficult 
position, being banned from all kinds of political activities. As mentioned above, 
under the aegis of his guidance, the DYP was formed quickly after the upcoming 
elections were announced; however, it was vetoed by the junta. Demirel, 
nevertheless, did not give up fighting. Despite infuriating Evren, he continued to 
receive visitors at his home from all over the country. He blamed the generals of 
the coup for not fulfilling their duty of having halted the bloodshed in time but 
rather used it as a justification for establishing the military regime. The leaders of 
ANAP could not escape Demirel’s criticisms either. Demirel branded Özal as a 
by-product of the military intervention. 
 
Evren, in his address to parliament in 1985, fiercely criticized Demirel for being 
too talkative, though without mentioning his name. Evren stated that Turkey paid 
the price of the demand for “Talking Turkey” that aimed to replace “Silent 
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Turkey.”298 Demirel responded with a four-page tract labelling Evren a “biased 
president” who violated Article 103 of the 1982 Constitution. Demirel 
emphasized that anger does not befit some posts the most important of which is 
occupied by Evren.299 Demirel’s judgmental remarks on Evren and the military 
regime were so persistent that Evren had to defend himself in public speeches by 
asserting that the events that occurred in 1980 were not a coup but a defense of the 
Republic against anarchy.300 Demirel’s speech in his Black Sea visit annoyed 
Evren intensely. There, Demirel had argued that Çankaya should change hands 
without blood, without fight, without political intrigue, and argued that a 
democratic regime had yet to be installed.301 During the period that he was barred 
from all political activities, Demirel in his visits made his criticisms of Evren 
public, and Evren in turn always took these seriously and responded to them.   
 
At the time, another rift developed between Evren and Demirel over the subject of 
military recruitment. Being concerned about the threats coming from religious 
fundamentalism against the secular regime, Evren was opposed to the recruitment 
of the graduates of the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (Đmam Hatip Okulları) 
to the army. As the architect of those schools, Demirel did not keep his silence on 
this discussion and argued that those graduates could be army officers just like 
they could be doctors, lawyers, engineers, and the like. In his opinion, it was 
meaningless to prevent them from joining the military since those schools also 
had a state-approved curriculum. Demirel clashed with Evren on the headscarf 
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299 Ibid., p. 229. 
300 See Evren’s speech delivered in Kahramanmaraş on December 25, 1985 in Kenan Evren, Zorlu 
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issue as well. Targeting the statements of Evren on the headscarf and reactionism, 
Demirel argued that “attributing ideology to the headscarf of students is wrong. 
So does searching ideology in the headscarf itself. Wearing or taking off 
headscarf have no relevance with religious reactionism. Secularism is not 
damaged by wearing a headscarf.”302 
 
Starting from 1987 at which date the political ban was lifted, the strained relations 
between Evren and Demirel gradually improved. In fact, this was an act of 
expediency on both sides. Evren, as he stated, had started to be disturbed by 
Özal’s political actions, especially Özal’s “staying out of the fight against 
obscurantism and religious reactionism;” therefore, he looked for an alternative 
for Özal’s ANAP government.303 Consequently Evren portrayed Demirel, his 
once leading adversary, as the most suitable person to deal with Özal in politics. 
Likewise, for Demirel, it was expedient to establish better relations with President 
Evren. Demirel, just after being elected the chairman of the DYP on September 
24, stated that he was not agonizing over the past anymore and not harboring 
resentment against anybody.304 Indeed, this was an implicit message for President 
Evren, who was still holding the office with which Demirel wished to reach 
rapprochement. On October 6, 1987, Evren received a courtesy visit from 
Demirel. As Evren reported, the previous disputes were not even mentioned 
during that visit.305 Furthermore, on May 27, 1988, Demirel made another visit to 
Evren in order to present forty members of the DYP’s General Administrative 
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Board. According to Evren, that unprecedented visit could be seen as implying 
that past was left behind.306 
 
The détente policy of Demirel was not maintained in every circumstance though. 
In 1987, at the opening address of the parliament by President Evren, the deputies 
of the DYP did not stand up to protest Evren as he gave his speech from the chair 
of the Speaker of the Parliament. In May 1988, upon the incidents of leftist 
violence, Evren stated that the Armed Forces could not keep its silence. Demirel 
responded this immediately, which could be considered as part of the DYP’s 
policy prioritizing civilianization, and reminded Evren that only the parliament 
had the authority to call upon the Armed Forces to do their duty. He underlined 
that the nation needs neither protecting nor salvaging, and interventions have 
made the problems chronic.307  
 
 
4.2.3.2. Demirel and President Turgut Özal  
 
Following the termination of the presidential term of Evren, Özal was elected the 
eighth president by the TBMM on October 31, 1989. Those were the years in 
which Demirel returned to active politics after the ban on political figures of the 
pre-coup period had been lifted by the referendum in 1987. Indeed this made the 
tension between two old friends much more palpable and, contrary to what was 
expected, this grew even worse after Demirel became prime minister in 1991. 
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Demirel and Özal had known each other for a long time. Both of them were 
brilliant engineers working specifically on electrification projects. Following the 
same path and becoming a protégé of Demirel, Özal made a successful career in 
state institutions before joining to World Bank in 1971. After returning to Turkey, 
he became the Undersecretary of the DPT. Demirel’s confidence in him was so 
high that until the 1980 military coup he, as Prime Minister, assigned Özal as his 
undersecretary. It was with the start of the military regime that their relationship 
started to deteriorate.  Following the announcement of the ban by the coup 
leaders, Demirel, like other pre-1980 politicians, was forced to remain outside of 
active politics while the political visibility and activity of Özal gained momentum. 
During the military regime (1980-1983), Özal became a state minister and deputy 
prime minister in charge of the economy. After the reinstallation of democracy in 
1982, Özal founded ANAP, which was one of the three political parties allowed to 
participate in the 1983 national elections. With the sweeping victory of ANAP, 
the era of Özal began in that year. Demirel saw the success of ANAP as the 
capitalization on the political ban and stealing votes from the political base of the 
defunct AP. This further damaged irreparably the strained relationship between 
Demirel and Özal. 
 
Özal’s campaign against the lifting of the political ban in 1987 by referendum had 
resulted in just the opposite of what Özal had desired. Indeed, this influenced 
Demirel’s attitude and behavior toward Özal. Demirel’s -along with others’- 
direct and harsh criticisms about Özal’s decision to run for presidency can be seen 
as a reaction to Özal’s attempts to block the pre-1980 politicians’ return to active 
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politics. In Demirel’s opinion, Özal had wanted to use the referendum as an 
instrument to eliminate his political rivals but could not succeed. Hence, as the 
next act of this sort he backdated the general elections.308 
 
As another tactic, the Özal government proposed constitutional change and a 
referendum was held on September 25, 1988. In addition to the change made in 
Article 127 of the Constitution on the powers of local administrations, local 
elections would be held a year earlier than its expected date. With the 65 percent 
no votes as opposed to 35 percent yes votes, the proposed change was refuted. 
Demirel claimed that the results of the referendum had shown the illegitimacy of 
the ANAP government. In Demirel’s view, this was the articulation of a definite 
failure; the support of people for Özal government was eroded.309 
 
When Özal announced that he would run for presidency, he had already been 
stranded by the aggressive opposition of Demirel. The DYP organized rallies 
known as “Get Lost Protests” (Çek-Git mitingleri) intending to force the 
government to resign. After Özal’s declaring his candidacy, again rallies with the 
slogan “Çankaya belongs to the nation” (Çankaya milletindir) were organized by 
the DYP. However, those protests were not enough to make Özal retreat, and on 
November 9, 1989 he was elected the eighth president (in the third round 
receiving 263 votes of a parliament consisting of 450 deputies). All of the political 
parties in Parliament except the ruling ANAP had opposed Özal and had not 
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joined the balloting, which later was thought to have strengthened the hands of the 
opposition in their questioning the legitimacy of Özal’s presidency. From then on, 
it was toppling not only the ANAP government but also Özal from Çankaya that 
had become the target of Demirel’s DYP. These developments affected the nature 
of the relationship between Demirel and Özal in the following years. Rather than 
having established amicable relations, tension was always high between the two 
even after they began to share the executive power, one as prime minister and the 
other as president. 
 
Demirel, while chairman of the DYP, argued that with the coming of Özal to the 
presidential office the era of a “hampered presidency” (“yaralı 
cumhurbaşkanlığı”) began. Criticizing the 1982 Constitution, Demirel maintained 
the necessity of presidents being elected by people. In his view, a candidate who 
receives less than 50 percent of the votes should not become president. His call 
was, in his words, for making the nation “sit in the state’s armchair.”310 In that 
way, Demirel intended to put Özal (who had previously proposed the idea of 
popular election) in a difficult position and open the legitimacy of his presidency 
to discussion. 
 
To understand how Demirel portrayed presidency during his term in Çankaya, the 
debate Demirel initiated after Özal’s presidential candidacy was announced needs 
to be more closely examined. Demirel’s criticisms about the way Özal fulfilled his 
presidential duty could give an idea about how Demirel’s concept of the office of 
presidency differed from Özal’s. President Özal’s meddling in party politics was 
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roundly criticized by Demirel. According to Demirel, it was unacceptable for a 
president to compromise his impartiality in such cases as an internal matter of a 
political party or a matter for which the government is responsible. However, Özal 
had a different view on the status and functions of the president. He interpreted 
the provisions about the presidential powers of the 1982 Constitution broadly. 
Özal claimed that Çankaya holds the half of political power;311 he wished to be 
briefed regularly on the state of the economy, and gave instructions to the 
government or directly to the bureaucrats. In his opinion, all that was within the 
scope of the powers conferred upon the president by the Constitution. 
Consequently, Özal justified his involvement in the internal affairs of ANAP and 
matters concerning economy and foreign policy. 
 
Özal’s active interest in the internal affairs of ANAP was evident in the election 
of leaders in that party. It is an open secret that he had a profound influence over 
the election of Yıldırım Akbulut as ANAP’s next chairman following Özal’s 
becoming president.  Akbulut was nominated as prime minister, and in that post 
he acted in a subservient manner to Özal. Akbulut’s passivity and dependency 
helped Özal’s establishing his absolutism but provoked a sharp reaction. When 
early elections became a matter of debate, Özal disclosed his views and 
emphasized the importance of drafting a new constitution before those elections 
were held.312 In response, Demirel criticized Özal for misusing the executive 
power, on the grounds that the president is defined as the politically irresponsible 
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part of the executive branch.  Referring to Özal’s expressing his views on behalf 
of ANAP officials, Demirel argued that the president’s partiality was revealed.313 
Demirel was also uncomfortable with the President Özal’s policy on the Kurds. It 
was a bold move of Özal at that time to spark off a debate on constitutional 
amendments on the right to freedom of press and freedom of expression targeting 
specifically abolishment of censorship and the ban on some languages, i.e. 
Kurdish. In his party group meeting, Demirel fiercely criticized Özal by claiming 
that Çankaya is in an “act of negligence, perversion, and treachery”.314 He pointed 
out that the issue should be addressed in a more circumspect manner. 
Furthermore, Demirel reminded that in Turkey for more than a thousand years 
twenty three different ethnic groups have been living together without being 
assimilated and, excluding the non-Muslims, no ethnic group has been considered 
a minority. Demirel stated that “if Turkish citizens are classified according to their 
ethnic and religious differences then Turkey would be divided.”315 Those 
allegations of Demirel were countered by Özal’s filing a lawsuit against Demirel; 
Özal accused Demirel of engaging in defamation. Not unexpectedly, the lawsuit 
added more fuel to the fire rather than a calming down of relations between Özal 
and Demirel. Demirel repeated his accusations of treachery against Özal and 
defined the lawsuit as a “political reckoning”316. 
 
The way Özal created a significant shift in the civil-military relations made 
Demirel feel uneasy as well. Even though the resignation of the Chief of General 
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Staff, General Torumtay, due to the clash with Özal on the strategy to be followed 
in the Gulf War was interpreted as a remarkable development by Demirel, he did 
not refrain from criticizing Özal. According to Demirel, president Özal wanted to 
assume the responsibility of the post of Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
In fact, as Demirel highlighted, it is stipulated by the Constitution that the 
president, in peace time, represents the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces which is inseparable from the spiritual existence of the TBMM 
(Article 117). What Özal attempted, however, was evaluated by Demirel as 
transgressing the limits of his presidential powers.317 
 
Despite the ongoing tense relations, relations were sometimes relaxed between 
Demirel and Özal. When a group of Greek protesters threw eggs on President 
Özal in New York City, Demirel publicly condemned that event. He considered it 
not as a move solely against the personality of Özal but against the national pride. 
Demirel, significantly, underlined that he and Özal might confront each other on 
any issue at home, but abroad they stood up together in unity and solidarity.318 
In March 1990, Özal made a call for a summit in Çankaya to the leaders of 
ANAP, the DYP and the SHP, those parties having seats in parliament. For Özal, 
the mounting terrorist acts of the PKK made such a summit necessary. Those were 
the days when both Demirel and Erdal Đnönü, as opposition leaders, debated 
Özal’s legitimacy. However, as they stated, when the issue was a matter of state 
like integrity and security it was unthinkable not to attend the meeting. This also 
exemplifies the importance Demirel has attached to state matters. 
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The above account of Demirel’s relations with Presidents Evren and Özal 
demonstrate that those were much more confrontational and tense compared to his 
relations with the presidents of the 1960s and 1970s, Gürsel, Sunay and Korutürk.  
Since Demirel was banned from politics by the military regime of September 12, 
his accusations and criticisms were directed particularly against Evren, the head of 
the 1980 junta. On the other hand, for Evren the politicians of the pre-1980 period 
(one of whom was Demirel) were responsible for the worsening political situation. 
These mutual allegations created a tension in the relationship between Demirel 
and Evren which lasted until the ban on pre-1980 political leaders was lifted in 
1987. From then on, Demirel and Evren had better working relations. What made 
this possible for both was their being at odds with Özal. Evren began to be 
uncomfortable with the policies of Özal, who was seen as a political adversary by 
Demirel. It is interesting that after Demirel was elected leader of the DYP, he 
underlined that he had no desire to take revenge for the past disputes.  
 
Nevertheless, Özal’s explicit opposition to abolishing the ban on the leaders of the 
pre-1980 period was not forgiven by Demirel. Demirel attacked Özal for being 
elected president by the parliament only with the support of ANAP, the old party 
of Özal, and thus questioned the legitimacy of his presidency. Özal’s 
interventionist style as a president in the fields of economics and international 
relations as well as his partiality towards party politics also received criticism 
from Demirel. Furthermore, Özal’s words and deeds in some issues like the 
Kurdish question and civil-military relations became unacceptable for Demirel. 
Demirel’s approach to these issues differs from Özal as Demirel’s political 
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understanding is centered on the state and policies on these issues should not put 
the continuation of the state in danger.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
PRESIDENT DEMĐREL AND THE STATE 
 
 
 
Since the backbone of the study is to analyze the “statist” role of presidents in the 
Turkish political system, in particular during the presidential term of Demirel, 
first what this role implies should be analyzed. The statist role is basically about 
prioritizing the matters of state with an emphasis on political stability and 
functioning of the state with a sense of commitment to the constitutional order. It 
should not be regarded just a matter of preserving the status quo, though. The 
statist role has furthermore a constructive dimension: acting as a mediating force 
in order to reduce the conflict between the state elites and the political elites, 
which in turn is expected to lead to a viable democratic system, as Sartori 
proposes. Therefore the significance of the statist role of the Turkish presidency 
regarding the maintaining of democracy is obvious. 
 
In critically scrutinizing the statist role of presidents in the Turkish parliamentary 
system vis-à-vis the consolidation of democracy, the Sartorian distinction between 
vertical and horizontal democracy is useful. As mentioned, Sartori underlines the 
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significance of the state in preserving and promoting the general interest in his 
conceptualization of vertical structuring of democracy.  
 
 
5.1. The Evolution of the State 
 
In Demirel’s conception, the state is a “living organism”. Hence it is not a “static” 
but a “dynamic” entity which has changed through centuries.319 As a starting 
point, Demirel points out that the state, in particular, existed where civilizations 
began to flourish. This means there is a strong link between the state as an 
organization and the civilization that harbors it. The state emerged as a reflection 
of the relations between the ruler and the ruled. 
 
For Demirel, concerning the historical evolution of state, there had been a 
transition from a state in which the right to rule comes from the state per se to a 
state that derives its power from the consent of the governed. In other words, he 
describes this historical shift as a “transition from the people of the state to the 
state of the people.”320 
  
Demirel makes reference to some important declarations to illustrate the historical 
development of the concept of the democratic state. The first group of those 
documents has become significant in limiting the power of the ruler and framing 
the inviolable and sacred rights of the ruled. According to Demirel, these are 
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Magna Carta (1215), the Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies of 
the United States of America (1776), and the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen (1789). Demirel underlines that Magna Carta is a breakthrough 
in the process of constructing a democratic culture, and the 1789 Declaration of 
Citizen, on the other hand, led to the birth of consciousness of natural rights by 
highlighting three concepts: liberty, equality, and fraternity. 321 Belonging to the 
second group of the milestones in the evolution of state, in the post-World War I 
period, the Wilson Principles (1918) and the foundation of the League of Nations 
(Cemiyet-i Akvam) (1920); in the post-World War II period, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Helsinki Final Act (1975), and the Charter of Paris (1990), according to Demirel, 
have further made the inalienable rights of man universal. After 1953, the idea 
that the essence of right shall not be violated by limitations has become widely 
acclaimed, and this, for Demirel, is a real limitation of power.322 
 
 
5.2. Features of the State 
 
According to Demirel, one of the most important characteristics of state is 
governability (yönetilebilirlik) which can be defined as the state’s ability to 
implement the laws and to use force when it is necessary. However, what should 
be kept in mind is that in Demirel’s opinion it is only the state itself that could use 
force. If some organs of the state attempted to use force individually, then that state 
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would be impossible to govern. This brings the second feature, that is, the 
sovereignty of the state. For Demirel, power is indivisible, and hence the state 
should preserve its characteristic of being the absolute and unrivaled authority. 
 
According to Demirel, the first and foremost duty of those administering in the 
name of the state is to maintain it in a governable situation. The second task which 
is no less vital than the former is keeping this governable state within the rule of 
law.323 Here comes the other feature of the state: legitimacy. Demirel states that to 
realize the legitimate conditions, first the supreme book that is the Constitution, 
and second, the supreme will, that is the free will of the people, should not be 
superseded.324 That said, legitimacy for Demirel means, on the one hand, deriving 
the power to govern from the consent of the governed and on the other, limiting 
the will of the people within the framework of legal order and balancing it with 
law.325 In order to eliminate the possible increase in the vulnerability of state to 
turmoil, as Demirel claims, all using the state’s authority must have legitimacy in 
their jurisdiction.  
 
Demirel considers failure in governing the state as the utmost threat for 
democracy. A well-functioning state is beginning of everything in Demirel’s 
understanding of politics. Democracy and the state are linked in his political 
terminology through the concept of a “state that functions in an efficacious 
manner” (“işleyen devlet”). In such a state, institutions function harmoniously and 
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the norms are respected without tolerating any exceptional cases. Democracy in 
Demirel’s conception is the totality of those institutions and norms. It is not 
possible to maintain a viable democracy only with state’s efforts. Nonetheless, as 
Demirel underlines, without a state, institutions cannot function and norms cannot 
be salient.326  
 
By using an analogy of a “golden triangle,” Demirel describes the “strong 
state.”327 This triangle is composed of democracy, development, and defense, and 
it is not possible to think any of them as separate from the others. Only if the three 
exist together may freedom, security and livelihood be maintained.328 A strong 
state is not conceptualized as an obstacle to democracy by Demirel but rather the 
“sine qua non of a viable democracy.” Nevertheless, not only the existence of the 
state but its nature and the way it functions are important for the flourishing of 
democracy. Parallel to that, Demirel emphasizes that the state is not an end in 
itself but a means for people’s contentment, and therefore in a strong state, the 
state is protected not only by a specific elite group but by the whole nation.329 The 
bond between nation and state is strong in a strong state. The concept of the 
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state’s embracing the nation is used by Demirel to describe this relationship.330 
Hence another feature of the state for Demirel is its inclusiveness. In addition to 
the above examples related to the horizontal dimension of democracy, a further 
dimension of the concept of the strong state is suggested by Demirel: the 
institutions grounded upon the free will of the nation and the constitutional norms 
are the factors that make a state stronger. In a related manner, he underlines the 
significance of the notions of “civic consciousness” (yurttaşlık bilinci) and 
“democratic culture” (demokrasi kültürü), which, in his opinion, derive from the 
people’s trust in the rule of law and the constitutional regime. In such a state, the 
authority is democratic, legal, and legitimate, and this contributes, according to 
Demirel, to the harmonious functioning of the organs of a strong state.331  
 
As Demirel underlines, the strong state embraces all of its citizens. Parallel to that, 
it provides moral leverage that upholds people’s pride in living in their country. 
However it is not sufficient for a state to be regarded as trustworthy by people. 
Competency comes to the fore as another feature of the state in addition to 
trustworthiness.  As Demirel explains, competency is directly linked to the 
principles and resoluteness of the state;332 in other words, the state should fulfill 
what it has promised. The erosion of the trust in state is among the issues Demirel 
heeds most. At that point he sees the necessity of differentiating between “trust in 
the state” and “confidence in the government.”333 “Being distrustful to the elected 
government or criticizing its political acts and deeds are only to be expected. 
Indeed, the body politic exists to be criticized. Nevertheless it should not be 
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disregarded that governments are like hats. They could become worn out and one 
can buy a new one. But the state is the head one cannot dispense with.”334 This 
analogy is important to understand the significance Demirel attributes to the state. 
Moreover this analogy can be useful to clarify the controversial statement of 
Demirel: “The council of ministers is a political institution. The MGK is state.”  
Not surprisingly, this statement met with negative reaction from some circles. By 
saying that the council of ministers is a political institution Demirel did not aim to 
belittle its importance. There is no intention of making a comparison between the 
council of ministers and the MGK. In line with the hat and head analogy, he tries 
to underline that the composition and policies of the council of ministers is not 
continuous and stable and the change occurs depending on the election results. 
However since the MGK is not only composed of elected civilians but in addition 
the president as the head of state and the commanders of the armed forces, the 
MGK is where the matters of the state are discussed in detail and advisory 
decisions on national security are taken. That is the reason why Demirel considers 
the MGK as state not as a political institution. Looking at his understanding of 
state, this is not surprising and the statement above does not contradict with it. 
 
 
5.3. Functions of the State 
 
As Rueschemeyer and Evans have noted, such core tasks as maintaining 
sovereignty, defense and institutional infrastructure should be undertaken by any 
viable state. The pursuit of general interest and deliverance of collective goods are 
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therefore claimed to be universal state roles.335 Drawing on their classification, 
four main categories can be pinpointed, which Demirel considers as “great matters 
of state”: law and order, modernization and development, socio-economic issues, 
and international relations. 
 
As mentioned, Demirel is of the opinion that the concept of the state has been 
transformed through ages. Likewise, he asserts that the functions of the state have 
also changed, and thus points out the shrinking of the state. As an example, he 
observes that states are withdrawing from commercial and industrial activities. 
The functions of the state as well as the functions of society 
have changed. That means the state no longer tackles each and 
every single problem the country faces. Likewise, the people 
no longer sit and wait for the state’s aid thinking that the state 
is required to do that. With the changing functions of state, the 
“welfare state” is substituted by the “welfare society.” The 
welfare state meant that the state was required to respond the 
needs of the have-nots.336      
 
Similar to the bringing-the-state-back-in theorists, Demirel argues that, in the 
current situation, there are still many fundamental functions that the state should 
continue to perform. Nonetheless, he makes a distinction among these core tasks. 
Some of them could only be performed by the state. For Demirel, these tasks are 
related to justice, freedom, security, peace and prosperity, all of which ensure 
happiness and contentment for the people.337 He emphasizes that neither 
distribution of justice nor showing compassion (şefkat) should be considered as a 
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favor, for the state is obliged to be just and merciful.338 Apart from these, there are 
other fundamental tasks concerning which the state functions as a facilitator and 
coordinator; these are on issues which could also be handled by voluntary and 
private organizations.339 According to Demirel, fulfilling duties concerning 
education and health without privileging any portions of society, adopting 
measures against environmental problems, and building infrastructure of all kinds 
are among those latter tasks.340  
 
 
5.3.1. Law and Order 
 
During the presidential term of Demirel, there were some serious concerns about 
two major issues that could disturb the law and order. The violent terrorist acts of 
the separatist PKK targeting the territorial integrity and internal peace of the 
country and the religious fundamentalism endangering the secular regime were 
those two issues. This led Demirel, in his capacity as president, to emphasize the 
priority of maintaining order and securing justice among the functions of the state. 
For him, prior to freedom, it was justice and safety that people have sought 
throughout the ages.341 Therefore, the state has become a means to make people 
lead a secure and peaceful life under a free and just order.342 
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According to Demirel a country is secure if everybody can move freely within the 
borders of the country and is able to start any business they want. In other words, 
that means being free from doubts about insecurity. Demirel highlights that 
insecurity is something formed in people’s minds343, and hence first, the state 
should try to dispel fears and make people feel that they are secure.  
    
Demirel, on avoiding any threats against the political order coming from terrorist 
attacks or reactionary movements, considered “rule of law” as an assurance since 
in a state based on the rule of law, there are mechanisms that can sustain law and 
order.344 Hence, in that way, everybody can be freed from worries about regime 
change and secession. Demirel’s insistence on showing that there is no threat to 
the secular democratic regime in Turkey as long as it keeps its trust in and respect 
for rule of law in the speeches he gave on religious and national celebration days 
can be interpreted as his endeavor to eliminate formations of possible polarization 
and tension in the society. 
 
Demirel was anxious to eliminate possible distortions about the fight against 
terrorism in the southeast region of Turkey which is mispresented by the PKK as 
the state’s policy of suppressing the Kurdish origin people of the region. In fact, 
he strongly emphasizes that the state has no problem with its citizens, but rather 
performs its duty to protect its citizens, frontiers, lands, and democracy with its 
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legitimate forces.345 For Demirel, Turkey is a unitary state having one country, 
one nation, one language and one flag. His usage of nation does not include an 
ethnic connotation. He admits the differences based on religion, faith, and 
political tendencies but regards them as a source of richness and power of Turkey. 
Demirel made public in one of his speeches on December 8, 1991 in Siirt that he 
has acknowledged the Kurdish reality. This was in fact a bold move when the 
political atmosphere of that period is taken into account. Nonetheless, on the heels 
of this sentence, he stressed that “cultural identity together with civic identity 
constitutes the link of confidence between the individual and state.”346 Demirel 
frequently refers to the vitality of the preservation of national unity for the 
continuation of the Turkish Republican State. Demirel asserts that all citizens, 
wherever they live within the boundaries of Turkey, regardless of their [ethnic] 
origins, language, creed, and sex, are “first-class citizens” having equal rights 
before the law. This is, as he underlines, the basic condition of national unity in 
Turkey.347 
 
In Demirel’s political terminology, rule of law means obedience to the supremacy 
of law. In a state based on rule of law, where rights, justice and law are the bases, 
there is no despotism and no one is subjected to injustices. Furthermore, in such a 
state, one is not obliged to save oneself or to stand upon one’s rights. 348 Rather, it 
is the state that establishes justice, provides peace and protects human rights 
through abiding by law. In a state which respects rule of law, as Demirel 
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underlines, there are basic concepts, norms and institutions. Free and fair 
elections, a parliament formed by the free will of the nation, a government which 
received the vote of confidence of the parliament, independent judiciary, political 
parties, free media, free universities, and free trade unions are all taken as the 
institutions of rule of law, and this political regime is called democracy.349 It is 
important to note here that in Demirel’s political discourse, rule of law, 
democratic state, and constitutional state are all interrelated concepts he uses 
frequently and interchangeably.  
 
Demirel argues that rule of law requires a legal order that frames the capacity and 
objectives of the state and the will of people to live together.  It is grounded upon 
a constitution that defines the rights, duties, responsibilities and relations among 
institutions.350 Hence rule of law is a constitutional state. In addition to that, for 
Demirel, there is a strong link between rule of law and democracy.  He conceives 
rule of law as “the advanced stage in a democratic development” and, in other 
words, as “the constituent element of democracy extended to a wider area.”351 
Demirel points out that in a rule of law the will of the majority is balanced with 
law and democracy is indeed the rule of law, not the rule of the majority.352 The 
will of the people is respected and given importance by Demirel but he sees law 
as a safety valve against the shift of a democratic regime into a tyranny of 
majority. Moreover, as already noted, he highlights two concepts, “citizenship 
consciousness” and “democratic culture,” which are claimed to cultivate the rule 
of law. Loyalty and obedience to the constitution, for Demirel, are the virtues of 
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citizens, and the balance between the rights, freedoms and responsibilities could 
only be created in that way. As we have seen, according to Demirel, rule of law, 
with its “substance democracy” (“içerik demokrasisi”) signifying the rights, and 
its “procedural democracy” (“yöntem demokrasisi”) signifying the norms and 
rules that public authorities should comply with, encompasses both vertical and 
horizontal dimensions of democracy.  
 
Another related concept with rule of law in Demirel’s political terminology is the 
strong state. Referring to his “golden triangle” analogy, the coexistence of 
democracy, development and defense are important for a state to maintain 
freedom, subsistence and security as reflections of the former three. For him, as 
mentioned before, a state is strong when it serves its people best by fulfilling its 
basic functions, which are ensuring security, justice and equality of 
opportunity.353 Demirel praises the attentiveness and vigilance of people which he 
considers the main assurances for the rule of law.354 Demirel argues that in a 
strong state people are free to ask for the better conditions and the contentment of 
the people is prioritized by an open, just and an effective administration. Hence, 
as he put forward, the politicians should preserve the smooth functioning of 
state.355  
 
Based on the above explanations, it can be argued that Demirel acts as a 
proponent of the “strong state” which he defines by referring both to the 
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horizontal and vertical dimensions of democracy. Looking at the periods during 
which Demirel acted as prime minister, Heper has come to the conclusion that “he 
remained political elite only” without attempting “to double as the state elites” 
and added that the clash with the state elites made Demirel fail to “appreciate the 
particular function the state had been performing in Turkey.”356 However, 
Demirel in his presidential term has proved the opposite and become aware of the 
fact that it is required to establish a modus vivendi between the state elites and the 
political elites in order to have a viable democracy. 
 
 
5.3.2. Modernization and Development 
 
In Demirel’s train of thought, modernization has four pillars. The economic pillar 
is made up of integration with the global market economy, economic growth, and 
prosperity. Improvements in the areas of public works and reconstruction and 
achieving a more prosperous society as an outcome of development, 
industrialization, and technological advancement form the social pillar. The third 
pillar, that is the political, requires a democratic system in which the will of nation 
is considered supreme and fundamental rights and freedoms are secured. The 
fourth one, the cultural pillar, is becoming modern while preserving national and 
moral values. It should be highlighted that in Demirel’s conception of 
modernization, the state is given a central place. 
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As mentioned before, the state and development are closely linked according to 
Demirel. In that vein, matters of infrastructure are an important part of the issue of 
development. Demirel states that it is necessary for the state to continue in a 
selective way, investing in infrastructure projects for which it is strictly 
responsible. Energy, communication, and transportation infrastructures should be 
developed accordingly. Demirel adds that the investments in the eastern and 
southeastern regions of Turkey should be completed as soon as possible. He 
argues that it is wrong to consider these investments as mere infrastructure 
projects because these become hope for the people of those regions.357 
 
In Demirel’s thinking, development has also the dimension of technological 
advancement. To become capable of competing in the globalizing world and 
fueling economic growth, the country should develop its scientific and 
technological capacities. In his view, this could be achieved through education. To 
become modern and developed, becoming a knowledge society (bilgi toplumu) 
has great importance. As Demirel asserts, the state plays a key role, as an architect 
of a modern education system, in catching up with the level of contemporary 
standards in the fields of education and science that the information age 
presupposes, and in increasing the number of citizens who could benefit from the 
opportunities provided by science and technology and, in turn, make contributions 
to knowledge production.358 Demirel states that developing the kind of education 
system that increases the number of well-equipped individual-citizens is also 
crucial in raising the level of consciousness among citizens, which is thought to be 
                                                
357 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Süleyman Demirel’in Milli Günler ve 
Bayramlar Dolayısıyla Yayınlanan Mesajları,  p. 55. 
358 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Süleyman Demirel’in Çeşitli Toplantılarda 
Yaptığı Konuşmalar III, pp. 30-31. 
 159 
correlated with modernization.359 Indeed, for him, this is directly associated with 
the state’s responsibility for creating the necessary environment for the exercise of 
rights by the citizens who acquire awareness of justice and democracy in the 
process of education.360 In Demirel’s terms, modernization and the presence of a 
responsible and active society are intimately connected.  
 
 
5.3.3. Socioeconomic Issues 
 
Demirel underlines that, besides its being a democratic rule of law, the state’s 
social dimension should not be disregarded. As explained, the state has an 
obligation not to provide the educational service alone but to support its provision 
by various other institutions. Demirel claims that the state is primarily responsible 
for taking the necessary measures to ensure that all portions of society could be 
given the equal chance to benefit from the educational opportunities at similar 
standards.361  
 
Similarly, on the issue of health, Demirel emphasizes the important role of the 
state, particularly in making reforms for providing the opportunity of a healthy 
life for all citizens. Here too, he thinks that the implementation of such reforms 
should not be left only to the state. Indeed, for Demirel, private entrepreneurs 
should take part in the health sector, too. While stating the necessity of 
encouraging the private enterprises, he also pays attention to the matter of 
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supervising the private health institutions. According to Demirel, other than the 
idea of state control, establishing institutional structures that will enable the 
private health sector to supervise itself is also important.362 
 
In Demirel’s view, another issue that the state should be responsive to is the issue 
of social justice. He believes that it is the task of the state to decrease disparities 
between different income groups by reallocation of resources at the disposal of the 
state.363 
 
 
5.3.4. International Relations 
 
Demirel argues that in the field of international relations the tasks of the state 
could not be delegated to any other institution. Within the family of states all over 
the world, the prestige and esteem of a country is very important. According to 
Demirel, preserving the reputation and increasing the credibility of the country is 
among the responsibilities of the state.  
In Demirel’s view, the protection of sovereignty is the other significant issue that 
a state should tackle. To that end, he gives an important place in the tasks of the 
state to security and defense. In harmony with his positive conception of politics, 
Demirel favors following a strategy of foreign affairs predicated upon peace and 
stability. He thinks that it is advantageous for all countries to cooperate. In his 
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opinion, conflicts can be resolved through mutual understanding, tolerance, and 
peaceful dialogue.364  
 
Demirel is of the opinion that “foreign policy should be conducted in balance” 
and that should be done without being “surrendered to the anger of the people.”365 
The public administrators have to pursue the national interest and fulfill those 
responsibilities of the state inherited from the past.366 This might include creating 
new or activating old zones of influence. Nevertheless, at the same time, the state 
should be careful not to disturb the peace in its region and the world. Demirel 
summarizes his views on the continuity of the state’s foreign policy and its 
independence from individual practices as follows:  
Foreign policy is a sensitive issue. It could not be separated 
from the country’s past. The continuity in state affairs is 
fundamental. Political executives in power could make 
engagements in foreign affairs in the name of state. The real 
owner of the engagement here is the state. [Authorized] People 
could change but the engagements [of the state] remain 
unchanged. The continuity on foreign policy is exceptionally 
important. It may carry the seal of the governments, but it still 
belongs to the state’s domain. Unless it becomes a state matter, 
the validity of the policy would be considered dubious when 
the government changes.367  
 
 
5.4. Demirel’s Conception of Presidency as the “Head of State” 
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During presidential elections, Turkish politics tends to lurch into a legitimacy 
crisis (also sometimes called “state crises”). Considering the presidency as the 
foremost institution of state shows us that “head” in “head of state” is not just 
symbolic. Through many years, in spite of the changes made in the presidential 
elections, the president has never stopped being perceived as the one representing 
the general interest and acting in a manner for the good of the country as a whole. 
Article 104 of the Constitution defines president as the “representative of the 
Turkish Republic and the unity of the Turkish nation”; this provision has inspired 
Demirel to construe presidency as representing not only the state but the nation as 
well.368 Dodd, in his article on Turkish presidency, points out that the president in 
Turkey is a protector rather than a mere impartial figurehead.369 This view seems 
to have been adopted as a principle by Demirel in his Çankaya years.  
 
In analyzing the presidential term of Demirel and the way he perceived and 
interpreted the statist role of the president, the oath sworn by the president under 
the 1982 Constitution constitutes a reference point. As he stated, the attributes of 
the Turkish state are well described in this article (Article 103) of the 
Constitution. The Turkish state, for Demirel, has been set up on three basic tenets. 
One of them is national will; the others are the principle of secularism and a 
unitary state with the indivisible integrity of the country. The Constitution pays 
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high attention to these three tenets.370 What the president swears upon, as the head 
of state, are the essential elements of the Turkish state, as Demirel stated.371 
 
In a similar vein, the speech that President Demirel delivered in the Parliament on 
assuming office in 1993 is noteworthy in the sense that the points he raised give 
us a clue about Demirel’s perception of presidency. He indicated that it is 
inconceivable for a president representing the Turkish Republic and the unity of 
the Turkish nation, who is obliged to embrace all sorts of legal organizations of 
the citizens including political parties, to act in a partisan manner.372 Hence it is 
obvious that Demirel, in parallel with the state elites, highlighted the impartiality 
of the president. Nevertheless, he added that becoming impartial did not mean that 
the president would keep his silence in state matters, but rather that he would act 
in accordance with the Constitution and the democratic-secular character of the 
Republic.373  
 
As mentioned in the second section of Chapter IV, Demirel explains his 
perspective on what the status and duties of president ought to be in the Turkish 
political system by frequently criticizing the way Özal acted as a president. For 
Demirel, Özal acted in a partisan manner and beyond the limits of Constitution 
where the powers of the president are clearly stipulated. Demirel highlights that in 
Article 8 the executive power and function is defined as follows: “Executive 
power and function shall be exercised and carried out by the President of the 
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Republic and the Council of Ministers in conformity with the Constitution and the 
law.” It is also clearly stipulated in already mentioned Article 104 that the 
president “shall ensure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and 
harmonious functioning of the organs of state.”  
 
After mentioning these articles, Demirel has somehow shifted his previous claim 
that duties and powers of president are clearly defined in the Constitution. 
Surprisingly, he admitted that it is normal to have different perspectives in 
interpreting these duties and powers and it is also possible to have some 
differences of view concerning that issue. Moreover, he argues that the statements 
in the Constitution extend the duties and powers of president. Thus Demirel 
accepts that during his presidential term, when the circumstances were unclear, he 
interpreted those statements and acted accordingly.374 On the other hand, he 
makes it clear that while interpreting the provisions in question, he paid great 
attention to the protection of the interests of the nation, and to avoiding any delay 
in state matters.375  
 
Demirel emphasizes that the president represents the unity of the country as well 
as the integrity of the state. In his words, the office of president is the sole office 
that state and nation are simultaneously manifested.376 On the other hand, he also 
states that the office of president belongs to the nation.377 In that way, the 
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president leads the efforts to embrace nation and state. According to Demirel, the 
president is authorized to be the president of each and every person in the country. 
Therefore, s/he should be above party politics and make clear the ideals that all 
political views are required to embrace.378 According to Demirel, the president 
ought to address all of the significant problems of the country and suggest 
solutions for them.  
 
Consequently, according to Demirel, the president is expected to safeguard the 
regime and state. As mentioned, s/he is also responsible for the smooth and 
harmonious functioning of the state. Demirel believes that even if some people try 
to hinder this, the president should remain calm so as to overcome such 
obstacles.379 To that end, Demirel puts forward the conciliatory role of the 
president. He states that the president assists the political parties in reaching an 
agreement. However, the limits of this role have been drawn by the president. 
Anything could be a subject of compromise except the unity of state and its 
secular character.380 
 
Demirel’s view of the presidency paralleled the way he conducted himself in that 
office. Demirel, who has argued that a president ought to listen, consult, and 
enlighten, acted in a way that was consistent with that dictum. In addition to the 
senior state officials and political party leaders, he received the leaders and 
representatives of many organizations such as labor unions, employers’ 
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associations, public professional organizations, voluntary initiatives, and 
foundations. Demirel noted that his objective was to maintain harmony among the 
state organs and spread that harmony to society, thereby turning the presidency 
into a “consultation mechanism.”381 Moreover, he claimed that his endeavor was 
to mold public opinion for the purpose of sustaining democratization. To realize 
that goal, he made various suggestions to institutions and organizations so as to 
lead and guide people, too.382 As the head of state, Demirel’s general strategy was 
to closely watch all important developments related to the country and intervene 
when he deemed it necessary. The events during the February 28 process can set 
an example in order to understand how Demirel put this strategy into practice. 
This will be analyzed in detail in Chapter VI. For the purpose of this section, it is 
sufficient to argue that there might have been a connection between Demirel’s 
active involvement in the process and his opinion that people’s expectations from 
the president rise during periods of crisis.383 
 
 
5.5. Summary 
 
The state is a pivotal concept in Demirel’s political understanding. It is idealized 
as being “strong”. In the web of his conception of politics, the state is the only 
concept affiliated to each and every other concept. For him, the state is not static 
but has transformed through the ages from “the people of the state” to “the state of 
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the people.” It is interesting that Demirel established a link between state and 
civilization, seeing them as evolving together.  
 
This analysis of Demirel’s sophisticated views on the features of the strong state 
has resulted in eight characteristics. The first one is governability, which indicates 
state’s ability to implement laws and use force when needed. It is closely linked to 
the state as an absolute and unrivaled authority which implies its sovereignty. 
Demirel here puts forward the importance of keeping the governable and 
sovereign state within the rule of law which brought the third dimension, the 
legitimacy of the state. This is important since the idea of democracy in Demirel’s 
web of thinking appears at this point. The legitimacy of the state is considered to 
be closely related to the “consent of the governed” as the basis of state’s power on 
one hand, and on the other, with the limitation of the “will of the people” by laws. 
Where there are respected norms and laws, and harmoniously functioning 
institutions, the state functions. Thus, it is understood that for Demirel a strong 
state and a viable democracy are not mutually exclusive. It is unique to argue that 
strong state is a sine qua non of a viable democracy. Three d’s, i.e. democracy, 
development, and defense, are defined by Demirel as the fundamentals of a strong 
state. The last four features of a strong state are basically about its ties with nation 
and people. Demirel’s strong state embraces the nation as a whole. This 
inclusiveness in turn breeds civic consciousness and democratic culture in a 
constitutional regime. According to Demirel, the competence, resoluteness, and 
trustworthiness of state are basic requirements for the rule of law.  
 
 168 
In discussions revolving around whether state withers or not, Demirel is on the 
side that holds that it is not fading away. He admits that its functions have 
changed. Nevertheless, some goods can still be provided only by the state, i.e. 
justice, freedom, security, peace and prosperity, happiness and contentment, and 
the like. As seen, these are all abstract and intangible concepts. On the other hand, 
according to Demirel, there are also some other tasks that the state performs as a 
facilitator and coordinator. Those are more concrete and tangible issues such as 
education and health services, environmental projects, and infrastructure.  
 
Demirel’s conception of presidency as head of state is influenced by his strong 
state understanding. He considers the president responsible for the implementation 
of the constitution with all its institutions functioning harmoniously, and the 
durability of the democratic regime by activating the conciliation mechanism 
when deemed necessary. He distinguished state matters from matters of party 
politics. In that way, Demirel could act decisively concerning some issues without 
harming the image of the president which is expected to be impartial. The next 
chapter examines in detail how Demirel’s style managed to be both active and 
impartial. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
PRESIDENT DEMĐREL AND DEMOCRACY 
 
 
 
In Demirel’s political vision, democracy has primary importance too. As 
mentioned, for him, state and democracy could not be separated from each other. 
He stressed that a state without democratic rule would not be a functioning state 
and pointed out that democracy would not exist in a stateless structure. To repeat 
it again for the purpose of this chapter, what he envisaged is a state that is 
cherished by the people, a democratic state where authority is given through the 
consent of the people.384 At this point Demirel addressed a concept, “democratic 
authority” which for him is related to the rule of law. 
 
As mentioned, Demirel defined a well functioning state as a democratic state 
where there are applicable laws implemented without any exemptions and where a 
harmony between institutions exists. Demirel believed that as long as the rules are 
enforced, problems can be solved within democracy. However, what is also 
important in this process is eliminating a possible loss of people’s confidence in 
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democracy, because Demirel thought that a democratic system would collapse 
when the trust of people in democracy totally disappears.385 For maintaining a 
viable democracy, the state as an organizing actor is necessary, though not 
sufficient, because perpetuation of democratic rule depends also upon the 
sensibility and involvement of public opinion. Therefore in Demirel’s political 
lexicon, democracy, state and people are interconnected. Democracy, in a sense, is 
a manifestation of the embracing of the people by the state. 
 
Demirel also talked about the “democratic reflex of people” as indispensable in a 
functioning state; this means that people would not condone injustice but rather, 
through being organized, legally stand up for their rights.386 In his political jargon, 
political participation will not be realized only by elections. Demirel’s view that 
“the majority, as long as it is set free, will not go wrong”387 can also strengthen 
the argument made earlier that he has a belief in people. In that regard, he has 
diverged from the state elites who assume the role of safeguarding the regime. 
Demirel pointed out that as it is underlined in the Constitution the true guardians 
of the Republic are the citizens per se. He emphasized that if a society leaves the 
responsibility of the preservation of democracy to the state and to the security 
forces, democracy will collapse.388 This viewpoint has paved the way for 
Demirel’s contribution to the efforts in Turkey of maintaining a viable democracy 
by being a conciliatory figure between the state and its people. Moreover, 
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Demirel, whose entire political career is marked by his belief in people, has tried 
to counteract elitist inclinations, which were salient in the state discourse.  
 
Demirel’s approach to the increasing violent acts in the southeast of Turkey 
during his presidential term would also make clear his conceptualization of 
democracy. He reacted to the attempts of some people to justify these moves by 
arguing that they emerged due to the defects of Turkish democracy. Demirel 
stated that these violent acts could only be named separatist acts and there is no 
place for secessionism in a democracy since democracy could never be related to 
the acts targeting the indivisible integrity of country.389 It is obvious that Demirel 
praised the conception of the unitary state; however, Demirel did not stand for 
assimilating differences based on ethnicity or religion. Indeed, in his political 
terminology, nation as a term denotes something more than ethnicity or race. 
Demirel sticks to what he had expressed just before he was elected president 
about his conceptualization of nation and nationalism: a common future and a 
feeling of a shared destiny make a society a nation.390 
 
In his mentioned Siirt speech (1991), by referring to the Kurdish reality, Demirel 
pointed out that the Turkish Republic is the country of people coming from 
different ethnic backgrounds. Nevertheless, Demirel interpreted this fact as 
enriching and strengthening but not as a divisive factor harming national unity. 
Considering this problematic issue of the Republic, Demirel has proposed an 
important concept as a remedy, which is “constitutional citizenship” (anayasal 
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vatandaşlık). For him, it can be defined as treating everybody as equal before the 
law and ignoring differences based on religion, ethnic origin, and geographical 
location.391 Therefore, Demirel suggested that the minority rights issue would be 
an entrapment and a great mistake for Turkey if it is discussed in the name of 
democratization.392  
 
Demirel always stressed the necessity of everybody’s being loyal to the 
constitutional order. In his entire political career as a party leader, he kept up his 
struggle for a more democratic constitution. At first sight, it might seem as if there 
is a paradox between his previous criticisms of the 1982 Constitution and his 
emphasis on loyalty to the constitution after he became president. Nevertheless, 
Demirel’s statements during his presidential term clearly indicate that he 
continued supporting the constitutional changes, some of which were planned 
under his guidance during his premiership. Within the seven-year-term of office, 
seventeen articles393 of the constitution have been amended and two articles394 
were abolished. 
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6.1. Demirel and the Political Parties 
 
When Demirel was elected president by the parliament in 1993, he faced a similar 
difficulty to that which his predecessor Özal had experienced in his term of office. 
He had become the President of Turkish Republic while the party that he had led 
for a long time was in power. However, Demirel was prepared and able to protect 
himself from harsh criticisms regarding the relationship with the political parties 
such as he had made while Özal was president. From the beginning of his term, 
Demirel on every occasion declared that he was and always would be loyal to the 
requirements of “constitutional presidency,” (anayasal cumhurbaşkanlığı)395 i.e., 
he would keep an equal distance from each and every political party. 
 
In explaining the term constitutional presidency, Demirel emphasized the 
impartiality of the president as an essential characteristic of the presidency. On the 
other hand, Demirel felt the necessity to make it clear that the impartial and 
above-party-politics position of the president should not be interpreted and 
understood as his complete detachment from all political issues. At this point, it 
would be beneficial to look at Demirel’s perception and differentiation of “active 
politics” from “party politics.” He claimed that the president should not be 
expected to be indifferent to some particular issues, such as the indivisibility of 
Turkey, preserving its secular republican character, and defending the principles 
of justice, fairness, clemency, and conscience.396 For Demirel, it is a duty of the 
president that is assigned by Article 104 of the constitution to maintain the 
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effective and harmonious functioning of every mechanism in politics within the 
legal framework.397 
 
Contrary to what was expected, throughout his presidency Demirel was careful 
not to behave in a way that might be interpreted as meddling in the affairs of the 
party he had previously led. He paid attention to the criticisms of the opposition 
about the policies and performances of the Çiller-Karayalçın coalition government 
that was at one point in a crisis of confidence due to the economic slump. Demirel 
conducted the presidential office as an intermediary body between the unsatisfied 
opposition and the coalition government. At the time, Demirel denied the rumors 
that Çiller and he did not get on well.  On the other hand, he supported 
clandestinely the growing opposition against the coalition government. When 
opposition parties, associations such as TÜSĐAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association), and some media institutions visited Demirel to 
criticize the government and demand the setting up of a new government, Demirel 
said that Çankaya is not the place to discuss such issues and directed them to the 
parliament instead. His sensitivity on this issue is important to understand what 
kind of role Demirel thinks a president should play. Every three or four months, 
Demirel came together with all the leaders of the political parties and tried to find 
out their views on various matters. More importantly, as the head of state, he 
regarded convening the party leaders on a regular basis as his responsibility. In 
that way, Demirel successfully opened up a constitutionally legitimate space for 
himself in active politics without endangering his impartiality. It can be argued 
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that his success in this respect is an indication of his accomplishment in 
developing a unique style as a president in Turkish politics. 
 
 
6.2. Views on Secularism and Islam 
 
President Demirel considered secularism as one of the bases of a democratic 
republic. He stressed the incorrectness of equating it with other doctrines or belief 
systems. For Demirel, secularism has a vital importance as a principle and a 
method.398 He objected to distorting the meaning of the concept of secularism to 
mean atheism or hostility toward religion.399 Furthermore, Demirel was opposed 
to the politicization of religion since he believed that using religion for political 
purposes would mostly endanger religion.400 Demirel argued that religion should 
not serve politics, but the latter should serve secularism, which in turn might be an 
“umbrella for religion,” as a protector.401 
 
During the revival of Islamist politics in Turkey with the coming of the RP to 
power, Demirel was the resident of Çankaya. He struggled to dispel worries about 
the threat of political Islam in Turkey. On the other hand, Demirel referred to the 
use of religion as a road map in politics as a violation of the Constitution. He also 
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vehemently argued that those aiming to establish a secular versus Muslim 
dichotomy and thus create divisions in Turkish society could never succeed.402  
 
According to Demirel, secularism is a warrant for freedom of conscience and 
belief. Furthermore, he underlined that people in Turkey do not have a problem 
with secularism.403 In his conceptualization, secularism could only be a matter for 
political life not for the people. It is not a characteristic for the individual. For 
him, an individual could be a believer or a non-believer.404 Hence Demirel 
opposed classifying people as secular or anti-secular. 
 
Another significant matter that Demirel proposed was the compatibility of Islam 
and secularism which, as he argued, is best practiced in Turkey. He claimed that 
the secular Turkish Republic felt abhorrence neither for Islamic faith nor for its 
practices. It is just a system in which legal norms are not designated in accordance 
with Shari’a, which was for Demirel the crux of the struggle of Turkey for 
modernization.405  
 
 
6.3. Demirel and Civil-Military Relations 
 
As explained in the previous chapters, the military has always been an influential 
actor in the Turkish polity. The Armed Forces intervened in politics in 1960, 
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1971, 1980 and 1997, on the grounds that the Republican regime was under 
serious threat.406 Nonetheless, it could not be easily argued that the Turkish 
generals are motivated by personal or partial interests like their Latin American 
counterparts.407 Rather, they always felt the necessity to go back to their barracks 
as quickly as possible after they thought that they had secured the main pillars of 
the regime. However, this does not mean that it is in line with democracy by 
Western standards. Even though, as Heper stated, the series of mini-interventions 
perpetuating heretofore took place in the policy-making rather than politics 
arena,408 the military has continued to perceive itself as the defender of the 
interests of the state and intervened in politics when the country was seen by them 
as facing an internal threat.   
 
Demirel is the only political leader in Turkey who was removed from office twice 
by military interventions, first in 1971 and then in 1980. Demirel’s presidency 
also coincided with a time of problematic civil-military relations. But unlike his 
premierships, Demirel as the head of state came close to the state elites by sharing 
their worries about the rise of religious fundamentalism. However, being critical 
of the democratic breakdowns and claiming to safeguard the regime, Demirel has 
stated that, contrary to expectations, military take-overs breed nothing but 
negative outcomes for the nation’s interests.409  
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President Demirel has become an expert on the negative implications of civil-
military confrontations on the democratic regime that Turkey experienced in an 
interval of approximately ten years, from 1960 to 1997. On every occasion, he has 
drawn on this experience to warn both the military and civilians not to fall into the 
same trap. In his statements, Demirel has always been sensitive when the issue is 
the Armed Forces as an institution. The controversy on the extension of the term 
of office of the CGS Doğan Güreş that was put on the agenda by the Prime 
Minister Çiller in 1994 can exemplify the diligence of President Demirel on this 
matter. Demirel interpreted such ill-timed discussions as attempts which might 
harm the sensitive balance of civil-military relations. He warned the government 
not to draw the army into such a meaningless debate, because it would possibly 
end up with tarnishing the reputation of the military as an institution. Moreover, 
Demirel dealt with the issue by underlining that it is beyond the government’s 
initiative to decide on such an extension, since without the will of the president it 
is a stillborn attempt.  
 
The TSK is particularly sensitive to the issues of secularism and national unity. 
Any action against them is perceived as an attempt to overthrow the regime. 
Hence, in the 1990s, it was inevitable that Turkey would not see a tension 
between the military and the Islamic groups that became an important part of the 
political and social life from then on. During the RP-DYP coalition government 
(28 June 1996- 30 June 1997), the generals were disturbed by the words, actions, 
and policies of RP politicians so much so that the continuation of the coalition 
government was regarded as hazardous for the secular character of the Republic. 
The confrontation between the military and the RP did not end up in a direct 
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military take-over. However the February 28 process had long-term impacts on 
Turkish political life. Four months after the notorious meeting of the MGK, 
Erbakan resigned and that casused the RP-DYP coalition government to fall in 
June 1997. A year later, the Constitutional Court closed down the RP.  
 
President Demirel’s endeavor to balance civil-military relations in Turkey is 
demonstrated best by the February 28 process of 1997. Those were the days when 
secularists in Turkey started to live in a state of alert. They became alarmed by the 
lack of loyalty to the Kemalist legacies, especially regarding the issues of 
secularism and territorial unity. The generals had long started to point out that two 
internal threats were menacing the Republican regime, one of which was Islamic 
activism, which was regarded as even more dangerous than the Kurdish 
insurgency in the southeastern Turkey.410 Indivisibility of the territorial integrity 
of the country and persistence of the secular regime were the two most important 
things that the military was resolved to safeguard. The staunch supporters of 
secularism including some groups from the media, the bulk of the academic 
circles, the Istanbul-based business community, and civil societal associations as 
well as the secularists among the people gave a strong hand to the military in 
combating the Islamist threat.  
 
Demirel, in tandem with this secular alliance, thought that necessary steps should 
be taken immediately about the Islamist reactionism that was perceived by many 
                                                
410 Cumhuriyet, 1 April 1994. 
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as the “undetectable malaise of the Turkish polity.”411 Demirel’s acting in this 
manner was interpreted as a shift from his previous stance on the issue and he was 
criticized harshly by those having conservative orientations. However, apart from 
Demirel’s sharing the state elites’ worries about the Islamic fundamentalism, he 
did not miss any opportunity to give messages calling them to be sober in facing 
such circumstances. For instance, in his celebration address for the feast of 
Ramadan in 1996, just after the elections in which the religiously oriented RP had 
been victorious, Demirel emphasized that there was no need for causing political 
disharmony by making faulty inferences from the election results, which, as he 
underlined, was the expression of nation’s free will . He added that the latter was 
a fundamental principle of Turkish Republic.412 Demirel thus showed that as 
president he chose to warn both sides and thus tried to act in an impartial manner.  
 
Demirel not only wanted respect and responsiveness to the will of the people, 
which he considered as the basic component of democracy, but also sent signals to 
the elected RP to act in a responsible manner and take into account the 
sensitivities of the regime. Demirel’s end of the year address again displayed his 
attempt to make opposing sides remain calm. That speech was delivered in the 
tense atmosphere two months before the February 28 crisis. Demirel, being aware 
of the seriousness of the situation, put the weight of the presidency behind the 
issue and reminded everybody of his presidential duty of being the advocate of the 
Constitution, rule of law, democracy, Atatürk’s principles and the secular 
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character of the Republic, which should be differentiated from the impartiality of 
president vis-à-vis party politics.413 However, it is also important that in his 
speech he, as president, did not call upon any other bodies but only citizens to 
defend the main pillars of the Republic. For regime survival, Demirel considered 
nothing as necessary as the trust of people in the state. It is important to mention it 
here again that, in Demirel’s understanding, the true guardians of the regime were 
the citizens per se and hence without the citizens’ protection democracy could not 
survive in that society. As evidence, Demirel quoted from the Constitution that it 
“is entrusted by the Turkish nation to the patriotism and nationalism of its 
democracy-loving sons and daughters.”414 
 
Despite Demirel’s calming messages, the mounting worries of the secular bloc 
due to the policies of the RP-DYP coalition government escalated the political 
tension, which was most clearly observed in the February 28 meeting of the 
MGK. It was a regular monthly meeting of the MGK, but what made it a 
prominent event in Turkish political history was the ultimatum-like 
recommendations made in that meeting to the coalition government led by 
Erbakan as a reaction to the increase in the “relentless pro-Shari’a actions and 
hostility against the secular order.” Beforehand, many controversial events had 
taken place, which had led to discontent and doubts about the coalition 
government especially its main partner, the RP. For instance, in the eyes of the 
state elites, Erbakan’s Libya visit on October 4-6, 1996 was a real humiliation for 
the Turkish nation since he could do nothing there to defy the derogatory remarks 
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of Muammar Qaddafi. Moreover, at the Prime Minister’s residence, Erbakan had 
given a dinner to the leaders of religious orders (tarikat) during the holy month of 
Ramadan on January 11, 1997, and that was again perceived as a challenge to the 
secular regime. The attempts to build mosques (one in Istanbul in Taksim Square, 
which always has had symbolic importance for Kemalists with its famous statue 
and other in Ankara in Çankaya which is known as the fortress of the Kemalists) 
were again disturbing, and they, too, deepened the rift between the secularist 
camp and the RP. 
 
As the grievances increased among the state elites, counter attacks began. With 
the purpose of defending their democratic rights and freedoms preemptively from 
being smashed with a possible Islamist revolution that they predicated would take 
place as long as the RP remained in power, the secular bloc did not avoid taking 
some measures which in turn were bound to degrade the quality of democracy in 
Turkey. Numerous briefing meetings were held by the military to inform various 
public institutions such as universities, judiciary and the like about the extent of 
the threat.  New units within the military were set up to monitor the infiltration of 
Islamic fundamentalists into the civil service. In the summer of 1996, the military 
denied the admission of the members of the RP to an army graduation ceremony 
on the grounds that they were not properly dressed (they had Islamic beards and 
headscarves). The last straw for the military was the pro-Islamic demonstrations 
against Zionism that took place in the so-called Jerusalem Night (Kudüs Gecesi), 
which was organized by the RP-controlled municipality of Sincan, a district of 
Ankara, on January 31, 1997. The reaction of the army was harsh; tanks rolled 
through the streets of the town, which was something like a premonitory act. 
 183 
The complaints of the army about the words and deeds of the members and 
supporters of the RP were conveyed by the CGS Karadayı to President Demirel. 
Then Demirel visited the headquarters of the general staff on January 17, 1997. 
Later in an interview Demirel told that during this meeting the commanders 
proposed to put their complaints about the anti-regime activities of the 
government on the agenda of a MGK meeting.415 Demirel considers the initiative 
of Karadayı to discuss these issues in the MGK meeting instead of staging a coup 
a civilized move.416 What is also important about this meeting is that the 
recommendations were prepared by the military before the MGK meeting but it 
was revised during the meeting with the participation of all members of the 
Council. Demirel mentioned in the same interview that he softened some of its 
statements and added a note stating that sincere Muslims are not the target of 
these recommendations.417 
 
The MGK recommendations were designed to protect secularism in such a tense 
atmosphere. At first Prime Minister Erbakan refused to sign some of the 
recommendations, but later he realized that he had no chance but to sign them. 
Nevertheless, he came under heavy criticism. He was blamed for inciting people’s 
religious feelings for the sake of coming to power and dividing the society into 
two camps, thus deepening polarization and enmity in the country. Erbakan, who 
was considered responsible for the political turmoil, became aware the seriousness 
of the situation and resigned from the coalition government.  
                                                
415 Zaman, 12 July 2007. 
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In this severe test for Turkish democracy, President Demirel was one of the 
conciliatory figures as he helped to surmount the crisis. The resignation of 
Erbakan created an expectation on the part of the deputy Prime Minister Çiller, 
the chairwoman of the other partner of the coalition government (DYP), of being 
asked to form the new coalition government. However, Demirel’s reading of the 
ongoing events was different than Çiller’s. He thought that Erbakan’s resignation 
was not sufficient to terminate the crisis; the coalition government should itself 
disband for the sake of social and political tranquility. Hence, in his constitutional 
capacity Demirel entrusted Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of ANAP, with the 
responsibility of forming the new government.  
 
Demirel displayed sensitivity to the discomforts of the secular bloc. However, 
when there were aforementioned undemocratic measures taken to prevent a 
possible Islamist take-over, he failed to fully assess negative implications of such 
measures on the portions of society other than the secularists. As a consequence, 
there emerged a growing distance between Demirel and his traditional political 
supporters. 
 
Demirel’s reputation in the eyes of the military as a statesman despite the previous 
antagonistic relations during military interventions and his ability to bring about 
peace and order when things become complex due to his long experience in state 
matters somehow prevented Turkish democracy from drifting toward another 
rupture phase; at least the armed forces did not directly intervene in politics. Some 
people argue that it was the prudence of Demirel that made the then CGS say that 
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they backpedaled on the idea of staging an intervention.418 It is suggested that by 
acting as a buffer between the commanders and the coalition government, Demirel 
played a critical role in the process of democratic consolidation.419 However, for 
some students of Turkish politics, the February 28 process has opened up a new 
phase of the “crystallization of state-friendly features by almost all political 
persuasions and a pervasive sense of political inertia, both of which have 
exacerbated the weakness and instability of Turkey’s civilian politics.”420 Hence it 
can be argued that though Demirel acted in conformity with the Constitution, not 
only the military but the secular bloc behind the scenes managed to pull the 
system towards a more state-centric, security-oriented inclination. In this process, 
the presidency as the locus of the state could not detach itself from that struggle 
and, in fact, could not prevent Turkish politics from moving in that general 
direction. 
 
Demirel’s personal experience regarding civil-military relations might have made 
him behave in such a manner; that as the head of state he should have sustained a 
balance among the rival parties and prevent another political crisis from arising. 
For him, the February 28 MGK meeting could not be considered as a “post-
modern coup” since there had been no direct intervention aimed at the parliament 
or the ruling government.421 Demirel suggested that the MGK is a constitutional 
body comprising not only high-ranking military officers but elected civilians as 
well. He also argued that the military members of the council are not there as 
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representatives of the military but as top experts in security. The notorious 
recommendations in question were, in fact, made with the consent of the civilians. 
Although Demirel claimed that there was nothing unconstitutional in this process, 
this does not mean that it did not degrade the quality of Turkish democracy 
especially when one considers that the 1982 Constitution is a product of the coup. 
It is possible to argue that Demirel was well aware that the invisible hand of the 
Armed Forces was again at work. Demirel’s later criticisms about Article 35 of 
the Internal Service Code of the military can be evaluated as his endeavor to save 
himself from criticisms coming from the liberal and conservative circles; the latter 
thought that Demirel was an “accomplice” in the February 28 crisis. He argued 
that the mentioned legislation was the product of the 1960 military coup’s search 
for legitimacy. Demirel added that none of the militaries in other countries has a 
similar code. For him, the duty of protecting and safeguarding the republic and the 
constitution could only be assigned to the armed forces by a legal political 
authority.422 
 
 
6.4. Summary 
 
This chapter shows that democracy in Demirel’s understanding is inseparable 
from the concept of the state. For the purpose of this essay, it is important to 
underline the statist role of Demirel as president and its implications for a viable 
democracy. Hence his relations with the political parties, the military and his 
views on secularism and Islam are examined in this chapter. Demirel has 
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established an intellectual framework for himself which would set boundaries for 
his behaviour as a president. He called it “constitutional presidency” and tried to 
remain faithful to the requirements of his framework. Impartiality was the first 
requirement. In his relations with the political parties, Demirel tried to keep his 
distance without exceeding the power entitled by the constitution. The second 
requirement was acting as an intermediary, and he acted accordingly. In fact in the 
1990s, the society was on the brink of serious divisions. Secularism had become a 
shelter for some against the Islamic-oriented RP in government. In such a tense 
atmosphere, Demirel as president tried to give calming messages to the people to 
eliminate further conflict. By reminding them that the RP had received the 
greatest number of votes in the general election (December 24, 1995), he 
emphasized the necessity of showing respect and being responsive to the will of 
the people. This in fact illustrates the consistency between his construction of the 
image of presidency as an intermediary body and how he conducted himself 
during his presidency.  
 
Nonetheless, the growing antagonism between the secularists and Islamists could 
not be eliminated. The formation of the secular alliance against the RP-DYP 
coalition government had resulted in the February 28 process in which Demirel 
actively took part. Indeed, how Demirel acted as president during the February 28 
process illustrates the reflections of the statist role of the presidency. When 
Demirel realized that it was not possible to conciliate the parties, he tried to solve 
the issue by using his constitutional powers. Demirel criticized Sunay and 
Korutürk for not activating the MGK effectively where the commanders could 
express their unease about the political landscape to the civilians before the 
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military intervened in politics. Unlike them, Demirel did so and put the growing 
unrest in the military on the agenda of the MGK. The military’s involvement 
could not be avoided, but at least Demirel did not remain passive. By activating 
the constitutional instruments, especially the MGK, he managed the conflict 
without a direct military intervention taking place. That said, this cannot be seen 
solely as the success of Demirel. For the aims of this essay, it is sufficient to state 
that the political context was also lessening if not averting the possibility of 
military intervention  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The president in the Turkish political system is one of the important actors in the 
development and maintenance of a consolidated democracy, though it is a 
relatively neglected topic in the relevant literature. The way the presidents 
interpret the role and function of the presidency provides us with some clues on 
the vacillation of the system between a “parliamentary system with a presidential 
corrective” and a “parliamentary system with presidential dominance” that Siaroff 
defines. He argues that the triple distinction of Duverger is inadequate to fully 
cover the varying forms of political practice that semi-presidential regimes 
exhibit. That is why instead of semi-presidentialism as an in-between category in 
the presidential-parliamentary continuum, Siaroff comes up with three in-between 
categories: “parliamentary systems with figurehead presidents,” “parliamentary 
systems with a presidential corrective,” and “parliamentary systems with a 
presidential dominance.” Siaroff argues that the debate about the regime category 
centered on the head of government and to whom s/he is accountable and this can 
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be fuzzy. Thus while formulating his categories he looked through the “prism” of 
the head of state.  
  
Siaroff formulates eight categories, which are numbered from 1 to 8, first by 
looking at the position of head of state based on the following three questions: (a) 
whether the head of state is also the sole head of government or there is a separate 
head of government; (b) whether the head of state is popularly elected or selected 
by the legislature; (c) whether the head of government is accountable to the 
legislature and thus can be removed by a vote of non-confidence. In the first four 
regime categories, according to Siaroff, there is a unified executive. In Category 1 
and Category 2, the president is popularly elected, whereas in Category 3 and 
Category 4, s/he is selected by the legislature. The head of government is 
accountable to the legislature in Categories 1 and 3. In Categories 5, 6, 7, and 8 
there is dual executive. The president is popularly elected in Categories 5 and 6 
but selected by the legislature in Categories 7 and 8. On the other hand, the head 
of government is accountable to the legislature in Categories 5 and 7 but not in 
Categories 6 and 8.  
 
Secondly, Siaroff analyzes the measuring of presidential power based on nine key 
characteristics that together comprise a scale. These characteristics are (a) popular 
election, which is central to the power and legitimacy of the president, (b) 
concurrent elections of president and parliamentarians for synchronized terms, (c) 
discretionary appointment by the president of some key individuals (prime 
minister, cabinet ministers, high court judges, senior military figures, etc.), (d) 
ability of the president to chair formal cabinet meetings and engage agenda-
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setting, (e) veto power of the president, (f) broad emergency or decree powers of 
the president in cases of national disorder and/or economic matters which are 
valid for an unlimited time, (g) central role of the president in foreign policy 
making, (h) central role of the president in government formation, (i) ability of the 
president to dissolve the legislature at will. Each of these characteristics is given 
the numerical value of one if they exist in the analyzed electoral democracies. 
According to his scale of measuring presidential power if the score is 1 or 2, these 
regime types are called as “parliamentary systems with figurehead president;” if 
the score is 6 or more, Siaroff names these systems as “parliamentary systems 
with presidential dominance;” in case of a score of at least 3 but less than 6, he 
describes them as “parliamentary systems with a presidential corrective.” 
 
Siaroff includes Turkey in his country analysis by examining it in three periods, 
i.e. between 1961 and 1971; between 1973 and 1980; and after 1983. In the first 
two periods, the president chaired cabinet meetings and had veto powers. That 
means in accordance with Siaroff”s measuring scale Turkey scores 2, so it is 
classified as a parliamentary system with a figurehead president. After 1983, the 
new constitution delegated discretionary appointment powers to the president, 
which made Turkey’s score 3. Thus Turkey shifts to the grouping that Siaroff 
names “parliamentary systems with a presidential corrective” without a change in 
its category type. Turkey, until the constitutional changes in 2007 concerning the 
election of the president, seems to fit into the Category 7 of Siaroff’s distinctions, 
i.e. there is a dual executive; the head of state is selected by the legislature; and 
the head of government is accountable to the legislature. With that amendment, 
the president from then on shall be popularly elected for a five-year term, and 
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hence Turkey can be put under Category 5, i.e. there is a dual executive, the head 
of government is accountable to the parliament and the head of state is popularly 
elected. Turkey’s shift that is observed after 1983 is quite distinct for Siaroff.  He 
argues that such a system having a corrective president could only be maintained 
with the popular legitimacy gained through elections based on universal suffrage, 
which is suggested as one of the characteristics of Category 5. The positive 
correlation between the corrective role of president and legitimacy of popular 
elections that Siaroff suggests becomes invalid for Turkey. The Turkish case in 
the post-1983 period by having a strong president creates a deviation from the 
other cases that fit into the same category (Category 7) having similar scores but 
with weaker presidencies. However, his analysis left incomplete to explain how a 
president who is not popularly elected could assume a corrective role. The first 
paragraph of Article 104 of the 1982 Constitution stipulates that the President of 
the Republic as the Head of State represents the Republic of Turkey and the unity 
of the Turkish Nation, and shall ensure the implementation of the Constitution, 
and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of state. This essay has 
shown that Article 104 contributed to the blurring of presidential duties and 
powers by opening the channels to varied interpretations and thus practices. This 
made it favorable for transforming the system into a system with a presidential 
corrective.  
 
Starting from the early Republican days, granting more powers to the president 
has always become a thorny issue. In earlier decades, such proposals were 
rejected after heated debates. Yet the charisma of Atatürk institutionalized the 
influential role of the president over the system. From then on, the significance of 
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the office of president has continued to be one of the characteristics of the regime. 
In the institutionalization period after the foundation of the Republic, the office of 
presidency was mostly designed as a locus of stateness. Until the 1960s, the 
president was considered the guarantor of the Republican regime and the guardian 
of Atatürkist principles, who was responsible for maintaining and preserving 
peace and security. The leading figures of the independence movement who 
founded the new Republic under the leadership of Atatürk (Đsmet Đnönü and Celal 
Bayar) hold the office of the presidency respectively after the death of Atatürk. 
Although they were not given considerable constitutional powers, in practice they 
all emerged as dominant presidents. This is to say that their dominant role is not 
related with their constitutional powers but their position in the system as 
important contributors to the formulation of state understanding and structuring of 
the new Republic.  
 
Under the 1961 Constitution, the need for a politically neutral president was 
highlighted and the era of presidents of military provenance started. Cemal 
Gürsel, Cevdet Sunay and Fahri Korutürk were the presidents during the period 
between 1961 and 1980. As these three presidents have a military background, 
their positions overlapped with that of the state elites. Their expected role of being 
politically neutral did not lead them to stay out of politics but to monitor and take 
part in defining the boundaries of political domain alongside the interests of the 
state in eliminating the conflict of particularistic interests.  
 
After the 1980 military intervention, it was thought that there was a need for a 
stronger presidency. The loss of trust of the coup leaders in politicians led to a 
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redesigning of the office of presidency with the expectation that the president 
would act as state elite to safeguard the state and continuity of the secular order. 
The perception of the leaders of the military regime was that there had been 
attempts to make the institutions of the state a mere apparatus of governments. In 
order to prevent this, under the 1982 Constitution, the president is portrayed as 
above day-to-day politics, and made responsible for the harmonious functioning 
of state organs. However, to what extent he would intervene in the functioning of 
the state mechanism is left to the presidents’ interpretations of this statist role. 
This gives the presidents of the post-1982, Kenan Evren, Turgut Özal, Süleyman 
Demirel, Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Abdullah Gül, a flexibility to position 
themselves differently in the clash between the state elites and political elites. 
 
As noted the president is vested with the authority to protect the regime and the 
principles of the constitution. During the times of political crisis, the state elites 
expect the president to actively take part in eliminating any moves against the 
secular character of the Republic. The political elites, on the other hand, put 
emphasis on the impartial and inclusive nature of the office of president. 
Therefore discussions on who would be the next president have always been an 
important part of the Turkish political history. Following the AKP’s coming to 
power in 2002, the secularists were anxious about the transformation of the 
regime. These fears made the secularists to place great moral responsibility upon 
the president for protecting the state and the Republican regime. The president is 
politically irresponsible but he has to shoulder the burden of that moral 
responsibility attributed to him. The 2007 crisis over the election of the president 
shows the importance attached to the president by the state elites. The way the 
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president is elected to the office is influential in defining the degree of maturity of 
the democratic regime. Hence pre- and post- election debates on issues concerning 
the presidential elections serve, in a way, as a litmus test to assess the progress in 
maintaining a viable democracy but this could be analyzed as part of further 
research.  
 
Following the election of President Gül on August 28, 2007, a constitutional 
change on the election of the president was put to a referendum and was 
approved. As a result, from then on the president will be popularly elected. This 
change was seen by some experts a “shift to semi-presidentialism” in Turkey.423 
Election of a president by a popular vote is argued to further increase the political 
legitimacy of already powerful president holding extensive powers of 
appointments (1982 Constitution). It should be noted here that there have been 
several amendments to the 1982 Constitution since its adoption but none of them 
included limitations on the extensive powers of the president.  
 
There has been an ongoing clash between the state elites and the political elites in 
Turkey and this impedes democracy. They have divergent perceptions on how 
each perceive general interest. These perceptions have created controversy over 
many political issues and even deep polarization. That is why the role of the 
president in this clash between the two elite groups is important to be examined. 
As Sartori argues, striking the balance between different groups’ interests and the 
long term interests of the country is vitally important in order to have a viable 
democracy. The president, at this point, might play a crucial role. To clarify this, a 
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particular role, that is the “statist role” is used in this essay. The “statist” role of 
president used in some other studies is based on Özbudun’s observation424 that 
president’s ability to act alone pertains to his capacity as “head of state” framed 
with the 1982 Constitution.425 This is to say that the reference in these studies to 
the statist role is made to emphasize the president’s role in safeguarding the state 
and prioritizing its matters. Without disregarding this dimension of the “statist” 
role, this study concentrates more on its constructive dimension. It is about 
ensuring harmony and balance for the smooth functioning of the state. A president 
who manages to establish well-balanced relations with the state elites and the 
political elites without engaging with the positions of either of them could fulfill 
this. The constructive dimension is important because the effective performance 
of the president in this role might contribute to reducing the conflict between the 
state elites and the political elites which has important implications for democracy 
to flourish. Based on the findings of the present essay on the “statist” role of the 
president, further research may look at the question of how that role may be 
transformed as a result of the 2007 constitutional change. Other points for further 
study are the possible impact of this change on the nature of the system and the 
office of president and on the relationship between the states elites and the 
political elites.  
 
In Süleyman Demirel’s presidential term is analyzed as the case study within the 
framework of the “statist” role a president may play in the clash between the state 
elites and the political elites. For this purpose, Demirel’s ideas on state and 
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democracy as well as his actions as president are examined. Prior to that, first the 
development of his state understanding and its links with democracy and then how 
he put into practice his mentioned ideas when he was the leader of a political 
party are studied. Demirel did not get along well with the state elites when he was 
a political party leader. However, since Demirel was cautious not to create 
political feuds out of frictions during the periods of crisis, he could set up a 
dialogue with the state elites after he was elected president. Thus he had a relative 
advantage to succeed in reducing the conflict between the state elites and political 
elites. He tried to warn the both sides to act responsibly and have a dialogue and 
thus placate the hardliners of each group. He positioned himself in the same place 
with neither the state elites nor the political elites at all times. When he 
emphasized the sensitivities of the regime, his ideas and position overlapped with 
the state elites. Whereas when he underlined the importance of showing respect to 
the will of people and relying only on the trust of the people to defend the 
republic, he took sides with the political elites. In doing so, Demirel came closer 
to achieve the balance Sartori suggests. 
 
Demirel’s perception of the role of president has prevented him from staying out 
of the social and political transformation that Turkey has begun to experience in 
the 1990s. In fact, with his emphasis that “Çankaya could not become a mere 
spectator when the regime was locked in a stalemate,” he successfully took part in 
politics actively. His support for the constitutional changes, his emphasis on the 
need for reform, his diligence in preventing polarization, his attempts to mediate 
conflicts while handling the contentious issues such as civil-military relations, 
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secularism, and political Islam can be listed as the indicators of Demirel’s active 
style. 
 
Some observers share a firm conviction that Demirel’s presidential term marks a 
turning point in his political career. They argue that Demirel’s political line has 
changed in a noteworthy way. It is claimed that as a president he backpedalled 
from his previous discourse and allied himself with the state elites especially 
during the February 28 process in contrast with what he voiced in the past. This, 
they claim, is evidence that Demirel’s political views have changed. 
 
Another widely seen contention is that change in Demirel’s political line is not a 
recent phenomenon; indeed he has always been a “spineless politician.” This 
group uses the statement of Demirel “yesterday is yesterday, today is today” to 
support the claim that he has formulated a style that is opportunistic and 
pragmatic. Those having this perspective argue that Demirel makes different and 
contradictory statements in similar situations depending on the conditions of the 
day. In examining his political line, one should be aware of the risks involved 
with Demirel’s metaphorical language and the possibility of being trapped with 
his ambiguous usage of words which may lead to misinterpretations.  
 
This essay suggests a different argument than the two opinions stated above, 
especially when the state and democracy are the issues. Demirel’s ability to adapt 
to the changing context is a fact. It is also true that from time to time deviations 
were seen from what he stated previously on some policy issues. Yet it should be 
underlined that when Demirel’s terms as prime minister are compared with his 
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term as president, the state as a concept has had great importance in his political 
discourse from the very beginning. This study concludes that his state 
understanding is relatively remained stable. He always prioritized the effective 
functioning of state so that democracy would flourish. For Demirel, first and 
foremost a strong state should function effectively. Although Demirel’s 
conceptualization of state is by no means unique, the link he develops between 
state and democracy is not usual. To highlight it again, the existence of a strong 
state is considered essential for the existence of democracy in Demirel’s views.  
 
Some would criticize Demirel for his rather “populist policies and stubborn and 
polarizing style of politics” especially during his years in the office of prime 
minister which eventually led to military interventions and posed an obstacle to 
the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. For some, this is also valid for 
Demirel’s presidential terms. This essay has shown that Demirel, as president, 
played an active role in protecting the political fabric of the state. In his view, this 
was directly linked with preserving the democratic nature of the regime. He took 
the initiative when rumors that a military coup would be staged were circulated. 
Demirel got a grip on the situation and tried to find a possible way out within the 
constitutional limits. He struggled to prevent the foundations and principles of the 
Republican regime and its institutions from being objects of debate which may 
have adverse effects for democracy. Some people evaluated this as an indication 
of Demirel’s contribution to the viability of democracy. However, his success in 
dealing with the February 28 crisis by activating the constitutional mechanisms 
did not prevent the military’s continuing though indirect intervention in the 
civilian domain.  
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